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Bob Simulator is a 3D Sandbox / Adventure Game with Sandbox, RPG, and Adventure Elements. Home About Videos Yoggarithms Hyperseeds System Requirements Development Activity Bob Simulator Menu More Bob Sim About Bob Simulator is a 3D Sandbox Adventure Game being developed by TonyTCB / jimmybob . The game is being designed as the ultimate sandbox game, the 'Bob of all Games' . The game is set to contain within it many different features and parts, including: RPG Elements (items, quests, monsters, potions), Transfinite Worlds , Procedural Terrain, Procedural Space Travel, Infinite Dimensions, Time Travel, VR Support, Procedural Materials/Items, Cross-Platform Multiplayer, and Built-In Modding Support. There are also ideas of possible Console support, Infinitesimal Scales, Mac Support.. This page will be updated soon with more content relating to Bob Simulator. "May the Bobs know no Bounds." - TonyTCB / jimmybob Help Promote the Game See Devlogs Bob Simulator Space Demo Download for Windows / Linux Or play in Web (web is buggy) Bob Simulator is a 3D Sandbox Game composited with RPG/Adventure Elements. Sandbox-Level Freedom, Adventure Mechanics, Space Travel, Physics, Infinite Distances, Time Travel, and much, much more. May the Bobs know no Bounds. Do what you want. No arbitrary limits. You can ask questions about the game on the official Discord: https://discord.gg/GQCH4Hnf99 You can help promote the game here: tc-blox.net/bobmob A demo of the Space part of Bob Simulator is now available as a prototype! You can play the Bob Simulator Space Demo here . The Game explained through Others:: Imagine Garry's Mod. Add more stylized graphics, then create add modular gameplay design similar to Minecraft, with procedural worlds and world manipulation. Finally, add RPG mechanics, questing systems, better inventory support, the works. Here you get physics, and worlds, and mining, and adventure. Then add Procedural Space Travel and mod support. You then have the core gameplay of Bob Simulator. Yoggarithms Yoggarithms How Yoggarithms allow for World Generation beyond 10^18,000 What Yoggarithms Do Yoggarithms are a custom numerical system developed by TonyTCB for Bob Simulator. The system allows for procedural chunk generation out to a distance of 10^18,500+ meters. This allows for Bob Simulator worlds and space to generate at scales far beyond Minecraft worlds, and the scale of the Observable Universe, which is only 30 million meters and 90 billion light-years respectively. How Yoggarithms Work The way Yoggarithms work, is as a combination of floating-origin techniques and a re-implementation of numerical storage similar to BigInt arbitrary integers. Functionally, instead of storing a single positional coordinate (X, Y, or Z) as a 32-bit integer, limited from -2^31 to +2^31, or as a 64-bit integer, limited from around -9 quintillion to +9 quintillion; Yoggarithms store numbers as an array of 64-bit integers, such as [280000, 9000000000000000000, 50000, 2]. Transfinite Worlds Yoggarithms, in combination with the Infinite Dimensions system, allow for this to be compatible with Multiplayer and allow for infinite distances. Take the crazy array from before, and tack on a second array. [5000, 10000000, 99999, 2] [1] - This second array can be used to represent infinites, such as Hyperreals or Transfinite Ordinals. Hyperseeds Hyperseeds More than a Centillion (10^350) Unique Worlds How World Seeds Normally Work When you create a new world in most games that have procedural world generation, you enter (or the game generates) a world seed, a string or number of 20-32 or 64 characters. In most games, such as Minecraft, this seed is then hashed into a single 64-bit number, used as the seed for all in-game RNG (random number generators) thus determining world generation. The problem with this, is that it limits the amount of unique worlds, and in-fact the number of unique chunks, to the total number of 64-bit hashes, which is 2^64, around 18 quintillion. What are Hyperseeds Hyperseeds are the world seed system of Bob Simulator, they work fundamentally differently from other games. Since every Bob Simulator world is essentially an infinite Omniverse containing 10^18,000 scales, infinite dimensions and outer space, hyperseeds are there to ensure there is a greater variety of worlds that can be created. Using the Latin alphabet (abcdefg..), numbers (01234..), and basic symbols (!@#%:;'.,>..), this grants 10^118-10^124 worlds. Including Unicode symbols, more than 10^350 unique worlds in-fact. This number is greater than a Googol (10^100), and more than a Centillion (10^303). How Hyperseeds Work The way hyperseeds work is that instead of simply hashing the starting world seed to a 64-bit number, bottlenecking the total number of worlds to the amount of 64-bit numbers (2^64), instead Bob Simulator takes your world seed and uses it to generate 64 different hash numbers. Different chunks, props, and entities, then use this new set of "internal seeds" for random number generation. Since many of the hashes are used by each entity, every permutation of the 64 hashes gives rise to it's own world. The total amount of permutations and thus worlds is thus 18 quintillion ^ 64, which is much larger than the total number of world seeds that can actually be entered. In Unicode v17, there are 297,334 different characters, so there are 297k ^ 64th power different 64-character seeds, this gives a grand total of 1.939 x 10^350 if you include all Unicode symbols.

Check the FAQ and see answers to common questions about our content, games, videos, projects, etc. TC Blox FAQ Below are answers to common questions about TC-BLOX.NET What is the meaning of life? Yes Am I allowed to use your music in my own content? Usage of our music, 3d models, and other Assets are subject to the Fair-Use License . In-general, you are free to use our Assets in your own work as long as you give credit. There are no limitations on what works you make with the Assets. Am I allowed to use your Content in my own content? Usage of our videos, games, projects, and other such Content is subject to the Content License . In-general, you are allowed to post videos online about our Content, but you are not allowed to redistribute significant portions of our Content directly, any distributed modifications must be transformative, and you must give credit. When are we getting more episodes of The Movy Chronicles? I dunno. I'm working on other things like Bob Simulator right now. At some point I plan to come back to it. Where can I find your MiniMods? (and related content) You can find my mods for Minecraft on the Content for Minecraft page. You can also find specific MiniMod mods on the descriptions of the videos associated with them. You can view those videos here . When is Bob Simulator Bob Simulator is still in development. Check Development Activity and my YouTube for updates. What Platforms will Bob Simulator Support? Bob Simulator is set to support cross-platform multiplayer and compatibility with: Windows 10 / 11, Linux, SteamOS, ChromeOS, Android, Meta Quest VR Support, and in the future IOS and possibly console support (PS5 and Xbox), as well as *maybe* MacOS. Why "Yogg" It's a surprise tool that will help us later. It references ye olde Discord group called 'Yegg', and is used in the naming schemes of: Yoggism , and Yoggarithms . Is Bob Simulator REALLY Larger than Minecraft? I'm developing a system called Yoggarithms for my game Bob Simulator. This system allows, at least in singleplayer, to allow procedural world generation out to 10^18,500+ meters, larger than the Observable Universe itself. This system has already been prototyped and seems to work. Terrain generation is still in development but mixing noisemaps together should allow terrain in a world of this scale to be spliced together. Where can I find new TC Blox Talk Shows? Previously, TonyTCB hosted talk shows in the VR game Rec Room. After Rec Room shut down, talk shows were moved to VRChat. I also plan to host talk shows in the VR game Vanilla, and possibly Radium in the future. How can I help Contribute? Joim le Discord! In my Discord server you can send concept art and other ideas, even music assets! Feel free to contribute to my projects there! https://discord.gg/GQCH4Hnf99 What is Yoggism? Yoggism is a philosophical framework created by TonyTCB that acts as an individualist philosophy based on the Fulfillment of Interests. It is the philosophy of the Bobs in Bob Simulator lore, and the philosophy behind the Admin Abuse Resistance . You can check it out at the Yoggism page.

Welcome to TC Blox Studios, we make games, music, videos, and host information on game development and open source software. Welcome to TC Blox Studios Hi! I'm TonyTCB , aka jimmybob , and I'm a game developer. I'm making a game called Bob Simulator , as well as much, much more ! Games , Projects , 3D Models , Music , Videos , and information for use in projects of all kinds. (as well as a bunch of philosophy! ) We also now offer Content for Minecraft ; composed of Worlds , Skins , Mods , and more ! Join the TC Blox Studios Discord Server: https://discord.gg/GQCH4Hnf99 Help promote Bob Simulator and my other projects: tc-blox.net/bobmob Only on TC-BLOX.NET: Portfolio About Assets Games Demo Projects Bob Simulator The Movy Chronicles Content for Minecraft Admin Abuse Resistance Yogg Interest Theory (Yoggism) Videos Music Contributors Development Activity Help Center and Support FAQ Licenses and Usage: Fair-Use 2024 License Open-Source 2024 License Content License Bob Simulator License Extra: Bobbelfont License Attributing Guidelines Site Version: v4.5.5 Play Video Facebook Twitter Pinterest Tumblr Copy Link Link Copied Minecraft is owned by Mojang Studios. We are not affiliated with Mojang Studios or Microsoft Corporation. Gallery I host VR Talk Shows in Rec Room and VRChat!

