Search TC Blox

Back to Home Details Yoggism Guide Philosophy Menu More Anti-Abuse Principle [Full Text] —The Anti-Abuse Principle (AAP)— Actions that are intrinsically frustrating to another's non-abusive fulfillment of interests, or inherently subordinate another's interests, constitute abuse, and are thus illegitimate. Actions that proportionately defend against abuse, or inhibit conduct that is inherently frustrating of interests, are legitimate insofar as they constitute self-defense. This principle can be stated in essence in a simple sentence: "Acts that intrinsically frustrate and subordinate others' interests, are illegitimate. Defense of interests is the imperative." —The Abuse of the Spook (AS Recognition)— Some actions function as a 'spook' against the fulfillment of interests, such actions can be defined as intrinsically frustrating actions that inherently subordinate another's interests. These actions constitute abuse, norms based on such actions represent spooks of the mind against interests, and are thus the true enemy of both individual freedom and rational ethics. Therefore, actions that constitute inherent frustration through coercive frustration or subordination of another's interests, cannot be justified by any metric and are thus illegitimate. —What We Know— From Justification Ethics, is proven that actions inherently frustrating to others' interests cannot be justified. From Inherent Interest Theory, is proven the action spectrum that can be used to measure frustrating actions against each-other. Different actions have differing justificatory burdens based on how interferring they are. From here we can define a binary distinction of when a certain action is unjustifiable based on it being frustrating to interests in a way intrinsic to the content of the action itself, in relation to another action or non-acting person. —Interest Abuse— We can define a type of conduct actions can constitute, this conduct is interest abuse, and we can define it in terms of interest misalignment as granted by the previous information. Similar to the philosophy by Immanuel Kant, which states that one should treat other people never as a mere means but rather as an end in themselves, what will be called the enforcement of interest misalignment is fundamental to ethical reasoning based on similar application. Actions that inherently frustrate in a way unjustifiable, can be thought of as enforcing interest misalignment overall, which is what causes the unjustifiability as interest misalignment is the very thing preventing the derivation of normative claims to an agent as per Justification Ethics. This is the definition of what will be coined "Interest Abuse": If an action inherently results in frustration of interests, through enforcement of interest misalignment, whereas in a way intrinsic to the content of the action itself, it frustrates against other interests that themselves are NOT frustrating as intrinsically, and the action does not function as defense against inherently frustrating conduct, constitutes abuse. Such abuse cannot be justified. —Property Rights Explained— To steal from another person without justifiable cause is a frustration of their interests, in a way intrinsic to the action itself. This is inherent frustration at work, and an active enforcement of your misaligned interests. This is the case as long as the property claim does not itself represent an unjustifiable action against others, such as with hoarding land, as land is finite at least locally and taking up land prevents others from using an object that already existed prior. Personal possessions on the other hand do not do this, creating something new does not stop others from doing anything they could prior to the new creation, and thus does not and can not constitute an inherent frustration. The exception is if people already have access to some good and then access is blocked off or otherwise limited, which is an action that frustrates their interests directly; or if access is unjustifiably limited from the start to the benefit of the property holder. This is captured by the concept of Interest Entanglement of Inherent Interest Theory, as creating or otherwise laboring to gather property entangles your interests in that property such that the loss of it constitutes an active frustration against your interests in the property and your ability to fulfill your interests related to the property. —Bodily Autonomy Explained— Bodily Autonomy works the same way. An attack upon your body and your ability to fulfill interests pertaining directly to your body is an inherent frustration for the same reasons. For cases where one person's body may rely upon another, the action spectrum is to be applied, implying an active user of a body may not overrule such body's owner, as usage of a person's body constitutes an action that may be against the interests of the person and thus may be unjustifiable. This action, whether intentional or not, necessarily justifies self-defense against the actor by the person being acted against, as much as is necessary to prevent the action. —Plagiarism Ethics— Plagiarism is unethical by similar grounds. Relying on another's work may frustrate the interests of the creator of the work, claiming another's work as your own is a clearer case. Similar to land use though, the action of blocking the use of a specific creative work can either represent an unjustifiable action against those who are already users of the work or sometimes block those who already had the ability to use the work but now cannot, such as in the case of patents blocking use of inventions. —Wage Slavery— Unjustifiable actions against others that enforce interest misalignment are illegitimate. As such unfair treatment in the workplace and many negative consequences of wage labor are rendered illegitimate actions against the employee/worker. Similar market abuse against workers and consumers, including shareholders taking precedence over workers and consumers in publicly traded companies, similarly constitutes abuse. The ethical and rational imperative is to grant ownership with those whose interests are most entangled with the firm, to give workers and consumers a real stake and voice in the means of production. —The True Consent Ethic— Consent is a continuous, preferably enthusiastic, explicit, and relevantly-informed, acceptance of an agreement, contract, or activity. Preferably enthusiastic here means you not only should have an interest in accepting an agreement, but you also ought to approve of each term of the contract, every part or at least the most important parts of the agreement or activity. Relevantly-informed means that