Yoggism, also called Yogg Interest Theory, is a philosophical framework based on the idea that the Fulfillment of Interests is the ultimate value. Home Step-by-Step Guide Conclusions Theories Implications Concepts Philosophy Menu More Anti-Abuse Principle Justification Ethics Inherent Interest Theory Normative Will More Conclusions Theories Implications Yoggism - Yogg Interest Theory Yogg Interest Theory, aka Yoggism, is an individualist philosophical framework built on the Fulfillment of Interests as the source of Ethics. Acts that stop people from doing what they want, and interfere with one's interests, are illegitimate. Defense of interests is the imperative. This is posited as a more rational and individualist alternative to Kantian Ethics , Utilitarianism , the Non-Aggression Principle , and more broadly, Contractarianism and Voluntaryism . --Content Usage-- The Texts, Theories, Ideas, and Info Post ers present on this page, relating to Yoggism, can be freely redistributed with credit to TonyTCB . Page Version: v5.2.7 Details of the Theory - Info Posters Yogg Interest Theory, is the idea that the Fulfillment of Interests, with priority to Inherent Interests, and the defense against Inherently Frustrating Interests, is the most justifiable and universal normative standard that can be defined. It is the logical consequence of Justification Ethics , the idea that accepting the need to rationally justify normative claims presupposes interests as the source of value, as all other standards create arbitrarity. To reject justification is to forfeit all normative force. Inherent Interests as priority is justified by Inherent Interest Theory . Inherent Interests are defined as interests that act as a conduit of other interests, that are casually connected to the capacity to fulfill other interests; I.E. they are intrinsically foundational to interests. Below is a slideshow containing 'Info Posters' that explain overviews of different parts of the philosophy. Step-by-Step Guide Yoggism has various sections that act as justification and answers to different questions of how the framework works. Basic Definitions:: 1. Interest - A preference / goal, that which a sentient being's behavior tends towards. 2. Inherent Interest - An interest that acts as a conduit for other interests, other fundamental interests depend upon it. 3. Normative Will - The capacity for normative and rational claims to be evaluate-able; aka ethical agency. 4. Abusive Interests - Interests that enforce through misaligned interests, active frustration/violation of inherent interests. Anti-Abuse Principle - The core principle of Yoggism, that unjustifiable frustration against inherent interests is illegitimate. [see overview] www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text1_anti-abuse-principle Justification Ethics - The justification for why Interests as a Value is presupposed by any attempt to rationally justify normative claims. [see overview] www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text2_justification-ethics Inherent Interest Theory - The basis of how interests are weighed against each-other, and how 'Inherent Interests' act as conduits for other interests. [see overview] www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text9_inherent-interest-theory Retaliatory Law - Justification of Self-Defense, of defense of inherent interests over 'abusive' interests. www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text6_retaliatory-law Normative Will - This theory justifies what kind of life the framework applies to. Yoggism grants all sentient beings value through Interests. [see overview] www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text5_normative-will --Implications of Yoggism-- Markets and Interest Alignment [see full text] - How Worker-Owned Cooperatives are more Ethical and Prosperous as they allow greater Interest Alignment and prevent abuse via the AAP Omnilibertarian Communities [coming soon] - How Private Communities have a duty of Fairness to all members, and how Yoggism prescribes True Individualist Freedom in all domains Environmentalism from Interests [coming soon] - How Entanglement of Interests generate environmental rights and justify anti-pollution sentiment via individualism better than the NAP Interest Property Theory [see full text] - How a value of Interests implies non-abusive Property Rights Yogg Virtue Theory [see overview] - The art of a Good Character is in Respect of Interests Definition of Inherent Interest (from Inherent Interest Theory ): An interest is more inherent than another if the given interest is entangled with other interests, or acts as a conduit for other interests regardless of external factors; in a way the second interest does not, or to a higher extent. For example, an interest in not having food taken away, can depending on circumstance be a very inherent interest, as it acts as a conduit for an interest in not dying; which itself is a conduit for all other interests. Anti-Abuse Principle (AAP) Actions that constitute interference with another's non-abusive fulfillment of their own inherent and non-contradictory interests, are illegitimate. Actions that inherently result in the frustration of interests, through overall frustration by misalignment of interests between parties, or due to conduct that frustrates against inherent interests, are unjustifiable, constitute ‘abuse’, and are thus illegitimate. Actions that prevent abuse, or inhibit otherwise unjustifiable conduct; including conduct that is a product of interest misalignment between parties, and conduct that is inherently frustrating to interests; are legitimate as they constitute resistance to abuse. --- (Inherent Interests vs. Non-Inherent Interests) Inherent Interests are defined as interests that intrinsically act as a conduit for other interests, interests foundational or causally connected to other interests. --- (Simplified Principle) This principle can be stated in essence in a simple sentence: "Do what you want, unless it stops others from doing what they want, unless it constitutes proportionate defense against the latter." This principle is justified by Justification Ethics . The use of "inherent interest" is derived from Inherent Interest Theory . [see full text] [see justification ethics] [see inherent interest theory] Justification Ethics Justification Ethics is a way of proving Yoggism via the claim that the normative value of Interests is implied by rational justification, because any argument that is a rational justification of normative force requires an appeal to the interests of whomever you are interacting with. The only exception is arguments that prove things purely rationally, as rationalism is presupposed by engagement with any argument. Any other kind of argument must appeal to Interests. The way this logic works, is that all interactions rationally ought to be justifiable deductively, meaning normative claims should be derivable. This is presupposed by rational discourse, but if it is true then interests are the only thing that can derive normative claims. Thus, rational justification requires an appeal to the normative value of Interests, otherwise you forfeit all ability to justify normative force. Justification Ethics (Simplified) All rational justification of normative claims must appeal to Interests as the source of normative value, because: 1. To prove an action or interaction is rationally justifiable through deductive argument, premises based on arbitrary assumptions need not apply. 2. Premises based on simple truths will not derive normative claims. Definitions: Justification: Proving an action justifiable means to form a deductive argument that derives a claim in the form "you ought to accept X". Such a deductive argument only proves justification if the conclusion is derived from premises that apply to the person you're justifying the action to; for if they don't then the conclusion cannot follow. Normative Claim: As used here, a claim that is not a simple normative truth like "you ought to accept 1+1=2" but rather something like "you ought not murder". Persuasive Argument: A deductive argument (or argument equivalent to a deduction) that derives a claim in the form "you ought to accept X". [see full text] [see deduction] [see yoggism as a procedural norm] Deriving Interest Fulfillment Persuasive Arguments and thus Rational Justification must appeal to Interests Premises of a persuasive argument must be justifiable to the person the ought claim is made to, otherwise the claim could not follow. Rational Justification functions as a persuasive argument, an argument that proves a claim in the form "you ought to accept X" to some opponent. Any argument like this, any 'persuasive argument' at all, must appeal to the interests of the opponent for the opponent to accept the premises; the only exception being arguments that prove claims solely based on rationalism itself. For if the opponent does not accept the premises, the argument will not follow. For example, trying to argue that "you ought to buy a washing machine" must appeal to the interests of the opponent. Rational Justification must appeal to the Normative Value of Interests Normative claims cannot be derived purely through non-normative premises. If a claim is truely normative, that normativity has to come from premises that are justifiable. Persuasive Arguments, and thus Rational Justification, is only meaningful if it proves a normative claim "you ought to accept X". The normativity of the claim must be derived from the premises of the argument, and those premises must appeal to the interests of the opponent. Therefore, as a premise of any act of rational justification, the normative value of the opponent's interests must be appealed to. Interactions should be Rationally Justifiable If you act in a way where your behavior is rationally unjustifiable, you are being irrational. Any semblance of reason would thus discredit such behavior. If you interact with someone, you should be able to rationally justify your interaction, in a way where those involved in the interaction should be rationally required to accept your justification. This means you should be able to justify that the claim “You rationally ought to accept my way of interacting is reasonable” is true for the person you are interacting with; you should be able to argue you are acting reasonably. To contradict the value of Interests is to contradict Rational Justification Interactions that contradict the normative value of interests, fail to be rationally justifiable to those engaged in the interaction. This is a 'persuasive argument', meaning an argument that attempts to derive a claim in the form "You ought to accept X". Any argument in this form, must appeal to the interests of any debate opponent for the conclusion to have valid normative weight. To engage in an interaction that is inconsistent with the normative value of interest, is to engage in an interaction that cannot be rationally justified to anyone. Imagine someone is outside of your house and is dancing weirdly on the sidewalk. Not too close to your house to disturb your yard, not making much noise, either. They just.. look weird, and you can see them being weird out of your window. Imagine you have an interest in them not doing that. Said another way, you don't like that they are doing that. What is more reasonable relative to the Fulfillment of Interests? A. To forcibly stop the person from doing what they want. B. To close your window so them dancing stops getting on your nerves. Inherent Interest Theory --A Definition of Inherent Interest-- Inherentness is a spectrum used to compare interests. An interest is more inherent than another if the given interest is entangled with other interests, or acts as a conduit for other interests regardless of external factors; in a way the second interest does not, or to a higher extent. For example, an interest in not having food taken away, can in most circumstances be a very inherent interest, as it acts as a conduit for an interest in not dying; which itself is a conduit for all other interests. -- More Details-- You can also think of inherent interests as interests a sentient being can hold where the goal or outcome their behavior is tending towards, is an end in itself, meaning that to a reasonable extent, they will maintain said activity regardless of external factors; the interest is itself of intrinsic value . That 'extent change' is the spectrum of inherentness, some interests are more intrinsically foundational to other interests than others [see full text] Normative Will A water bottle cannot behave irrationally, the distinction of rational behavior and irrational behavior does not apply to it. A water bottle's behavior can only be measured relative to the laws of physics themselves. Sentient beings can act rationally and irrationally though, relative to their interests and relative to the value of truth. This grants a way of describing "free will" that is coherent and non-mystical. The Normative Will of sentient beings is the difference in volition and capacity to resist instinct, the capacity to act rationally or irrationally relative to rational standards and relative to one's own interests, and the capacity to contradict naturally selected preferences. Definition: Normative Will is therefore the capacity for normative evaluation of behaviors relative to standards beyond the mere laws of physics; including rationality, ethics, and personal preferences. [see full text] Implications How it connects to Justification Ethics Justification Ethics is the idea that rational justification presupposes an appeal to the Normative Value of Interests themselves. If you interact with a water bottle, you need not justify your actions to the water bottle, because rationally justifying a claim of "This water bottle ought to accept X idea" makes no sense. The water bottle is not a rational actor at any level. For sentient beings this isn't true. Consider the interaction of "I will steal this child's candy". How can you rationally justify such an interaction? The child would object, and the child's cognition should be complex enough to be able to judge the action on rational grounds, thus the objection is of rational weight. Thus, rational justification requires you to be able to prove "The child ought rationally to accept my interaction as non-contradictory". This is impossible, because you cannot: 1. Prove it's positively rational to steal candy based on rationalism alone, with no explicit or implicit appeal to normative value. 2. Prove it's legitimate to steal candy relative to the normative value of Interests, as the action is inherently frustrating and without reason. Therefore, stealing candy from a child is rationally unjustifiable. Therefore, Normative Will is the way to measure how strictly Justification Ethics applies. Animal Rights through Justification Justification Ethics, which implies the Normative Value of Interests, can apply to any sentient being where their cognition is complex enough to judge a given action on rational grounds, relative to the standards or complexity of the action and it's affects. In the "stealing candy from a child" example, the child's cognition is complex enough to be able to object to the behavior in a way that makes sense. Similar logic applies to animals, you can simply replace "child" with "monkey/dog/bird/earthworm" and it's fine. Since preference is present in all sentient beings, those beings can object to behavior based on their preferences. Those beings do have the ability to act rationally and irrationally relative to their interests, and relative to how they should act relative to the truth, making it possible to define "rational oughts" that apply to them. If you try to kill a dog for no reason other than you want to, it is impossible to make an argument such that "The dog ought rationally to accept your interaction as non-contradictory". This is impossible, because you cannot: 1. Prove it's positively rational to steal candy based on rationalism alone, with no explicit or implicit appeal to normative value. 2. Prove it's legitimate to steal candy relative to the normative value of Interests, as the action is inherently frustrating and without reason. Since the dog has the ability to judge your behavior based on their own preferences, and any attempt to justify your behavior has to appeal to their preferences, your actions are unjustifiable. Absolute Interest Conclusion Proven It has thus been shown that Normative Will is the appropriate measure on how strictly Justification Ethics applies. Killing a dog is unjustifiable because the dog has the ability to rationally object to it, same with killing a monkey, or a child, or a cow, or a human. The logical consequence of this is that any entity that is sentient with Interests, has Justification Ethics apply to it to the rational extent. Any unnecessary inherent frustration of their interests is thus illegitimate as it cannot be justified without appealing either to Interest-free Rationalism, which doesn't work, or appealing to the Normative Value of Interests by trying to appeal to their own standards, which is contradictory. Therefore, the Fulfillment of Interests of all sentient beings, in all reference frames; with priority to Inherent, Rational Interests, is sustained. [see Absolute Interest Conclusion overview] Yogg Virtue Theory Yogg Virtue Theory is the idea that the definition of a Good Character or Good Virtue is founded on the Respect for Interests, and behaviors that curate this respect, are good. This grants the Yogg Virtue Principle : You ought to act in a way consistent with the virtues that curate respect for interests, including Mutual Respect, Justice, Truth, and Recognition of others as Self-Sovereign. You ought to not act against Consent, or enforce Interest Misalignment for your own gain through Unfairness, Irrationality, Explotativeness, or Abuse. You ought to form a character that adheres to the responsibility of upholding these character traits, against Negligence towards others, and Abuse of others. Common virtues such as Justice, Self-Sovereignty, and Generosity, are simply emergent properties of the Respect for Interests. The idea of Virtue is a great way of explaining how inaction can be morally wrong. Specifically if someone does not act to save someone and lets someone come to harm, the justification of calling that a moral wrong, is difficult under Justification Ethics, Justification Ethics is contingent on the normative obligation to rationally justify methods of interaction. If there is no interaction occurring, it's not obvious how there could be an obligation to rationally justify inaction, or even how such justification could happen, and to whom. Praxeological Asymmetry could also be used to argue for inaction not needing justification, based on the epistemic logic of there being a default state of falsity for any positive claim, thus disbelief in something can be excused simply by the lack of evidence, though a true lack of evidence in all directions implies neutrality, violating this asymmetry. Virtue Ethics, specifically built around the Respect for Interests, solves these problems. Virtue Ethics is a philosophical approach emphasizing character and virtue, rather than adherence towards a principle or goal. Positive traits, Virtues, and negative traits, Vices, are the attributes that help curate morally positive and morally negative behavior, respectively. The Anti-Abuse Principle can then be used as an easy way to justify how: 1. Behaviors functioning off of misaligned interests can result in frustration for one side of a deal, which is dangerous, and 2. Respect of Interests in a way similar to Immanuel Kant's "Treat People as an End, never as a Mere Means" is a good way of describing how to prevent such abuse from occurring. These are the justification for Yogg Virtue Theory and it's utility. [see full text] Absolute Interest Conclusion It is utmost rational to uphold the fulfillment of existent interests of all sentient beings, across all possible reference frames; with priority to existent, rational, inherent interests , as a value. This conclusion is justified by rational justification itself via Justification Ethics , Normative Will , as well as the idea that the Utmost Rational Outcome for any specific set of sentient beings to approach is the outcome that best upholds the fulfillment of their Interests, where 'Interests' are rational preferences, wants, desires, or goals. It is also justified by an idea called Value Reductionism , wherein any value you have ultimately can be reduced to Interests and thus an implicit value of Interests. Further detail on Inherent Interests and non-inherent interests, is present in Inherent Interest Theory . Therefore, actions that are against the normative value of Interests are self-contradictory. Read Full Text All Texts Guide Oughts from Logic [see full text] Absolute Interest Conclusion [see overview] [see full text] Anti-Abuse Principle [see overview] [see full text] Justification Ethics [see overview] [see full text] [see deduction] Yoggism as a Procedural Norm [see full text] Retaliatory Law [see full text] Normative Will [see overview] [see full text] Yogg Virtue Theory [see overview] [see full text] Interest Property Theory [see full text] Markets and Interest Alignment [see full text] Rationally, you ought to utmost-Rationally Fulfill your own Interests, as all beings are acting in accordance with their interests and thus rationally must act utmost-rationally towards their ends. Thus, rational existent interests must have prioritization to the self. The utmost-rational outcome that all sentient beings should align with is that which upholds the Fulfillment of Interests of all sentient beings, in all reference frames; with priority to Inherent, Rational Interests. The distinction of Inherent Interests and non-inherent Interests is derived by Inherent Interest Theory . Thus, from the AIC, actions that constitute interference with another's non-abusive fulfillment of their own rational interests, are illegitimate. Actions that result in the frustration of interests, due to misalignment of interests between parties, are irrational, constitute "abuse", and are illegitimate. Abuse must be defended against. The Fulfillment of Interests as a value is implied by Rational Justification. Rational Justification of anything beyond pure rationalism requires appealing to the normative value of Interests, so any interaction that violates the value of Interests is rationally unjustifiable. As interactions ought to be rationally justifiable, that justification must be based in Interests, if an interaction cannot be justified on rationalism alone. Normative Rationalism is presupposed by deductive arguments and engagement in argumentation, as they rely upon it to have normative weight. Non-abuse is required as a procedural norm of argumentation and is required by rational interactions, not just due to rational justification, but because enforcement of interest misalignment itself invalidates rational argumentation and the ability to seek truth. Justification Ethics grants the value of Interests based on rational interactions. This grants interests as a value, as well as self-defense of rational interests, but not clearance to do evil for "the greater good". Instead, defense of the pillars that uphold Interests themselves can justify ideas reflecting Threshold Deontology and how a breakdown of rational deliberation should be avoided at all costs. Giving to the poor, self-defense, and frustrating to prevent existential disaster, are all different. Good, Right, and merely Justifiable. Only sentient beings have interests relevant to Justification Ethics and Yoggism, as these beings can be described in terms of the rationality of their behavior relative to different standards. A water bottle cannot behave irrationally, yet sentient beings can. Normative Will is thus the capacity for normative evaluation of behaviors relative to standards beyond the mere laws of physics, including rationality, ethics, and personal preferences. Every sentient being possesses some degree of this Normative Will. This also functions as a measure of how strongly Justification Ethics may apply to a given sentient being. The value of well-rounded Consent can be derived via Justification Ethics. This virtue-wise can be framed as a Respect for Interests broadly. Through this value, is inaction always justified? A framing of Virtue Ethics in terms of the Respect for Interests solves this problem, regardless of Justification Ethics granting explicit obligations, there is a basis for good character. This grants the Yogg virtue Principle: You ought to act in a way consistent with the virtues that curate respect for interests. Self-Ownership can be justified under Yoggism based on Consent, where abusive conduct is framed as a violation of consent, in a way that contradicts the Absolutist View of Ownership; due to it contradicting interests. You thus own your Interests, and Preferences, via the normative value of Interests, and also your Body and Mind as they are the primary conduit of your interests. Inherent Frustration is condemnable in local spaces; to be censored for honest criticism or fired for unfair reasons is inherent frustration even if done in the larger purview of property rights rather than direct use of force, as abusive use of property based on Interest Property Theory is not ethically justifiable. Due to the tendency for monopolization and more broadly centralization of firms in an unregulated market economy, caused by varying barriers to entry, inconsistency of perfect competition, and the self-reinforcing nature of market share growth, unregulated market economies naturally lead to abusive outcomes. All Yoggism Pages https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggism https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text0_oughts-from-logic https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text1_anti-abuse-principle https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text2_justification-ethics https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text_deduction-of-interests https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text6_retaliatory-law https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text5_normative-will https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text4_absolute-interest-conclusion https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text3_yogg-virtue-theory https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text7_interest-property-theory https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text8_markets-and-interest-alignment https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text2_yoggism-as-a-procedural-norm https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text9_inherent-interest-theory https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text_refutation-of-argumentation-ethics https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text_refutationofthenap

Yoggism as a Procedural Norm Back to Home Details Step-by-Step Guide Philosophy Menu More Yoggism as a Procedural Norm [Full Text] This is an addition to the text of Justification Ethics . It explains procedural norms as well as why normative rationalism is a valid assumption. It also provides a more direct alternative to NAP Argumentation Ethics . —How Non-Abuse is a norm of Argumentation— Rational argumentation can only happen if the members of a debate feel free to speak their mind and argue for themselves freely. What ‘freely’ means though, is interest-based, not just aggression-based. And the reasons for why freedom of this respect is important, and the reasons for why freedom of thought, expression, and argumentation are important, inherently apply to more situations than just argumentation. (1): Coercion and Argument If a person is dying in the desert from dehydration and they find another person who has water bottles, but this other person then says “I won't give you water, unless you grant me intimate favors”, this clear coercion renders rational argumentation between the two impossible. It also violates Consent as previously explained, which rational argumentation and deliberation rely upon. Rational argumentation cannot function if your debater is also your landlord and says they will just evict you if you disagree with them. (2): Why the Use of Force is Coercive The problems here are actually the same reasons for why the threat of violent force invalidates rational argumentation: It forces one party to capitulate to the interests of the coercer, due to the alternative being forced to be much worse, and this is true regardless of how irrational or nonsensical the interests of the coercer are. In the same way, when the alternative is eviction, or worse even starvation or dehydration, it does the same thing albeit to a sometimes lesser extent. Functionally, it forces capitulation to the coercive party in a way that sidesteps reason. What's clear from this is the process of argumentation actually requires both non-aggression and non-abuse, not just non-aggression, since abuse can come about non-aggressively. (3): Rational Dealings and Discouraging of Deliberation Two rational people from different places should be able to interact rationally, without fear. If one person goes insane and kills the other, that is clearly conflicting with rational dealings. If one person tries to trick the other for some scam, that is clearly conflicting with rational dealings. If one person takes advantage of another for their own gain, where the other is functionally forced to do their bidding, that also conflicts