you know what you are agreeing to and have the knowledge required, to a reasonable and relevant extent, to meaningfully judge the agreement's outcomes relative to your own interests. Approval of all parts of an agreement is the signifier of interest alignment, which makes sense as enforcement of interest misalignment is unjustifiable. It is for this reason that Consent is not a mere construct but rather the measure of justification. This is also the reason why behaviors that function off of misaligned interests, that may result in frustration for one side of a deal, can be so dangerous to the meaning of consent and interests itself. This, is the definition of Abuse at work. —The AAP and applications of Max Stirner's Philosophy— Through this kind of reasoning around ethics, can be applied a principle derived from the logical implications of Normative Justification and the ranking of Actions: The Anti-Abuse Principle. Along with this principle can be obtained the recognition of the Abuse of the Spook, or the AS Recognition. As per Max Stirner's Egoism, a 'spook' is a concept that constitutes an abstraction meant to push you away from your own self-interest and instead towards an arbitrary principle. Yoggism can be thought of as a "spook to end all spooks", and to define a rule against creating spooks upon others, is the kind of rule a "Union of Egoists", the hypothetical social organizing envisioned by Max Stirner, advocates for. This rule is essentially exactly what the Anti-Abuse Principle is. This makes Yoggism particularly justifiable by Egoist standards, compared with other normative frameworks. Yoggism itself is the spook to end all spooks, the Anti-Spook. —Yoggism is the Anti-Spook by this recognition— As such, the recognition of this implies some actions can be thought of as spooks against the fulfillment of interests, as only justifiable from abstractions against self-interest. Yoggism is the one anti-spook justifiable from the abstraction of reason and from the idea that such spooks are normatively bad. —Refutating Egoism - The Igism Dilemma— Max Stirner himself originally classified reason as a spook if it is taken as authoritative above one's own self-interest, but if we disregard reason as having such authority then we forfeit the argumentative, logical, and normative force of our own objection itself. An absurd and entirely arbitrary principle, like Igism, the philosophy that everyone should say 'Ig' once a day and encourage others to do the same, and use a State to indoctrinate everyone into Igism, becomes on equal footing with Egoism. To maintain the Egoist objection is to appeal to Rational Egoism, which falls into the trap where it is impossible to normatively justify Egoism as a system of ethics in a way others are rationally required to accept. To appeal to rationality in this way is also to appeal to the assumption that beliefs hold with them a justificatory burden, and as actions are guided by specific kinds of such beliefs, actions imply an inherited justificatory burden. This opens the door to Justification Ethics, and then collapses into the Anti-Abuse Principle again. True Consent Ethic

Oughts from Logic Back to Home Details Yoggism Guide Philosophy Menu More Oughts from Logic [Full Text] —Oughts From Logic— –Definitions: (Ought): An outcome that ought to occur or be valid relative to some principle, is an outcome that is logically consistent with and follows some principle. If you light a stick of dynamite it ought to explode relative to the laws of physics and the construction of the stick of dynamite. That isn't a subjective normative claim, it's an objective implication based on Logic. (Rationality): Used here, the empirically measurable accuracy towards an action being able to achieve a goal, where accuracy towards a goal applies to not only narrow goals, but overall goals and behavior, and to the consistency of acting with reference to rational standards of measure. (Interest): For a sentient being to have an interest in something, this simply means their behavior is tending towards fulfilling said something, even if it is ineffective. All people have interests, and even trying to avoid their interests, is itself an interest they are acting according to. Any sentient being with stimuli-driven behavior has interests. –Premises: (P1): All people have interests. (P2): All people act in accordance with the interests they have, and prioritize interests they hold with Intrinsic Value. (P3): Some actions are better than others at fulfilling interests. (P4): Rationally, if you light a stick of dynamite, relative to the laws of physics, and an object’s tendency to follow the laws of physics, it ought to explode. (based on the definition of Ought) (P5 from P4): Rationally, if you are acting in accordance with an interest, you ought to choose any of the most rational actions you can, to best fulfill the interest. –Logic: (L1): From (P1), a person X has an interest I. (L2): From (P1 + P2), person X acts in accordance with interest I. (L3): From (P3), there might exist an action A that most rationally fulfills I. (L4): From (P2 + P5), person X rationally ought to take action A, if it exists, to fulfill interest I. –Conclusion: From (L4): Any person X, rationally ought to take any actions A that best fulfills their interests I. Thus, people rationally ought to fulfill their own interests in the most rational way possible. To be clear, this rationality includes any necessary presuppositions or transcendental arguments, if valid and applicable. See Justification Ethics. This is then the basis of, and an explanation as to why, certain normative claims can be derived via an appeal to interests, and others cannot. "You ought to buy a washing machine" for example, can be derived using an appeal to an interest in clean clothes. This works because the ought, the normativity, is baked in at the interest. As all people have interests, and people’s interests may differ, the most rational situation for the people to create for themselves is a situation that is most consistent with the fulfillment of Inherent Interests overall, the upholding of at least the most intrinsic Oughts as priority. NOTES: Avoiding an interest may maximize Oughts for an individual, if the interest is self-destructive to other interests. Also, an action that fulfills your interest but can cause a collapse of Inherent Fulfillment of Interests down the line may not be the most rational action to take, either based on your own self-interest being threatened or based on an inconsistency of some kind, see Absolute Interest Conclusion and Justification Ethics for more clarification on inconsistency from transcendent arguments.