with rational dealings. Coercion means pressuring someone to act against their interests by undermining their ability to make a free choice through the threat of consequences. This is obviously contradictory with Interests as a value, and it is also conflicting with the norms required for rational argumentation and cooperation, as coercion does not track truth and in-fact undermines it by functioning more similarly to might-makes-right behavior. Imagine trying to make a semi-decent argument that God does exist, or the reverse, in a society where the vast majority of people believe the exact opposite of whatever conclusion you are arguing for, and will ostracize as well as discriminate against you of their own volition, if your argument is too explicit or offensive. There is no use of force, or threat of force, yet very clearly this non-violent coercion is contradictory and actively discourages rational and truth-seeking deliberation. It is also inherently frustrating. That is not a coincidence. (4): Conclusion of Anti-Abuse Argumentation Procedural Norms This points in the direction of the AAP, and interestingly, this thought process also holds up to rational scrutiny, unlike NAP Argumentation Ethics. What's different is that with AAP Procedural Norms, this standard actually makes sense to apply to many circumstances universally, because it is baked into what is required as a premise, to justify interactions rationally. To justify an interaction, or method of interaction, you must appeal to the normative value of your opponent's interests; otherwise you forfeit any justification of normative force. With NAP Argumentation Ethics it can be argued that aggression may not be valid in the process of argumentation, but may be valid in other circumstances, and you can argue that without a performative contradiction. With AAP Procedural Norms though, arguing that abuse is not valid in the process of argumentation is actually correct, but arguing abuse is valid for other circumstances may not make sense if the structure of civil interaction, in argumentation, is at all similar to the structure of the interaction of the other circumstance. It is also impossible to rationally justify such abuse on the basis of interests not having normative value, as such justification requires assuming and appealing to your opponent's interests for them to agree with the premises of any argument you give. —Abuse, and Interest-Frustration, is Anti-Rational— Similar reasons for the norms of argumentation can be applied to other circumstances. For example, the reason argumentation should be non-aggressive and more broadly non-abusive, is because those things prevent people from feeling free to express their actual thoughts and thus may prevent rational speech, which hinders seeking of truth. You can't argue rationally with your landlord if he reserves the right to just evict you for arguing too well, even though he's doing so non-aggressively. This gives a second requirement to argumentation, or a more refined requirement; that of non-abuse where abuse is some organized inherent frustration of another's interests, usually at the feet of two or more people or parties where one has opposing interests to the other, yet also has virtually all the power. Any other scenario where the goal of the interaction is to reach some sort of mutually beneficial agreement, for the benefit of both parties, can be directly compared to argumentation in this respect as that mutual benefit cannot be realized if people's interests are not respected or given fair weight. This is why it can be said that engagement of argumentation and acceptance of its specific norms can be used to rationally derive the reasons for why the AAP really is applicable in most situations directly, and for how the AAP being applied to all situations upholds civility as a principle more consistently than the NAP and other moral principles. It is for this reason that Argumentation Ethics on its own is valid for deriving the AAP in situations where civility, defined as mutual benefit, is important, and invalid for deriving the NAP. –Normative Rationalism is assumed by any Argument– Any persuading argument must appeal to Normative Rationalism, the idea that those ought to do what is utmost-rational. Any rational argument that aims to persuade people of an “ought” presupposes that rationality has normative authority. Therefore, any argument against normative rationalism cannot be persuasive without contradicting itself. Any deductive argument or argument that can be reduced ultimately to a deductive argument, as well as any engagement in argumentation for the purpose of seeking the truth, and/or creating justifiable or valid deductive arguments, must also presuppose the validity of rationalism and presuppose normative rationalism for such argumentation to be able to have any weight. This is the justification for Normative Rationalism as an a-priori assumption. Below is a more explicit deductive proof for the Persuasive Argument case: ---Normative Rationalism is an assumption necessary for all Persuading Arguments to Stand--- –Definitions: (Persuading Argument): An argument that validly deduces people ought to do something, or that people ought to believe something, including the central claim of the argument. (Normative Rationalism): Defined as used elsewhere, in its weak form, the idea that normative claims, oughts and ought-nots, can be derived via rational deduction. –Premises: (P1): A persuading argument is only meaningful if its deduction rationally holds given the premises, I.E. follows proper rules of inference. (P2): A persuading argument gives a conclusion that is normative, such as the claim that "therefore, people ought to believe in Santa Claus" or the claim that "therefore, people ought to eat more milk and cookies". (P3): Rational arguments that use rational deduction to deduce a conclusion, necessarily presuppose the validity of rational deduction itself. (P4): If a rational argument deduces a normative claim, the argument must assume the normativity, or if possible derive it within the argument from the premises. (P5): An appeal to rationality's normativity in a particular case, while restricting it to other cases, requires a rational justification. Using rational justification presupposes general normative rationalism though, therefore any appeal to general normative rationalism is inconsistent unless applied universally. –Logic: (L1): From (P1), Any meaningful persuasive argument is thus a rational argument. (L2): From (P2), Any rational persuasive argument gives a normative claim. (L3): From (L1 + L2), Normative claims given by meaningful, persuading arguments, must be derived from a basis of rational deduction. (L4): From (L3 + P3), Meaningful, persuading arguments, must appeal to the idea that normative claims can be derived through rational deduction. (L5): From (L4 + P5), Meaningful, persuading arguments, if they appeal to general normative rationalism in a specific case, rationally must appeal to it as a universal principle. (L6): From (L4 + P4), Meaningful, persuading arguments, as they derive normative claims, they must appeal to general normative rationalism, as if normative rationalism was false, then rational deduction would be disconnected from normativity, making the deduction of the argument invalid as the rationality of a deduction would be irrelevant to whether the conclusion was normatively true, making the conclusion given by the argument an irrational claim. (L7): From (L6 + L5), Meaningful, persuading arguments, must appeal to general normative rationalism as a universal principle. –Conclusion: From (L6): All meaningful, persuading arguments that derive a claim over what people ought to do, or ought to believe, necessarily appeals to general normative rationalism. So, to argue against general normative rationalism, must either be irrational, or must not attempt to make people disbelieve in normative rationalism. Any argument against normative rationalism, is thus entirely rational to reject, and holds no normative weight, even if someone thinks they should believe in that which is rational, since that belief contradicts the argument itself. Therefore, all meaningful persuasive arguments must appeal to general normative rationalism, and any argument against normative rationalism, holds no weight even if you assume rational claims should be believed. If you do, the argument just contradicts itself.

Oughts from Logic Back to Home Details Step-by-Step Guide Philosophy Menu More Oughts from Logic [Full Text] —Oughts From Logic— –Definitions: (Ought): An outcome that ought to occur or be valid relative to some principle, is an outcome that is logically consistent with and follows some principle. If you light a stick of dynamite it ought to explode relative to the laws of physics and the construction of the stick of dynamite. That isn't a subjective normative claim, it's an objective implication based on Logic. (Rationality): Used here, the empirically measurable accuracy towards an action being able to achieve a goal, where accuracy towards a goal applies to not only narrow goals, but overall goals and behavior, and to the consistency of acting with reference to rational standards of measure. (Interest): For a sentient being to have an interest in something, this simply means their behavior is tending towards fulfilling said something, even if it is ineffective. All people have interests, and even trying to avoid their interests, is itself an interest they are acting according to. Any sentient being with stimuli-driven behavior has interests. –Premises: (P1): All people have interests. (P2): All people act in accordance with the interests they have, and prioritize interests they hold with Intrinsic Value. (P3): Some actions are better than others at fulfilling interests. (P4): Rationally, if you light a stick of dynamite, relative to the laws of physics, and all object’s tendency to follow the laws of physics, it ought to explode. (based on the definition of Ought) (P5 from P4): Rationally, if you are acting in accordance with an interest, you ought to choose any of the most rational actions you can, to best fulfill the interest. –Logic: (L1): From (P1), a person X has an interest I. (L2): From (P1 + P2), person X acts in accordance with interest I. (L3): From (P3), there might exist an action A that most rationally fulfills I. (L4): From (P2 + P5), person X rationally ought to take action A, if it exists, to fulfill interest I. –Conclusion: From (L4): Any person X, rationally ought to take any actions A that best fulfills their interests I. Thus, people rationally ought to fulfill their own interests in the most rational way possible, and as all people have interests, and people’s interests may differ, the most rational situation for the people to create for themselves is a situation that is most consistent with the fulfillment of Inherent Interests overall, the upholding of at least the most intrinsic Oughts as priority. (Note: Avoiding an interest may maximize Oughts if the interest is self-destructive to other interests. Also, an action that fulfills your interest but can cause a collapse of Inherent Fulfillment of Interests down the line may not be the most rational action to take, either based on your own self-interest being threatened or based on an inconsistency of some kind, see Absolute Interest Conclusion for more clarification.) Goods by definition are what people ought to do, which based on this deduction is what their behavior tends towards that they view as an End in Itself, hence based on Inherent Interests. This gives us the Yogg Definition of Good. Therefore, people ought to do what is Good under the Yogg Definition of Good. We have derived this through pure rationality.

Justification Ethics Back to Home Details Step-by-Step Guide Philosophy Menu More Justification Ethics [Full Text] Note that the following arguments use Normative Rationalism as an assumption. This assumption comes from the 2nd section of this text: [yoggism as a procedural norm] This also provides a more rational alternative to NAP Argumentation Ethics . You can skip to the Deduction of Interests as a normative value, here: [Deduction of Interests as a Value] –Justification Arguments presuppose the Normative Value of Interests– A Persuasive Argument as used here, means a deductive argument deriving a conclusion in the form "You ought to accept/believe X". Such an argument must derive its conclusion from premises. Since the conclusion is a normative one, it contains "You ought", that normative conclusion must be derived from normative premises. Here, the different types of premises that can be used to form such a conclusion can be identified. These are: 1. Truth Claims (true facts about the world, is-statements) 2. Reason (logical truths, A=A, if A implies B and A is true then B is true, I think therefore I am) 3. Interests (wants, desires, preferences, goals; of some sentient being) 4. Axioms (assumptions, statements assumed to be true without justification) Any argument entailing normative force must rationally justify that normative force via one or more of these types of premises. Immediately the problem is that truth and reason cannot justify normative (ethical) force, the type of normativity that governs apparently logically neutral behaviors like "you ought not murder", because of the is/ought gap. Is-statements, and logical tautologies, cannot directly derive normativity of this sort. The one type of normativity that can be derived is normative rationalism, the idea that rationale and reason have action-guiding value. This is assumed as a starting point when engaging in argumentation or accepting deductive arguments based on their logical weight. Axioms also cannot derive ethical normativity, not in a way that is guaranteed to apply to the recipient, because the axioms themselves definitionally cannot be justified. Normative claims that are supposed to apply to specific people, derived from axioms like "Murder is wrong", are thus impossible to rationally justify. –Interests CAN Justify Normative Claims– Interests however, and the value of them, is the one type of premise that when appealed to actually can derive normative claims. Imagine a deductive argument that sets out to prove "You ought to buy my washing machine". This is a normative claim, so you can't derive the ought from pure logic. You also cannot derive the ought from truth claims, and appealing to "Washing machines are good" as an axiom isn't helpful. Yet if you appeal to "You want clean clothes" then suddenly it is possible to derive "You ought to buy my washing machine". Of course for the conclusion to be normative, that premise must also be normative, therefore "You ought to achieve your end of getting clean clothes" must be true at least relative to the person the conclusion is meant to apply to. –Interests from Normative Force Conclusion– Thus, only interests can derive normative force in a way that can be applied. Therefore, any presupposition of the existence of normative force, implicitly justifies the value of the Fulfillment of Interests in-order to rationally ground that normative force via justification. All arguments that are a 'Persuasive Argument' that tries to prove you ought to accept its conclusion, thus must presuppose the Fulfillment of Interests as a value as it pertains to the relevant interests of the person the argument's conclusion is meant to apply to. The only exception being arguments that prove normative claims based around pure truth, like "You ought to accept A = A". –Interactions ought to be Ju stifiable– If you interact with someone, you should be able to rationally justify your interaction, in a way where those involved in the interaction should be rationally required to accept it. This means you should be able to justify that the claim “You rationally ought to accept my way of interacting” is true for the person you are interacting with; you should be able to argue you are acting reasonably. This is a 'Persuasive Argument', meaning an argument that attempts to derive a claim in the form "You ought to accept X". Any argument in this form, must appeal to the interests of any debate opponent for the conclusion to have valid normative weight. To engage in an interaction that is inconsistent with the normative value of interest, is to engage in an interaction that cannot be rationally justified to anyone. To reject justification in this sense, is to forfeit all justification of normative force, which leaves you unable to justify your own actions. If normative claims and normative arguments, arguments about things like "you ought not to murder", are recognized as meaningful whatsoever, forfeiting normative force prevents you from engaging in that conversation. –Layered Justification– Imagine someone fulfilling their interests while not interacting with anyone else in a way that interferes with their interest fulfillment. This is someone acting in a way that does not frustrate against anyone else's inherent interests, where 'inherent interest' means an interest that acts as a conduit of other interests, like basic autonomy. Such fulfillment is neutral under Justification Ethics. No deduction can be made for or against the action. Yet, acts against the neutral action are explicitly unjustifiable, as they represent inherent frustration. It should also be noted that Justification Ethics cannot on its own derive a claim of positive obligation, aka an obligation to act. It only deals with the justifiability of actual actions, not inaction. This is because "interactions ought be justifiable" is presupposed by the recognition of normative value, and presupposed by argumentation. Yet, "inaction ought be justifiable" is not presupposed by either. This allows the separation of Justification Ethics into three layers. 1. Actions that are inherently frustrating or abusive under the Anti-Abuse Principle, cannot justify normative force. Actions that promote fulfillment of interests can justify normative protection. Actions that constitute fulfillment of interests while not interacting with anyone else, are neutral. To act against such behavior is still unjustifiable. 2. Inherent Interest Theory as derived, states that interests acting as conduits of other interests, are Inherent Interests and ought to be given priority in justification. 3. The concept of Retaliatory Law justifies frustration in one extra case, if it constitutes defense against inherent frustration. This is justified as proportional defense is frustration of interests in defense of interests more inherent. These then explicitly solve conflicts between interests, generating the AAP. –Justifying the Anti-Abuse Principle– These building blocks then justify the Anti-Abuse Principle as a consequence. Actions that inherently frustrate against other's interests are unjustifiable, unless they constitute defense against inherent frustration. Actions that constitute fulfillment of other's interests justify normative protection. Actions that only fulfill interests of an individual, while not interacting with anyone else, are neutral, and unjustifiable to act against. Conflict between interests is measured via Inherent Interest Theory, where interests that are entangled with other interests, like an interest in basic autonomy, are given more normative justificatory weight. —The Anti-Abuse Principle (AAP)— Actions that constitute interference with another's non-abusive fulfillment of their own inherent and non-contradictory interests, are illegitimate. Actions that inherently result in the frustration of interests, through overall frustration by misalignment of interests between parties, or due to conduct that frustrates against inherent interests, are unjustifiable, constitute ‘abuse’, and are thus illegitimate. Actions that prevent abuse, or inhibit otherwise unjustifiable conduct; including conduct that is a product of interest misalignment between parties, and conduct that is inherently frustrating to interests; are legitimate as they constitute resistance to abuse. –Max Stirner's Egoism– This then sews the seeds for a sort of Universal Egoism, the idea that my ends matter, and yours, and everyone's. This sets up Yogg Interest Theory to be the most consistent framework for ensuring the protection of the individual's self-interest, within an organized group or apart from one. This idea is a "spook to end all spooks". In Max Stirner's Egoism, a 'spook' is referred to as some action or concept meant to push you away from your own self-interest. To define a rule against creating spooks upon others, is the kind of rule a "Union of Egoists", the hypothetical social organizing envisioned by Max Stirner, advocates for. This rule is essentially exactly what the Anti-Abuse Principle is. This makes Yoggism particularly justifiable by Egoist standards, compared with other normative frameworks. Yoggism itself is a spook technically, but it is also the anti-spook. –Rejection of Normative Force results in Unjustifiable Nihilism– If someone says "normative ethical force cannot be justified", they are presupposing that actions and that which is action-guiding, normativity, ought to be justified in the first place. This claim is also presupposed by argumentation and the acceptance of deductive proofs. The idea that deductive justification of actions is valuable itself, forces confrontation with the Fulfillment of Interests because interests are the only way to ground claims of justification for actions such as acts of gift-giving, eating food, violence, murder, theft, etc. To reject normative ethical force is also to reject any normative force pertaining to logically neutral actions, which is simply to embrace nihilism. –Interest-Frustration cannot be justified by Nihilistic Egoism– True Egoism requires the conclusion that it is irrational to say a strong person should not murder a disadvantaged person. Either that, or it must contradict itself. It is impossible to argue such a conclusion to someone if they are the disadvantaged, because making such an argument requires appealing to their preferences and such a conclusion contradicts them; their interest in not being attacked is clearly relevant to any argument against it, yet the argument against it can only function by granting their interests no weight. This is a blatant contradiction in the nature of justification itself. You cannot rationally justify an assertion that you can punch someone in the face for your own enjoyment, because any argument they would care about must appeal to some preferences they share, yet the assertion itself is contradictory to their preferences and grants their interests no weight. It also cannot be claimed that to have a preference beyond Egoism is irrational, as Egoism itself dictates that all self-interest is rationally valid. It is only Preference as a Normative Force itself, that allows for the distinction between rational and irrational interests, and it is this which allows for proper rational justification. Therefore, it is impossible to justify Egoism, it is impossible to justify behavior through Egoism, it is impossible to normatively argue for Egoism in a way that applies to anyone with an interest against it, and it is also self-contradictory to accept an argument for Egoism as it always contradicts your own rationally-justifiable preferences. –Interests as Normative Value, Deductively Proven– We can now demonstrate this proof step-by-step: --Basic Definitions and Clarifications-- A. Persuasive arguments are definitionally, arguments that prove a conclusion of "Therefore, you ought to believe X", from deduction through premises. B. In this context we can assume normative claims deduced from premises, must require at least one normative premise. C. Interests are defined as any preferences, values, beliefs, wants, desires, that which a being's behavior tends towards; they are action-guiding. D. If a premise in an argument acts as a normative claim, the argument's correctness can assume the normativity of the premise, but only in so far as the argument is correct. If the argument is incorrect, either invalid or one of the premises is false, then the normativity of the given premise is not necessarily valid. For example, a persuasive argument that 1+1=2 could appeal to an opponent's irrational interests in astrology, though it would be wrong to thus conclude that astrology has actual rational normative weight. The normativity is only true in so far as the argument is true, and an argument appealing to wrong premises is not true. --The Argument-- –Definitions: Persuasive argument: an argument aimed at justifying the conclusion “Therefore, you ought to believe X” Relevant interests: an agent’s wants, desires, beliefs, and preferences relevant to the argument Rationally justifiable interaction: an interaction that can be defended via an argument deducing the claim "Therefore, you are rationally required to accept X" Objectively true: as used here, a claim that directly follows from hard logic, empiricism, or other inarguable epistemology; true facts about reality itself, is-statements Rational oughts: You rationally ought to accept anything that is rationally-derivable; including logic, inarguable epistemology such as empiricism, and the objectively true –Premises: (P0): If a claim is objectively true and rationally derivable, you rationally ought to accept it by definition; as they should be derivable through logic, empiricism, or other rational epistemology (P1): All persuasive arguments aim to justify the normative conclusion “Therefore, you ought to believe X” (definition) (P2): Any argument that proves a conclusion requires premises to derive it (P3): A persuasive argument’s “you ought to believe X” claim's derivation does not hold for an opponent unless they are rationally required to accept all that is necessary to justify the claim (P4): To be rationally required to accept premises of an argument requires that those premises appeal to what is objectively true, or to your relevant interests (P5): Normative conclusions must be derived through normative premises, for example rational oughts must be derived from rationally-derivable truths, which are normative by definition (P6): Rational justification works via persuasive argumentation for the claim "Therefore, you ought to accept X claim", which then grants a specific claim's justification (P7): Rationally, interactions ought to be rationally justifiable –Logic: (L1): From (P1 + P2), persuasive arguments necessitate premises to justify “you ought to believe X” (L2): From (P3 + L1), for a persuasive argument's conclusion's derivability to hold for an opponent, the opponent must rationally be required to accept the premises (L3): From (P1 + P5), the normative force of a persuasive argument's claim of “you ought to believe X” must come from the premises (L4): From (L3 + L2), a persuasive argument's normative force requires the opponent to be rationally required to accept the premises (L5): From (P4 + L4), a persuasive argument's premises must appeal either to objectively true statements, or to the opponent's relevant interests, for the argument to have normative weight (L6): From (L5 + L4), the normative force of persuasive arguments depends upon the normative value of; objectively true statements, or opponent’s relevant interests, based on the premises (L7): From (L6 + P6), the normative force of rational justification depends upon the normative value of; objectively true statements, or opponent’s relevant interests, based on the premises (L8): From (L7 + P7), interactions rationally must appeal to the normative value of; relevant interests of participants, or objectively true statements; in-order to be rationally justifiable –Conclusion: From (L8): Interactions rationally ought to appeal to the normative value of relevant interests of participants, or that which is objectively true, because rational justification requires persuasive arguments whose normative force depends on appealing to at least one. –To not respect Interests, is thus a performative Contradiction– We may also demonstrate that to act in a way inconsistent with premises assumed by an argument, is a performative contradiction. A performative contradiction is when a statement's assertion contradicts necessary presuppositions required for it to be meaningful. Imagine you argue with your landlord about what you or them ought to do, in any sense. The landlord attempts a persuasive argumentation, thus appealing to your interests. This value of your interests must be a premise of their argument, as otherwise normative force is unjustifiable. If the landlord then turns on you and threatens to evict you for criticizing them, they are acting inconsistent with the assumption of the normative value of your interests they held previously, as doing so forfeits their ability to justify normative force, and thus forfeits their own argument. By arguing for the claim that they should evict you, or for arguing that if they threaten eviction you ought to give in, this is thus a performative contradiction. Therefore, if they still hold their previous argument as valid, and/or hold persuasive argumentation between them and you in any way to be valid, they are also contradicting themselves. Rationally, it can be argued that they ought to value argumentation with you, or with anyone willing to give persuasive argument for that matter. The only way then to not contradict yourself, when interacting with others where you would value argumentation, is to uphold the Fulfillment of Interests for all parties involved in the interaction. Thus, rational interactions ought to uphold the Fulfillment of Interests as a principle applicable to those parties.