Justification Ethics Back to Home Details Yoggism Guide Philosophy Menu More Justification Ethics [Full Text] See a refutation of Egoism and why actions require justificatory burden: [Actions Must be Justified] See the deductive arguments only, here: [Deduction of Interests as a Value] Why Interests are an appropriate candidate for normative ground at all: [Oughts from Logic] –Justification Arguments presuppose the Normative Value of Interests– A Normative Justification as used here, means a deductive argument deriving a conclusion in the form "you ought to accept/believe X". Such an argument must derive its conclusion from premises. Since the conclusion is a normative one, it contains "You ought", that normative conclusion must be derived from normative premises. Here, the different types of premises that can be used to derive claims can be identified. These are: 1. Truth Claims (true facts about the world, is-statements) 2. Reason (logical truths, A=A, if A implies B and A is true then B is true, I think therefore I am) 3. Interests (wants, desires, preferences, goals; of some sentient being) 4. Axioms (assumptions, statements assumed to be true without justification) 5. Presuppositions (norms presupposed by things actors are already doing) Any argument entailing normative force must rationally justify that normative force via one or more of these types of premises. Immediately the problem is that due to what is called the is/ought gap, truth and reason cannot justify normative (ethical) force, the type of normativity that governs apparently logically neutral behaviors like "you ought not murder". Is-statements, and logical tautologies, cannot directly derive normativity of this sort. Axioms also cannot fully derive ethical normativity, not in a way that is guaranteed to apply to the recipient, because the axioms themselves definitionally cannot be justified. Normative claims that are supposed to apply to specific people, derived from axioms like "Murder is wrong", are thus impossible to rationally justify. –Presuppositions and Non-Ethical Normatives– The one type of normativity that can be derived is normative rationalism, the idea that rationality and reason have action-guiding value. This can be derived through presuppositions, as engaging in argumentation or accepting deductive arguments based on their logical weight presupposes that rationality can have this action-guiding value. This rationality though cannot derive normative ethical claims on its own, and every attempt to do so from Kantianism, Argumentation Ethics, Contractualism, have had to assume extra normative claims that cannot be justified in and of themselves. –Interests CAN Justify Normative Claims– Interests however, and the value of them, is the one type of premise that when appealed to actually can derive normative claims. Imagine a deductive argument that sets out to prove "You ought to buy my washing machine". This is a normative claim, so you can't derive the ought from pure logic. You also cannot derive the ought from truth claims, and appealing to "Washing machines are good" as an axiom isn't helpful. Yet if you appeal to "You want clean clothes" then suddenly it is possible to derive "You ought to buy my washing machine". Of course for the conclusion to be normative, that premise must also be normative, therefore "You ought to achieve your end of getting clean clothes" must be true at least relative to the person the conclusion is meant to apply to. –Interests from Normative Force Conclusion– Thus, only interests can derive normative force in a way that can be applied. Therefore, any presupposition of the existence of ethical normative force, implicitly justifies the value of Interests in-order to rationally ground that normative force via justification. All arguments that function as a Normative Justification that tries to prove you ought to accept its conclusion, thus must presuppose the Fulfillment of Interests as a value as it pertains to the relevant interests of the person the argument's conclusion is meant to apply to. The only exception being arguments that prove normative claims based around pure truth, like "You ought to accept A = A". –Interactions ought to be Justifiable– If you interact with someone, you should be able to rationally justify your interaction, in a way where those involved in the interaction should be rationally required to accept it. This means you should be able to justify that the claim “You rationally ought to accept the standard I'm applying by acting” is true for the person you are interacting with; you should be able to justify your action. This is a Normative Justification, meaning a deductive argument that attempts to derive a claim in the form "You ought to accept X". Any argument in this form, must appeal to the interests of any debate opponent for the conclusion to have valid normative weight. To engage in an interaction that is inconsistent with the normative value of interest, is to engage in an interaction that cannot be rationally justified to anyone. To reject justification in this sense, is to forfeit all justification of ethical normative force, which leaves you unable to justify your own actions. If normative claims and normative arguments, arguments about things like "you ought not to murder", are recognized as meaningful whatsoever, forfeiting normative force prevents you from engaging in that conversation. –Layered Justification– Imagine someone fulfilling their interests while not interacting with anyone else in a way that interferes with their interest fulfillment. This is someone acting in a way that does not frustrate against anyone else's inherent interests, where 'inherent interest' means an interest that acts as a conduit of other interests, like basic autonomy. Such fulfillment is neutral under Justification Ethics. No deduction can be made for or against the action. Yet, acts against the neutral action are explicitly unjustifiable, as they represent inherent frustration. It should also be noted that Justification Ethics cannot on its own derive a claim of positive obligation, aka an obligation to act. It only deals with the justifiability of actual actions, not inaction. This is because "interactions ought be justifiable" is presupposed by the recognition of normative value, and presupposed by argumentation. Yet, "inaction ought be justifiable" is not presupposed by either. This allows the separation of Justification Ethics into three layers. 1. Actions that are inherently frustrating or abusive under the Anti-Abuse Principle, cannot justify normative force. Actions that promote fulfillment of interests can justify normative protection. Actions that constitute fulfillment of interests while not interacting with anyone else, are neutral. To act against such behavior is still unjustifiable. 