Deduction of Interests Back to Home Details Step-by-Step Guide Philosophy Menu More Deduction of Interests as a Value [Logical Deduction] –The value of Interests, derived from the existence of Normative Force itself– --Basic Definitions and Clarifications-- B. Deduction starts with premises and derives a conclusion. If the conclusion is meant to apply to some agent, it's premises must apply to that agent, otherwise the conclusion would not follow. A. Acceptance of deductive arguments presuppose the validity of deduction and reason for seeking and identifying truth, as a rejection of deduction as valid makes those deductive arguments invalid. C. Agents view their own interests with normative value relative to themselves, by definition. D. The Is/Ought Fallacy dictates you cannot derive "You ought not murder" from pure truth claims. E. Thus, if normative force must require something else, that something else is presupposed by acceptance of any form of normative force apart from the normativity of reason itself. F. If an argument proves a normative claim such as "You ought to accept 1+1=2", that argument's correctness assumes and relies on the normativity of it's premises. If it turns out one of the premises is false, that's fine because that means the argument isn't actually correct. The conclusion being true doesn't imply the premises are true, the premises imply the conclusion. The normativity is only true in so far as the argument is true. --The Argument-- 0. Argumentation and acceptance of any deductive argument, presupposes reason and deduction. 1. Persuasive arguments prove a conclusion of "Therefore, you ought to believe X" by definition. 2. Rational justification is defined as a persuasive argument that deductively proves a claim X as correct, via a deductive argument proving a conclusion in the form "Thus, you ought to accept X". 3. Proving a conclusion in any deductive argument, requires premises. (basic deduction) 4. If rational justifications prove normative claims to some opponent, based on premises, those premises must apply to the opponent as otherwise the conclusion would not follow. 5. Normative conclusions must derive their normativity from some normative premises. 6. For a normative premise to apply to some opponent, it must derive it's normative force from claims already valid for the opponent; epistemic truths, reason, or values they hold as having force. 7. An opponent's wants, desires, beliefs, preferences; definition-wise these are their interests, and they are values the opponent holds with normative force relative to themselves. 8. Thus, for a normative premise to apply to some opponent, it must derive normative force from an appeal to truth, reason, or the opponent's value of their own interests. 9. It is impossible to derive normative claims in the form "You ought not murder" from true facts alone. This is the is/ought fallacy. Thus epistemic truths and reason, fail to derive normative force. 10. Any argument that hinges on or argues for normative force, thus must ultimately derive that normative force from the value of interests, as otherwise the conclusion need not apply. 11. Acceptance of the validity of normative force in any respect thus presupposes the assumption that normative force can be justified, thus appealing to the value of interests. –Acceptance of Normative Force presupposes a value of Interests– Therefore, to assume the existence of normative force rationally requires the presupposition of the normative value of Interests, as otherwise such normative force would be impossible to justify. To reject the normative value of Interests as they apply to all beings, is to make all arguments for normative force of any kind unjustifiable. To reject Interests as the source of normative value is thus to forfeit all normative force. —Deduction of Interests as a Value via rules of Interaction Justification— –Definitions: Persuasive argument: an argument aimed at justifying the conclusion “Therefore, you ought to believe X” Relevant interests: an agent’s wants, desires, beliefs, and preferences relevant to the argument Rationally justifiable interaction: an interaction that can be defended via an argument deducing the claim "Therefore, you are rationally required to accept X" Objectively true: as used here, a claim that directly follows from hard logic, empiricism, or other inarguable epistemology; true facts about reality itself, is-statements Rational oughts: You rationally ought to accept anything that is rationally-derivable; including logic, inarguable epistemology such as empiricism, and the objectively true –Premises: (P0): If a claim is objectively true and rationally derivable, you rationally ought to accept it by definition; as they should be derivable through logic, empiricism, or other rational epistemology (P1): All persuasive arguments aim to justify the normative conclusion “Therefore, you ought to believe X” (definition) (P2): Any argument that proves a conclusion requires premises to derive it (P3): A persuasive argument’s “you ought to believe X” claim's derivation does not hold for an opponent unless they are rationally required to accept all that is necessary to justify the claim (P4): To be rationally required to accept premises of an argument requires that those premises appeal to what is objectively true, or to your relevant interests (P5): Normative conclusions must be derived through normative premises, for example rational oughts must be derived from rationally-derivable truths, which are normative by definition (P6): Rational justification works via persuasive argumentation for the claim "Therefore, you ought to accept X claim", which then grants a specific claim's justification (P7): Rationally, interactions ought to be rationally justifiable –Logic: (L1): From (P1 + P2), persuasive arguments necessitate premises to justify “you ought to believe X” (L2): From (P3 + L1), for a persuasive argument's conclusion's derivability to hold for an opponent, the opponent must rationally be required to accept the premises (L3): From (P1 + P5), the normative force of a persuasive argument's claim of “you ought to believe X” must come from the premises (L4): From (L3 + L2), a persuasive argument's normative force requires the opponent to be rationally required to accept the premises (L5): From (P4 + L4), a persuasive argument's premises must appeal either to objectively true statements, or to the opponent's relevant interests, for the argument to have normative weight (L6): From (L5 + L4), the normative force of persuasive arguments depends upon the normative value of; objectively true statements, or opponent’s relevant interests, based on the premises (L7): From (L6 + P6), the normative force of rational justification depends upon the normative value of; objectively true statements, or opponent’s relevant interests, based on the premises (L8): From (L7 + P7), interactions rationally must appeal to the normative value of; relevant interests of participants, or objectively true statements; in-order to be rationally justifiable –Conclusion: From (L8): Interactions rationally ought to appeal to the normative value of relevant interests of participants, or that which is objectively true, because rational justification requires persuasive arguments whose normative force depends on appealing to at least one.

Normative Will Back to Home Details Step-by-Step Guide More Normative Will [Full Text] Only sentient beings, defined as entities that possess subjective experience, have interests relevant to Justification Ethics and Yoggism more broadly. Below is an explanation as to why, and the logical basis for how rationalism, normative value of preferences, and Justification Ethics all connect. --Yogg Normative Will-- For sentient beings with interests, their behavior can be described relative to more than just the laws of physics as a standard. A water bottle cannot behave irrationally, yet sentient beings can, relative to their interests and relative to the value of truth. This grants a way of describing “free will” that is coherent and non-mystical. The Normative Will of sentient beings is the difference in volition and ability to resist instinct, the ability to act both rationally and irrationally relative to rational standards and relative to one’s own interests, and the ability to act in contradiction with naturally selected preferences. Normative Will is therefore the capacity for normative evaluation of behaviors relative to standards beyond the mere laws of physics; including rationality, ethics, and personal preferences. Every sentient being possesses some degree of this Normative Will, and the stronger the Normative Will, the more clearly Justification Ethics applies; as under strict instinct or structural constraint, both appeals to non-self-interest and adherence to argumentative norms become impaired. Non-sentient life has preferences that can only be described and evaluated from the outside, thus normative evaluation can only measure behaviors relative to their consistency with physical laws, in which case the "behavior" or functioning, of non-sentient life, should never deviate. --Normative Will and Virtue-- Normative Will is thus the grounding capacity that makes interests ethically authoritative. How such dispositions are exercised is thus the grounding of an Interest-based definition of Virtue and Duty, where others should be recognized according to Justification Ethics, as normatively authoritative sources of reason, and holders of the basis of normative value, interests themselves. --Absolute Interest Conclusion-- --Connecting to Justification Ethics-- Justification Ethics is the idea that rational justification presupposes an appeal to the Normative Value of Interests themselves. If you interact with a water bottle, you need not justify your actions to the water bottle, because rationally justifying a claim of "This water bottle ought to accept X idea" makes no sense. The water bottle is not a rational actor at any level. For sentient beings this isn't true. Consider the interaction of "I will steal this child's candy". How can you rationally justify such an interaction? The child would object, and the child's cognition should be complex enough to be able to judge the action on rational grounds, thus the objection is of rational weight. Thus, rational justification requires you to be able to prove "The child ought rationally to accept my interaction as non-contradictory". This is impossible, because you cannot: 1. Prove it's positively rational to steal candy based on rationalism alone, with no explicit or implicit appeal to normative value. 2. Prove it's legitimate to steal candy relative to the normative value of Interests, as the action is inherently frustrating and without reason. Therefore, stealing candy from a child is rationally unjustifiable. Therefore, Normative Will is the way to measure how strictly Justification Ethics applies. --Animal Rights-- Justification Ethics, which implies the Normative Value of Interests, can apply to any sentient being where their cognition is complex enough to judge a given action on rational grounds, relative to the standards or complexity of the action and its affects. In the "stealing candy from a child" example, the child's cognition is complex enough to be able to object to the behavior in a way that makes sense. Similar logic applies to animals, you can simply replace "child" with "monkey/dog/bird/earthworm" and it's fine. Since preference is present in all sentient beings, those beings can object to behavior based on their preferences. Those beings do have the ability to act rationally and irrationally relative to their interests, and relative to how they should act relative to the truth, making it possible to define "rational oughts" that apply to them. If you try to kill a dog for no reason other than you want to, it is impossible to make an argument such that "The dog ought rationally to accept your interaction as non-contradictory". This is impossible, because you cannot: 1. Prove it's positively rational to steal candy based on rationalism alone, with no explicit or implicit appeal to normative value. 2. Prove it's legitimate to steal candy relative to the normative value of Interests, as the action is inherently frustrating and without reason. Since the dog has the ability to judge your behavior based on their own preferences, and any attempt to justify your behavior has to appeal to their preferences, your actions are unjustifiable. --Obtaining the Interest Conclusion-- It has thus been shown that Normative Will is the appropriate measure on how strictly Justification Ethics applies. Killing a dog is unjustifiable because the dog has the ability to rationally object to it, same with killing a monkey, or a child, or a cow, or a human. The logical consequence of this is that any entity that is sentient with Interests, has Justification Ethics apply to it to the rational extent. Any unnecessary inherent frustration of their interests is thus illegitimate as it cannot be justified without appealing either to Interest-free Rationalism, which doesn't work, or appealing to the Normative Value of Interests by trying to appeal to their own standards, which is contradictory. Therefore, the Fulfillment of Interests of all sentient beings, in all reference frames; with priority to Inherent, Rational Interests, is sustained. --What is a Rational Agent? What about theories of God?-- Below is an explanation as to what forms of sentience or some third, God-like form of being, could mean for rationalism. What if a being exists that is not held under the laws of physics, but rather is the originator of the laws of physics themselves? This idea is taken up assuming "the laws of physics" corresponds to some sort of fundamental law of existence; not the inventive and technically constructivist laws humans come up with to describe their observations. This separates an actual God from mere builders of a simulated world, those builders would still be held under some *real* laws of physics, whereas God is the originator of physics. Non-sentient robots cannot act rationally or irrationally, their behavior can only be measured relative to the laws of physics. It doesn't matter to sentient beings what non-sentient robots do to each-other, there is no philosophical reason to care. Sentient beings' actions can be measured relative to their interests, as well as the laws of physics. They always follow the laws of physics, but they do not always best act to fulfill their interests and thus have the capacity to act irrationally. We could imagine a third category of being, where this third being’s actions might be best measured by some third standard outside of the laws of physics, and interests. For such a being, it may have no reason to care about human actions, since it doesn't measure the validity of actions based on interests, but rather some greater construct. This third being could be a God, the top of the value hierarchy, where rational justification breaks down as they are beyond the concept of rationalism itself, or they are above the concept of interests in such a way where they are their interests, they are one and the same thing and thus can never act in a way that is invalid, and are thus utmost rationality itself. This seems to break the whole concept of rationalism though, because if it's definitionally impossible for God to contradict themselves, and God being an infinite being can justify and let be true anything, then it is also impossible for there to be separate true and false statements, which means everything is both true and false. If God breaks rationalism, then all arguments for God, and all arguments prescribing behavior to God, and all arguments prescribing oughts from God, arguing what to do based on God, etc, don't make any sense because their premises destroy their own structure. Thus, reason, rationalism, argumentation, and objective truth itself, are ontologically separate from God, faith, and any other unprovable spiritual beliefs that ultimately stem from God.