2. Inherent Interest Theory as derived, states that interests acting as conduits of other interests, are Inherent Interests and ought to be given priority in justification. 3. The concept of Retaliatory Law justifies frustration in one extra case, if it constitutes defense against inherent frustration. This is justified as proportional defense is frustration of interests in defense of interests more inherent. These then explicitly solve conflicts between interests, generating the AAP. –Justifying the Anti-Abuse Principle– These building blocks then justify the Anti-Abuse Principle as a consequence. Actions that inherently frustrate against other's interests are unjustifiable, unless they constitute defense against inherent frustration. Actions that constitute fulfillment of other's interests justify normative protection. Actions that only fulfill interests of an individual, while not interacting with anyone else, are neutral, and unjustifiable to act against. Conflict between interests is measured via Inherent Interest Theory, where some actions are farther from pure inaction and represent a more intrinsic interference with others' interests, thus giving them more of a normative justificatory burden. —The Anti-Abuse Principle (AAP) Actions that are intrinsically frustrating to another's non-abusive fulfillment of interests, or inherently subordinate another's interests, constitute abuse, and are thus illegitimate. Actions that proportionately defend against abuse, or inhibit conduct that is inherently frustrating of interests, are legitimate insofar as they constitute self-defense. –Max Stirner's Egoism– This then sows the seeds for a sort of Universal Egoism, the idea that my ends matter, and yours, and everyone's. This sets up Yoggism to be the most consistent framework for ensuring the protection of the individual's self-interest, within an organized group or apart from one. This idea is a "spook to end all spooks". In Max Stirner's Egoism, a 'spook' is referred to as some action or concept meant to push you away from your own self-interest. To define a rule against creating spooks upon others, is the kind of rule a "Union of Egoists", the hypothetical social organizing envisioned by Max Stirner, advocates for. This rule is essentially exactly what the Anti-Abuse Principle is. This makes Yoggism particularly justifiable by Egoist standards, compared with other normative frameworks. Yoggism itself is a spook technically, but it is also the anti-spook. It should also be said that the only thing 'spooky' about Yoggism is its recognition of a minimal spook, the idea that actions require justification in any way. This minimal spook is then presupposed by all ethical debate. From this follows the AS Recognition: —The Abuse of the Spook (AS Recognition)— Some actions function as a 'spook' against the fulfillment of interests, such actions can be defined as intrinsically frustrating actions that inherently subordinate another's interests. These actions constitute abuse, norms based on such actions represent spooks of the mind against interests, and are thus the true enemy of both individual freedom and rational ethics. Therefore, actions that constitute inherent frustration through coercive frustration or subordination of another's interests, cannot be justified by any metric and are thus illegitimate. –Actions Must carry Justificatory Burden– If you accept beliefs should be justified, then we can gather that beliefs that guide actions should similarly be justified, such that a specific belief that interacts with others that may object, should be justified in a way others rationally should accept. Thus is implied that actions inherit a justificatory burden, the basis of Justification Ethics as only interests can justify such actions. To reject this entirely and argue beliefs do not need justification, is to reject all deductive arguments meant to prove a claim is rational to believe. You must also reject conclusions themselves as requiring justification as conclusions guide actions, acceptance of a conclusion is merely a form of belief. This then requires forfeiting the argumentative, logical, and normative force of the objection itself, a self-contradiction. Not merely performative, but a logical one. –The Igism Dilemma– For an Egoist to take up this position is to fall for the Igism dilemma. Imagine the ideology of Igism, that one should say 'Ig' once a day, and encourage others to do the same, while attempting to form a coercive government that indoctrinates others into Igism. For an Egoist to reject debate is for them to grant Igism equal weight to their own framework. An objection to the claim that beliefs should face justification is also to object to the very argumentative force of the objection itself, since a belief in the objection or acceptance of it's conclusion itself counts as a belief and suddenly cannot be justified in a way binding to any agent. –Rejection of Normative Force results in Unjustifiable Nihilism– If someone says "normative ethical force cannot be justified", they are presupposing that actions and that which is action-guiding, normativity, ought to be justified in the first place. This claim is also presupposed by argumentation and the acceptance of deductive proofs. The idea that deductive justification of actions is valuable itself, forces confrontation with the Fulfillment of Interests because interests are the only way to ground claims of justification for actions such as acts of gift-giving, eating food, violence, murder, theft, etc. To reject normative ethical force is also to reject any normative force pertaining to logically neutral actions, which is simply to embrace nihilism. –Interest-Frustration cannot be justified by Nihilistic Egoism– True Egoism requires the conclusion that it is irrational to say a strong person should not murder a disadvantaged person. Either that, or it must contradict itself. It is impossible to argue such a conclusion to someone if they are the disadvantaged, because making such an argument requires appealing to their preferences and such a conclusion contradicts them; their interest in not being attacked is clearly relevant to any argument against it, yet the argument against it can only function by granting their interests no weight. This is a blatant contradiction in the nature of justification itself. You cannot rationally justify an assertion that you can punch someone in the face for your own enjoyment, because any argument that could prove a normative claim applies to them, must appeal to some preferences they have, yet the assertion itself is contradictory to their preferences and grants their interests no weight. It also cannot be claimed that to have a preference beyond Egoism is irrational, as Egoism itself dictates that all self-interest is valid. It is only Preference as Normative Force itself, that allows for the distinction between rational and irrational interests, and it is this which allows for proper rational justification. Therefore, it is impossible to justify Egoism, it is impossible to justify behavior through Egoism, it is impossible to normatively argue for Egoism in a way that applies to anyone with an interest against it, and it is also self-contradictory to accept an argument for Egoism as it always contradicts your own rationally-justifiable preferences. Under Egoism, it is also impossible to successfully argue against actions consistent with Yoggism. Under any system it is theoretically impossible to argue against actions consistent with Yoggism, as doing so requires extra assumptions that need not apply. –Interests as Normative Value, Deductively Proven– We can now demonstrate this proof step-by-step: --Basic Clarifications-- A. Interests are not presuppositions onto themselves. This argument is based on the concept of examining that which can be justified relative to someone who already rationally values their own interests. The normative value of interests is agent-relative, someone who values nothing at all simply forfeits all normative force and cannot justify their actions or claims. B. In this context we can assume normative claims deduced from premises, must require at least one normative premise; this is justified by the is/ought gap. C. Interests are defined as any preferences, wants, desires, goals, that which a being's behavior tends towards; they are inherently and definitionally action-guiding. --The Argument-- –Definitions: (Normative Justification): A deductive argument that derives a normative claim in the form “you ought to accept X” or “you ought not act against or inconsistent with X”. (Ultimate Justification): A normative justification of a claim that does not ultimately depend on unjustified normative premises, except for the rules of logic themselves. (Descriptive Facts): Is-statements, claims that are not normative but explain facts about the world, I.E. “the sky is blue”. (Interests): That which the behavior of a sentient being tends towards. (Interests as a value): The appeal to interests as the source of normativity that derives a normative claim. –Premises: (P1): Normative Justifications that derive normative claims in the form “you ought to accept X”, must include at least one normative premise. (P2): Purely descriptive facts and logical truths alone cannot derive normative claims. (The is-ought gap) (P3): Normative axioms and assumptions cannot constitute an ultimate justification, because the axioms themselves are left unjustified and can be used to support contradicting claims. (P4): Normative Justifications can derive normative claims by appealing to someone's interests, I.E. “you ought to buy a washing machine” from an interest in clean clothes. (P5): Normative justifications must derive their normativity from premises their target is rationally required to accept, as otherwise their target is not rationally required to accept the claim, leaving it unjustified. (P6): In deduction, claims are derived from premises; such premises are either descriptive facts, logical truths, interests, axioms, or presuppositions; or reducible thereto. (P7): Presuppositions arising from norms of some external process, cannot consistently ground normative ethical claims, as such process can be evaded and its norms need not apply outside the process. (P8): If a norm is merely presupposed by participation in an inevitable or universal process, that fact alone cannot justify a normative ethical claim as such presuppositions reduce to mere descriptive facts. –Logic: (L1): From (P2 + P3), neither descriptive facts, purely logical truths, nor axioms or assumptions can ultimately ground justification of normative claims. (L2): From (P1 + L1), normative justifications cannot derive conclusions solely from descriptive facts, purely logical truths, axioms, or assumptions. (L3): From (P4 + P5), normative justifications can derive normative claims by deriving the normativity from an appeal to interests. (L4): From (L2 + L3), interests have the capacity to ground normative justification, whereas descriptive facts, pure logic, and axioms cannot ultimately ground normative justification. (L5): From (L4 + P6), interests and presuppositions are the only available types of premises for the normative grounding of normative claims. (L6): From (P7 + P8), presuppositions cannot consistently justifiably ground normative claims. –Conclusion: From (L5 + L6): Therefore, normative ethical justifications that consistently derive claims in the form “you ought to accept X”, must ultimately appeal to interests as a value, as otherwise they are rendered unjustifiable. –To not respect Interests, is thus a performative Contradiction– We may also demonstrate that to act in a way inconsistent with premises assumed by an argument, is a performative contradiction. A performative contradiction is when a statement's assertion contradicts necessary presuppositions required for it to be meaningful. Imagine you argue with your landlord about what you or them ought to do, in any sense. The landlord attempts a persuasive argumentation, thus appealing to your interests. This value of your interests must be a premise of their argument, as otherwise normative force is unjustifiable. If the landlord then turns on you and threatens to evict you for criticizing them, they are acting inconsistent with the assumption of the normative value of your interests they held previously, as doing so forfeits their ability to justify normative force, and thus forfeits their own argument. By arguing for the claim that they should evict you, or for arguing that if they threaten eviction you ought to give in, this is thus a performative contradiction. Therefore, if they still hold their previous argument as valid, and/or hold persuasive argumentation between them and you in any way to be valid, they are also contradicting themselves. Rationally, it can be argued that they ought to value argumentation with you, or with anyone willing to give persuasive argument for that matter. The only way then to not contradict yourself, when interacting with others where you would value argumentation, is to uphold the Fulfillment of Interests for all parties involved in the interaction. Thus, rational interactions ought to uphold the Fulfillment of Interests as a principle applicable to those parties.