Yogg Virtue Theory Back to Home Details Step-by-Step Guide Philosophy Menu More Yogg Virtue Theory [Full Text] —Consent from Justification Ethics— Consent is a continuous, preferably enthusiastic, explicit, and relevantly-informed, acceptance of an agreement, contract, or activity. The value of Consent can be obtained through simple Justification Ethics. Agreements sustained via an alignment of interests will ensure people's interests are respected; for if agreements are handled with everyone involved only looking out for their own interests, and not actually in agreement, this will end up with gross interest misalignment and thus the interaction will dissolve into an anti-interest catastrophy in violation of the AIP and AAP. —Passive vs. Active Interactions— Justification Ethics lays out the following concept: Interactions rationally ought to appeal to the normative value of the relevant interests of all involved, due to the premises of the persuasive argumentation necessary to rationally justify the interaction. Thus, interactions must be rationally justifiable relative to Interests. The question here is what kind of interaction? If someone is in danger in front of me, do I have a duty to act and help them? To what end, to what limits? —Justification Ethics and a Right to a Private Sanctuary— Justification Ethics is contingent on the normative obligation to rationally justify methods of interaction. This normative obligation comes from Normative Rationalism. Does this normative obligation apply to inaction as well as action? It could be argued in theory that for someone in danger in front of you, you are not interacting with that person, and thus no rational justification for anything is necessary until you interact with them. This view implies interests only become relevant once you enter into an interaction with someone else who has Normative Will, who has interests. Thus, inaction is never unjustifiable unless somehow inaction is contradictory with the existence of interests themselves, such as if "Interest Structures" or the "Pillars holding up Interests" are themselves under threat, similar to theories of Threshold Deontology. There is a problem with this analysis though, couldn't it be said that inaction is yet another form of behavior, and as a behavior it is the fulfillment of an interest, an interest to not act? Must this interest be rationally justifiable? If so, justifiable to whom? How can it be narrowed down who is involved in a behavior that by definition is directly affecting no-one? —Praxeological Asymmetry— One place to turn to is the idea of a Praxeological Asymmetry. Praxeology is the theory of beings that engage in purposeful behavior. Praxeological Asymmetry is the idea that inaction or withholding from action does not require justification in the same way as active interaction, and this is founded on Epistemological Asymmetry grounds. Epistemology is the theory of how beliefs should be shaped, and this idea holds within it an arguable asymmetry. If you have a claim like "there is a teapot between the orbits of Jupiter and Saturn", the lack of evidence for such a claim means that you, empirically, ought to disbelieve in the existence of the teapot. So a lack of evidence leads to disbelief rather than just neutrality? This implies an asymmetry. Applying similar logic, or applying this epistomological thinking to rational justification, leads to a Justification Ethics conclusion that interests are relevant to only involved people in an interaction. If your actions don't directly affect anyone, you aren't interacting with anyone in an active way, then justification relative to interests need not be present due to the asymmetry. —Epistemological Asymmetry is Invalid?— There is unfortunately a problem here too. Belief in such a mystical teapot is irrational, but so is neutrality towards the hypothesis, due to there being an overwhelming amount of evidence that space is mostly empty, so the area between Jupiter and Saturn should be devoid of random teapots, as well as how Earthly objects should be nowhere near planetary orbits, except under very specific circumstances of which none should exist for a random teapot. Thus disbelief is the rational conclusion, not due solely because of a lack of evidence but also because of evidence to the contrary. This presents a problem because other claims where there is limited or no evidence going for or against the claim, may not have a "default state" to point to for deciding whether belief or disbelief is rational, leading to neutrality being the rational conclusion. This breaks the asymmetry which goes against the logic of "non-interaction" leading to non-justification, leading to inaction not being in violation of interests. —Abuse Constructs a Right to a Private Sanctuary?— Perhaps due to neutrality being correct in a true both-sides lack of evidence, no evidence for or against a particular claim, this can grant a "default state" that can bind Justification Ethics to ongoing interactions, the same way non-existent future interests are fundamentally different from Justification Ethics and the Absolute Interest Principle, as the ought to rationally fulfill interests only derives existant interests. You cannot ought that which you cannot. It may also make sense to acknowledge that the Anti-Abuse Principle as formulated grants a protection from Inherently-Frustrating Interests, classifying them as illegitimate based on the logical implications of Interests being treated as the fundamental normative value. A protection from such inherently-frustrating interests may include a protection from harmful obligations, which further demonstrates this "Right to Private Sanctuary". —Yogg Virtue Ethics— Even if it may be hard to justify any form of duty or obligation towards those you aren't actually interacting with, using Justification Ethics, there is still a basis for defining good character and morally positive conduct, and this is Virtue Ethics. Virtue Ethics is a philosophical approach that emphasizes the character and virtues of a person, what guides their behavior, rather than focusing on adherence to a principle or goal. Positive traits, aka Virtues, are the attributes that help curate morally or ethically positive behavior, and reflect an outlook on others or an outlook on existence that is in some sense morally positive. Negative traits, aka Vices, are the attributes that contradict this goal. Positive character, and the recognition of rational and irrational character traits, relative to Interests, is the way to address this problem. Virtue can thus be thought of as a Respect of Interests, of both others and your own, and the adherence to that responsibility. This is similar to Immanuel Kant's "Treat People as an End, never as a Mere Means" philosophy, which is also related to the given Yoggist definition of Abuse, that behaviors functioning off of misaligned interests, may result in frustration for one side of a deal, which can be dangerous to the meaning of interests themselves, and is thus illegitimate. —Plagiarism and Wheaton's Law— Wheaton's Law is a guiding principle that states simply, "Don't be a dick". This guiding principle maps almost perfectly onto the Anti-Abuse Principle, as to be a 'jerk' is pretty neatly spelled out as to engage in behavor that is inherently interest-frustrating, and unjustifiable to others in some way. Taking up the Anti-Abuse Principle with this idea of "Respect of Interests" as a form of Virtue, then maps perfectly the guiding principle of Wheaton's Law. This grants a valuable insight, the ability to both ethically and character-wise decry practices such as Plagiarism in the name of Interests. Plagiarism, and equivalently non-attribution and stealing credit, as well as very specific and limited forms of Intellectual Property, are thus justifiably anti-virtue as they correspond to a disrespect towards other's interests, and in many cases are unethical as they may correspond to inherently-frustrating interests as the product of both vices and interest misalignment. Some things that are illegal under absolutist Intellectual Property Rights, but are not inherently-frustrating, would include archiving, and derivative works. These actions don't harm anyone inherently, and simply represent creative expression. The ethical violation in plagiarism lies in false representation, not in duplication; so archiving doesn't count as an ethical infringement. Plagiarism frustrates interests by: 1. Stealing reputational capital (career prospects, social standing, trust). 2. Undermining trust and attribution (people rely on attribution to evaluate credibility). 3. Creating asymmetric advantage through deception (falsely-attributed exchange). 4. Discouraging creation by breaking the link between effort and recognition. This makes plagiarism inherently frustrating, regardless of any monetary exchange. Archiving does not inherently frustrate interests because: 1. It preserves access without deceptive or abusive practices. 2. It does not claim authorship of anything and ought to include proper attribution. 3. It often aligns interests (creator interest in preservation + public interest in access). Any harm is contingent, not inherent (e.g. bandwidth costs, disputes in hosting). —Forming a Principle— Therefore, based on all this reasoning, we can define Virtue and Vice as the following: Virtue: Traits that curate a respect towards Interests as having value. Vice: Traits that curate a disrespect towards Interests as having value. Some virtues consistent with this view would include: Generosity, Altruism, Self-Reliance, Solidarity, Trustworthyness, Justice, Fairness, Mutualism Some vices consistent with the view would include: Unfairness, Irrationality, Rage, Disrespect, Hatefulness, Exploitativeness, Callousness, Cowardice Using this reasoning we can then define the following principle, describing Just Duty, and Fair Behavior. —Yogg Virtue Principle— You ought to act in a way consistent with the virtues that curate respect for interests, including Mutual Respect, Justice, Truth, and Recognition of others as Self-Sovereign. You ought to not act against Consent, or enforce Interest Misalignment for your own gain through Unfairness, Irrationality, Explotativeness, or Abuse. You ought to form a character that adheres to the responsibility of upholding these character traits, against Negligence towards others, and Abuse of others. Common virtues such as Justice, Self-Sovereignty, and Generosity, are simply emergent properties of the Respect for Interests.

Refutation of the NAP Back to Home Details Step-by-Step Guide Philosophy Menu More Refutation of the NAP [Full Text] --When Aliens steal the Sun cause it's not Homesteaded - An Absurdity within the NAP-- Imagine aliens with advanced technology come to Earth's solar system and take the sun away. Earth stops receiving sunlight and thus freezes to death. This is not a violation of the NAP, because humanity does not own the sun. The sun is not homesteaded, until the aliens homestead it. Humanity owns the sunlight as it reaches the Earth, but owning the sunlight that reaches our planet does not mean we own it's source. --The Bird Cage Analogy-- Imagine there is an unowned cage. You place a light-bulb above the cage and turn it on. The light-bulb is your property. Later, someone random third party brings their pet bird and puts it in the cage, and walks off. The bird is their property. You come back and decide to turn your light-bulb off. You do. The bird goes to sleep, gets cold, and dies in it's sleep. Did you violate the third party's property rights over their pet bird? No, because withholding support is not the same as physical violation. From this we can derive that if the sun was owned by aliens previously, they would have a right to turn the sun off. Now imagine the aliens simply homestead the unowned sun. Does that actually change the situation at all? What if the light-bulb on the cage is unowned to begin with, and you simply homestead it by changing the bulb, and then later turn it off? Does that suddenly become aggression? What if the bird owner abandoned the bird, and we assume aggression against animals is itself wrong? Does that turn this into a violation of the NAP? No? The answer to all of this is no under the NAP. Dependency does not and can not grant entitlement. It isn't your fault the bird is in the cage, if you homestead the light-bulb it's yours, end of story. --But stopping Sunlight from reaching Earth causes Destruction of Property-- Causal links between an action and a destructive outcome are only valid if you are directly causing a destructive outcome, in an invasive way. Trespass, not mere withholding of resources in transit. For example, polluting a river next to a village is argued to be aggression because you're sending pollutants into the village without their consent. With trying to stop sunlight from reaching Earth, only messing with sunlight before it's reached Earth, you aren't aggressing because no foreign matter trespasses property borders, there is no invasion. This is a mere withholding of a Natural Input. This does not constitute invasion, same as slowly draining a large unowned body of water. If others like using it from time to time but nobody claims ownership, you can't argue aggression. Nobody is entitled to an unowned body of water. The same applies to the sun. Imagine Alice likes going to an unowned forest once a week and eating berries from it. Now imagine Gerald homesteads and cuts down the forest. Now Alice can no longer get her berries. Aggression? No. Now imagine Alice also used the berries she collected to power a machine that made her garden grow, and without the berries her factory will stop functioning and her garden will die. Does this suddenly make it aggression since now her property's integrity is linked to the berries? Of course not. She has no entitlement to the berries. --Entitlement through a Right to Easement, a Pattern of Use-- Perhaps humans own the sunlight and have a right to easement of the sun, they don't own the sun but they have partial homesteading of the sun due to continuous use of the sunlight from it. By this logic, the hobo's continuous, visible harvesting of fallen berries constitutes homesteading of the recurring yield itself as a pattern of use. Not the bushes themselves, but the recurring yield. This is a very vague assertion though, and feels kind of like Squatter's Rights being implicitly snuck in, continuous use of a house doesn't necessitate a right over the house in and of itself, right? Imagine Alice again, she likes going to an unowned forest once a week and eating berries from it. Gerald homesteads and cuts down the forest. Is this aggression or not? Surely not, yet Alice has a pattern of use in connection to the forest, therefore Squatter's Rig- I mean uh, a right to the continued pattern of use of the forest? --But the Natural State of Humanity is to have access to Sunlight-- Imagine a hobo who lives on an island. The hobo builds a house, the house is his property as he homesteaded it. He lives off of berries from berry bushes, but he never interacts with the bushes, he merely picks up berries off the ground that fall off the bushes. The berry bushes should thus be unowned, dependency does not create entitlement. If Johnny comes to the island and starts homesteading and uprooting the bushes, this should not qualify as aggression because the bushes are unowned and the hobo has no entitlement to them. 1. Hobo relies on berries fallen off bush 2. Humanity relies on sunlight from sun randomly reaching their planet There is no valid difference here. The only difference is that humans are born into relying on the sun, the "natural conditions". This doesn't hold up because you can argue the hobo has the natural condition of having access to the berries, as he was born on the island. What defines natural? Dependency should not grant entitlement, that contradicts the NAP.