Markets and Interest Alignment Back to Home Details Yoggism Guide Philosophy Menu More Markets and Interest Alignment [Full Text] —Public / Private Spectrum— If you have a dinner party at your house, is it inherently frustrating to kick someone out of your house for unfair reasons? Is it unethical? The problem with this, is that unfair judgement can count as frustration, but this frustration is happening within a greater scope that in a private space such as your own home, is more important. A right to your own sanctuary, to privacy, is more important. Relative to Yogg Virtue Ethics, it is unethical. Relative to Yogg Law, the Anti-Abuse Principle, it is permissible in the sense that it could constitute abuse to try and prevent you from removing them from your dinner party. A right to a private sanctuary makes less sense for something like a public restaurant. Though privately owned, it functions as a public space, and directly affects more people's interests in a way more inherent than your private home. In a private home, the person most affected by discrimination, is the home owner, not the person discriminated against. In a public restaurant, the opposite is true. The interest of someone wanting to stay at a dinner party, may be irrational if it resorts to violence, as they should have a private dwelling of their own. The protection of Interest Fulfillment implies as previously explained, a Right to Privacy and a Private Sanctuary to fulfill your own interests without frustrating against others. Whereas in a public restaurant, this logic stops making sense. There is no exact line here, it is a spectrum of what the difference between a public space and private space are, but the difference is in how different people's interests are weighed. A public restaurant would be weighed differently than a private club, for example. Although, if such a private club was integral to a community, this could change things. Very personal spaces are private. Very open spaces, are public. Spaces that are integral to a community or become inherently wrapped up in other's interests, such as spaces that provide services to people for profit, businesses, are public. —Ethics of Gated Communities— Similar to discrimination in open spaces, ethnostates and other gated large-scale communities create inherent frustration through discrimination and prejudice against people for reasons not relevant to Interests. This results in enforcement of frustration due to misaligned interests, as well as a lack of virtue such as respect and fairness, on behalf of the perpetrators of the unjustifiable exclusion. Racism, sexism, and other forms of prejudice, are hence an inherent frustration against people for irrational reasons, and for reasons that treat them as a mere member of some undefinable group, rather than as an individual who should be judged as such. The interests of a criminal, or drug trafficker, or gang member, may be irrational interests that should be defended against, but that does not make the interests of a random individual irrational or invalid, simply due to them being of the same creed. --Factionalism destroys Freedom of Movement-- For the most part, discrimination due to creed is justified not based on genuine and justifiable mistrust; but rather ignorance, and factionalism. It is for this reason that so-called freedom of association can quickly turn into instead, a freedom from those separate from your tribe, and a freedom to inherently frustrate, to discriminate, against others. If Interests are to have value themselves, the right to freedom of movement of people should be protected. People should not be limited to live in the community they were born in, and communities should be more open to letting new people in; it is only then that people can be truly free to fulfill their own ends. For these reasons, because of the importance of freedom of movement, the value of interests, and the unjustifiability of prejudice, ethnostates, ethno-nationalism, and the overall vices of tribalism, are ultimately against what is ethical. —Theory of Local Freedoms— Adding on to what constitutes abuse, in the setting of open or semi-public spaces, or even private spaces with common mutual trust, is the idea that inherent frustration when present in larger societies is condemnable, is also unjustifiable in local spaces. --The Unethics of Censorship-- To be censored for honest criticism, is unethical relative to the value of Interests, and the value of Truth. It represents an inherent frustration against someone's non-frustrating interests. To allow for such a form of censorship, is to allow for some people's interests to be given protection from criticism, in a way that may be irrational. This same logic applies in local circumstances, it is not purely beholden to large societies or to governments. If you're in a community and they try to kick you out for criticizing their leader, that is bad in and of itself. This grants an idea of Local Freedoms, freedoms that apply in local spaces as well as open, public spaces. True freedom thus grants Local Freedoms, since the value of the Fulfillment of Interests implies protection from abuse, and violation of these local freedoms is itself a form of abuse. --Alien Invasion Example-- If a group of aliens came down to Earth and claimed that thousands of years ago they created the Earth and have been continuously sustaining and developing the Earth and thus claim property ownership over the entirety of Earth (but not the humans themselves) and thus want to evict us from it, and force us from our homes, this act would be acceptable under the NAP yet it is clearly an unethical abuse of power, completely unfair, and abusive. Humans would be well within their rights to defend themselves. Relative to interests this is clearly the case, the aliens have interests misaligned with the humans and are inherently frustrating upon the humans. --Stripping of Contentment-- If someone is enjoying the fruits of their labor, and becomes content with their situation, stripping the person of their goods is bad. The consistency of circumstances entails a rational inherent interest in the circumstance, granting an entitlement to not being stripped of the goods via inherently frustrating transgression. If someone enjoys the ability to speak their mind on some platform, they should be able to continue with that and should not have their ability to interact on a platform taken away arbitrarily or exploitatively; as the taking away itself is bad regardless of the medium it is exercised through. --Conclusions of Local Freedoms-- If some action is good or bad, its morality is based on the content of the action and not purely in the medium with which it's carried out. Censorship is bad, whether performed through violence, or enforced via property. Censorship is wrong because the content of the action is itself wrong, not the way it is enforced. —Why Market Domination is Inevitable— Any market if left without enough regulation, will naturally create centralization through cumulative advantage, and said centralization will not be destroyed unless it screws up majorly. The problem with this, is it allows dominant producers to abuse their consumers and workers as already explained, within a threshold. For industries that have a naturally higher barrier to entry, or a low barrier to entry for competition but a high barrier to entry for meaningful competition, perfect competition and near-perfect competition may be impossible which will result in dominant producers forming, creating the same problem as full-on monopolies, to a slightly lesser extent. Libertarian theory assumes markets select for quality, but network science and empirical data imply they select for path dependance. In the real world, large firms will have an advantage over smaller firms by virtue of being large. This is path dependence, where consumers are more likely to choose the large firm more often, because their services will be of more consistent quality. --Market Share Growth is Self-Reinforcing- Market domination is simply a predictable consequence of feedback loops. Advantages such as capital, brand recognition, and network effects, compound over time allowing for increases in bargaining power, visibility, reduced marginal costs, etc. All of which, allows for greater growth and attracts more customers and talent. It is a cycle that causes market share to ever increase, until the business completely messes something up. This is a problem, because in-order for such a cycle to be prevented, for rightful fear of centralization, competition needs to happen. Unfortunately, entry into a market is not binary. While small competitors may or may not enter easily, the dominant firm's accumulated advantages can naturally, or deliberately, prevent entrants from forming meaningful competition. --Centralization leads to Widespread Abuse-- Markets do not select for the best product in the abstract; instead they select for the product that is good enough given historical adoption. Once a firm becomes the default, quality improvements by competitors face diminishing returns, while quality degradation by the dominant firm faces a delayed and weakened punishment. Advantages become too accumulated and competition too reduced. This is Market Centralization. The moment market share is centralized to specific companies, regardless of whether domination is by an absolute monopoly or not, a firm can exert monopoly-like power while retaining nominal competitors. All a firm needs, is a decisive market share. This is not a problem because it 'raises prices', it is a problem because it undermines consent. When exit is costly and alternatives are functionally inferior, transactions become structurally forced to follow the decisions of the dominant firm. This destroys consensual transactions, and is actually the exact same reason why monopolies can abuse their consumers. The problem is simple. A lack of competition creates a lack of functional alternatives, creating the ability for a dominant producer to enforce their own interests against their consumers. Markets work best when business bends the knee to their workers and consumers, unfortunately centralization creates a scenario where service industry forces consumers and especially workers to serve them and their every want, and not the other way around. This is the heart of interest frustration in the economy. --Why Markets do not Self-Correct-- The assumption that markets will self-correct relies on the idea that sufficient harm will cause greater competition. This is true to an extent, but once market power is centralized, the conditions required for correction are systematically undermined and beholden to the interest asymmetry created by the relationship between producers, consumers, and last, workers. Market correction therefore does not fail because actors behave irrationally, but because rational behavior under asymmetric power conditions reinforces the dominant position. What emerges is not a temporary deviation from market logic, but its predictable outcome. —Entangled Property by Entangled Interests— If you are employed as part of some large-scale job, it is worth saying that a significant set of your interests are wrapped up in your job. Employment, and the specific business you are employed to, explicitly become conduits of your rational interests. If you are to own what you make, in an Interest Property sense, as when you make something your interests get wrapped up in what you make, then that gives a conclusion that has interesting consequences: That you have an ethical claim over the decisions of the business you yourself are employed to, when it affects you. This represents a Right over Influence, a right over that which inherently affects you, and this comes right out of the value of Interests. --Layoffs are Inherently Frustration against Entangled Interests-- If you have a job and are suddenly laid off, this can cause significant harm to your own ability to fulfill your interests, and all interests directly related to your job, are immediately frustrated. If a job includes long-term commitment and long working hours, decisions at the firm you work at are suddenly directly entangled with your own interests. This is Entangled Property. Instead of personal property which is private to an individual, property used in a profit-generating setting through tools and devices operated by multiple people, which is called Productive Property, and sometimes just Private Property or Private Productive Property. This kind of property usage creates an entanglement of people's interests. --Productive Property operated by multiple people creates Entangled Interests-- This productive property is the means of the production of goods, and as used here is entangled property when multiple people's lives are inherently affected, and hence this applies to employment. In a limited sense, and in a way relevant to this concept, to be unfairly laid off of a job is thus not only inherent frustration against you, but a violation against the conduit of your interests. For interests to have value is for you to own your interests. To own your interests is to have some say over that which affects you personally. —Worker and Consumer Ownership— Entangled Property and Abuse, Interest Frustration, Eventual Centralization.. There is a solution to these problems, the solution is Interest Alignment. The fundamental problem here is that a firm is owned by a single person, or small group of people, who's interests take priority over their employees and consumers. --Interests must be Aligned-- Producers, workers, and consumers, are the three main groups. For companies that are publicly traded, this also includes shareholders. Producers and shareholders taking precedence over workers and consumers, and this time the shareholders have significant market power as a side-effect of being part of the means to profit. The most common targets of market abuse can be identified as the Workers and Consumers. This logic can be used thus, as an ethical justification of worker and consumer ownership of the means of production, in the sense of worker-owned cooperative enterprise and consumer coops. The best way to align the interests of workers and producers together, is simply for the workers to be the producers, or for the workers to have ownership of the firm itself. The ethical and rational imperative is to grant ownership with those whose interests are most entangled with the firm, to give workers and consumers a real stake and voice in the means of production. --Worker-Owned Cooperatives have Advantages-- Empirically, around the world; Worker-Owned Cooperatives, enterprise under the legal ownership and control of their employees, have been shown to result in greater stability during economic downturn, as well as a persistence to lower wages during a crisis in a way more consensual as the workers themselves are the ones choosing to lower wages, and instead of simply doing a non-consensual layoff as is common in other forms of enterprise. This results in a more stable market environment less prone to bust and boom cycles than traditional capitalist enterprise; capitalist in the sense of individuals maintaining sole ownership of a business through contracts. --Worker-Ownership is better than Centralized Command Economies-- One thing this logic acts against, is Centralized Command Economies. A Command Economy is an economy where the means of production and exchange is operated at a significant scale by the State, or some other form of government or central power. This is fundamentally different from worker and consumer ownership, and such an economy has a poor track-record around the world, especially for State-owned production, as this removes the competition-driven market forces that allow for markets to align interests at all. This damages the ability to decide what should be produced and how. To simply nationalize industry naively, and put it all under centralized control of a single entity with likely poor management, is not a good strategy. The market is a tool, not an enemy of Interests. —The Conclusion— Worker and Consumer Ownership, along with acts against Discrimination and an ensurance of fair treatment of consumers and workers alike, is the imperative given by Interest Alignment. This then acts as a rational justification for Worker Cooperatives, Consumer Cooperatives, Right to Employment Laws, Civil Rights, and the philosophical basis of Fairness in greater society.