Retaliatory Law Back to Home Details Step-by-Step Guide Philosophy Menu More Retaliatory Law [Full Text] —Retaliatory Law— Justification Ethics implies that rational justification of actions necessarily appeals to the normative value of the interests of others involved in some rational interaction. This grants us the Fulfillment of Interests as a value, but not necessarily the clearance to inherently frustrate one's interests to protect some greater good outcome, even in extreme circumstances. The reason for this is that the Fulfillment of Interests as a value is simply the acceptance of the normativity of interests themselves, the very basis of this philosophy and of rational oughts considering more than one person. Inherently frustrating actions that are not an act of defense against irrational frustration, are thus illegitimate, as such is called out in the Anti-Abuse Principle, which explicitly lays this out. —Part 1: Defense and Retaliatory Law— --Basic Recap of Self-Defense-- As explained before, valuing Rational Interests can only mean the right to defend rational interests from irrational transgressions. To have the right over your interests, and to not have the right to defend your interests through proportionate means, is a contradiction. If the idea that Interests form a right to Property, where certain objects and environments can act as a conduit of your interests, where attacks against personal property is an act of inherent frustration against your interests, this also implies a right to proportionate self-defense of your body, mind, and property, your stuff, belongings, your home; by any means necessary to protect interest fulfillment. --Proportionate Force and Lethal Retaliation-- Rational Interests win out over Irrational Interests, this comes from the assumption of Normative Rationalism. If someone breaks into your house and tries to destroy all of your stuff and then tries to burn down your house, is lethal force justified to defend what is yours? The answer is proportionate force is justifiable. If lethal force becomes proportionate, then it is justifiable. It can be argued that the transgressor could tell you explicitly, "You can leave, I won't stop you. If you try to stop me from burning down your house though, I will kill you." If they say this, assuming you know they are being truthful, you now know that any resistance will be met with lethal force by them. Since force against them to some degree is already justifiable defense of your interests, if they turn to lethal force in retaliation, then since that lethal force is unjustifiable this situation becomes the same as one where they used lethal force from the beginning. For this reason, since them using lethal force is foreseeable anyway, it is thus justifiable for you to engage in lethal force before they do. If you have reasonable foresight that they will use lethal force if threatened in any way, then you have a right to cut to the chase, since your interference with them is already justifiable. --Proportionality must be based on Necessity, not Category of Harm-- Someone may argue that it is disproportionate to enforce action against inherent frustration that does not violate bodily autonomy, for example. The logic goes like this, if someone is underpaying workers or discriminating in hiring and service unjustifiably, enforcing regulations and civil rights statutes to stop them is disproportionate force because you are using force against someone who isn't, that is a fundamental difference between categories of harm and is thus disproportionate. This standard of proportionality is the idea that force is proportional if the force is at the same level, same category of harm, of what injustice is being thwarted. This standard immediately breaks, because if there is a disabled person stuck in a wheelchair and all they have is a gun, they may be unable to defend themselves or their property without going from yelling to full on lethal force. By the category of harm logic, they may as well not own their property since jumping to lethal force is "disproportionate". Justification Ethics solves this problem. Since all harm becomes subcategories of inherent interest frustration, there is no "category claim" that can be made because these categories simply don't exist in the way they've been explained. Imagine being slapped in the face vs. being fired from your job for no reason. Both are unjustifiable given Justification Ethics and an appeal to the value of interests, yet being fired from your job may be much worse than simply being slapped in the face. Yet, in terms of harm categories, being slapped in the face is a direct violation of bodily autonomy, while being fired is not. This grants a form of proportionality based in the necessity of the use of force, and here even Libertarians will agree. The disabled person owns their property, and all that is necessary to enforce what is right is permitted. Thus, enforcement of regulations against unfair treatment, discrimination, and other non-violent yet anti-interest abusive activity is actually justifiable under Justification Ethics. —Retaliatory Law— Based on this reasoning, this then justifies a limited use of justifiable force by some form of court system. If a court justifiably and soundly argues you are inherently frustrating against others to such a degree that it must be stopped, and you try to refuse their justifiable demands, then under Yoggism they have the right to use proportionate force to prevent your transgression. If you then resist further with lethal force, your resistance becomes an inherent frustration against them and unjustifiable use of force, to which whoever is enforcing demands against you can then defend themselves with their own lethal force. To be clear, this logic behind enforcement of justified rules immediately fails if said rules are unethical or unjustifiable in and of themselves. In a democratic society, this logic will also fail if rules are contrary to the interests of the public, aka decided undemocratically or in a way not representative of the citizens of some community. —Part 2: Threshold Deontology— There is more to ethics than simply what works as a consistent and static system of law, though. In a situation where inaction may result in mass destruction, and mass inherent frustration, but the action to prevent the destruction is itself inherently frustrating, we seemingly run into a problem. It should also be noted that while it may seem justifiable to kill an innocent person or temporarily violate someone's inherent rights, or interests, to prevent mass death; assuming a best-case scenario where we know for sure the consequences and can measure them; it does not seem justifiable to kill an innocent person to lower death rates globally by 0.2%, even if doing so may technically save many more people. Instead of simply appealing to intuition itself, the reasons behind the intuition can actually be justified by the Fulfillment of Interests and the rational engine that makes this work. This threshold deontology, can be argued for based on a valuing of rational deliberation. --Defense of Interest Structure-- Threshold Deontology is the idea that we ought to act in ways consistent with some deontological ruleset, or principles, such as "Do not murder", or "Actions that are inherently frustrating are illegitimate"; but only up to a point where not violating the deontology creates an existential disaster, like the destruction of a whole country. It can be reasoned that inaction can result in a breakdown of rational deliberation. Imagine a town of people who have national deliberation days, where every Wednesday, they come together to reason for how best to use resources. This reasoning is held up by each person in the town having the ability to participate in argumentation, the same way democracy works through voting. Now imagine a disaster strikes, and you have the ability to act. Inaction would result in a breakdown of argumentation, deliberation, of truth-seeking within the town itself. In such a scenario, it is possible to disrupt or take advantage of the disruption to argumentation, through inaction. Taking advantage of this disruption is irrational, and letting people get away with taking advantage, is also irrational, as it takes away from actual truth-seeking. For this reason, the violation of someone's interests to protect the overall value of deliberation, may be justifiable; as the inaction becomes a negligence towards defending rationality itself. --Violating Rights is still Wrong-- Note that the logic used does not say it is "right" or "good" to violate someone's rights to prevent existential disaster. Yoggism has specific standards on what actually constitutes a 'right', but an innocent person who isn't inherently frustrating does constitute rights, specifically a right over their continued sentience and non-abusive usage of their interest-based property. It has been argued before, from a deontological point of view, that given a consequentialist argument scenario such as "Kill this guy or the entire world explodes!", that the looming existential disaster doesn't make it suddenly a good thing the guy dies, and thus killing the guy is still wrong, it's just that both scenarios are terrible. This intuition is actually a rephrasing of the conclusions here, and the reasons for that intuition have just been derived. This grants us definitions for Good, Right, and Justified. —Good, Right, and Justified— There is clearly some difference between giving to the poor, and self-defense, and there is also a difference between self-defense, and frustrating for the purpose of preserving the structure of interests itself. These differences can be distinguished well in terms of interests and their effects on them. Giving to the poor, assuming your individual giving doesn't somehow harm them, is Good. It's purely good if doing so fulfills your own interests as well, since then no meaningful interests are frustrated by any measure. Self-defense on the other hand is different. As argued before, it's justifiable as it is the defense of rational interests over irrational interests and inherently frustrating transgression. However, the transgressor's interests are also inherently frustrated, it's fire beats fire. If the transgressor is killed, this is an inherent frustration, just done in defense of the value of interests. This is not purely good as previously described. Long-term such defense is good, but more accurately this action is not purely good, but is Right. It is right, and thus permissible, because it is directly consistent with Interests as a value, along with any other rational action. To frustrate against someone's interests for the purpose of preserving the structure of interests itself, this would be something like stealing from someone in an emergency to stop a large disaster from occurring. Since the someone you are frustrating against is not a transgressor, they are not acting in a way that is inherently frustrating, which is why it counts as theft, this cannot be called defense against transgressors who are contradicting interests at all. Instead, this can only be justified in instances where the e nds are rationally integral to the structures that preserve interest fulfillment in a fundamental sense. It should also be noted the difference between frustrating as an end in itself, versus frustrating as a mere temporary side-effect, a means to a greater end where said frustration is unnecessary. To lie to save someone's life for example, is to frustrate against someone's interest in the truth, not as an end in itself, but as a side-effect to reach a greater end where the lie becomes unnecessary. Actions such as this are not inherently frustrating, as what is inconsistent about inherent frustration is that inherently frustrating against another's interests, as an end in itself, is by definition an end inconsistent with the value of Interests. If it is not an end in itself, and is a side-effect separate from the action, or is defense against a transgressor, then it is not inherent frustration in this way. It is no longer inconsistent with, and may be in defense of, Interests. —Definitions— Interest - What a sentient being's behavior tends towards; sentient preferences. Interest Fulfillment - A being's interest being fulfilled or their preferences respected. Interest Frustration - The violation or contradiction of a being's interest. Good - An action that is interest fulfilling and is not inherently frustrating to any interests. Right - An action that is interest fulfilling, and not inherently frustrating unless against irrational interests in defense of rational interests; in a way consistent with Interests as a value. Justifiable - An action that results in the minimally inconsistent outcome relative to Interests as a value, measured by whether the action is 'right' interest-wise, or if the action is rationally integral to the structures that preserve interest fulfillment fundamentally. Bad - An action that is frustrating to interests while any fulfillment is limited to irrational interests. Evil - An action that is inherently frustrating to interests and is frustrating to the very structures that preserve interest fulfillment. Moral - An action that is consistent with Interests as a value, in some form. Immoral - An action that is inconsistent with Interests as a value, in some form. Ethical (Yogg Law) - An action consistent with the Anti-Abuse Principle. Unethical (Yogg Law) - An action inconsistent with the AAP or is otherwise Immoral. Existentially Justifiable (Yogg Existentials) - An action consistent with the Anti-Abuse Principle or existentially protective in the sense of protecting the structure of interests themselves. Unjustifiable (Yogg Existentials) - An action inconsistent with the AAP or is otherwise Immoral, while not being existentially protective, or being diminishing to the structure of interests. —The Anti-Abuse Principle (AAP)— Actions that constitute interference with another's non-abusive fulfillment of their own inherent and non-contradictory interests, are illegitimate. Actions that inherently result in the frustration of interests, through overall frustration by misalignment of interests between parties, or due to conduct that frustrates against inherent interests, are unjustifiable, constitute ‘abuse’, and are thus illegitimate. Actions that prevent abuse, or inhibit otherwise unjustifiable conduct; including conduct that is a product of interest misalignment between parties, and conduct that is inherently frustrating to interests; are legitimate as they constitute resistance to abuse.