Deduction of Interests Back to Home Details Yoggism Guide Philosophy Menu More Deduction of Interests as a Value [Logical Deduction] –The value of Interests, derived from the existence of Normative Force itself– --Basic Clarifications-- A. Interests are not presuppositions onto themselves. This argument is based on the concept of examining that which can be justified relative to someone who already rationally values their own interests. The normative value of interests is agent-relative, someone who values nothing at all simply forfeits all normative force and cannot justify their actions or claims. B. In this context we can assume normative claims deduced from premises, must require at least one normative premise; this is justified by the is/ought gap. C. Interests are defined as any preferences, wants, desires, goals, that which a being's behavior tends towards; they are inherently and definitionally action-guiding. --The Argument Step-By-Step-- 0. Acceptance of any deductive argument, presupposes reason and deduction according to logic. 1. Normative Justifications prove a conclusion of "therefore, you ought to believe X" by definition. 2. Proving a conclusion in any deductive argument, requires premises. (basic deduction) 3. If normative justifications prove normative claims to some opponent, based on premises, those premises must apply to the opponent as otherwise the conclusion would not follow. 4. Normative conclusions must derive their normativity from normative premises. (is-ought gap) 5. For a normative premise to apply to some opponent, it must derive its normative force from claims already valid for the opponent; facts, logic, or values they hold as having force. 6. An opponent's wants, desires, beliefs, preferences; definition-wise these are their interests, and they are values the opponent holds with normative force relative to themselves. 7. A normative justification cannot be grounded on axioms or assumptions, as the axioms themselves are left unjustified and can be used to support contradicting claims. 8. Thus, for a normative premise to apply to some opponent, it must derive normative force from an appeal to truth, reason, presupposed norms, or the opponent's value of their own interests. 9. It is impossible to derive normative claims in the form "you ought not murder" from true facts alone. This is the is-ought fallacy. Thus epistemic truths and reason, fail to derive normative force. 10. Presuppositions arising from norms of a specific process cannot derive ethical force, as such process can be evaded and its norms need not apply outside the process. 11. Any argument that hinges on or argues for normative ethical force, thus must ultimately derive that normative force from an appeal to interests, as otherwise the conclusion need not apply. 12. Acceptance of the validity of normative ethical force thus presupposes that normative force can be justified, therefore appealing to the value of interests. –Acceptance of Normative Force presupposes a value of Interests– Therefore, to assume the existence of normative force rationally requires the presupposition of the normative value of Interests, as otherwise such normative force would be impossible to justify. To reject the normative value of Interests as they apply to all beings, is to make all arguments for normative force of any kind unjustifiable. To reject Interests as the source of normative value is thus to forfeit all normative force. --The Argument as a Deduction-- –Definitions: (Normative Justification): A deductive argument that derives a normative claim in the form “you ought to accept X” or “you ought not act against or inconsistent with X”. (Ultimate Justification): A normative justification of a claim that does not ultimately depend on unjustified normative premises, except for the rules of logic themselves. (Descriptive Facts): Is-statements, claims that are not normative but explain facts about the world, I.E. “the sky is blue”. (Interests): That which the behavior of a sentient being tends towards. (Interests as a value): The appeal to interests as the source of normativity that derives a normative claim. –Premises: (P1): Normative Justifications that derive normative claims in the form “you ought to accept X”, must include at least one normative premise. (P2): Purely descriptive facts and logical truths alone cannot derive normative claims. (The is-ought gap) (P3): Normative axioms and assumptions cannot constitute an ultimate justification, because the axioms themselves are left unjustified and can be used to support contradicting claims. (P4): Normative Justifications can derive normative claims by appealing to someone's interests, I.E. “you ought to buy a washing machine” from an interest in clean clothes. (P5): Normative justifications must derive their normativity from premises their target is rationally required to accept, as otherwise their target is not rationally required to accept the claim, leaving it unjustified. (P6): In deduction, claims are derived from premises; such premises are either descriptive facts, logical truths, interests, axioms, or presuppositions; or reducible thereto. (P7): Presuppositions arising from norms of some external process, cannot consistently ground normative ethical claims, as such process can be evaded and its norms need not apply outside the process. (P8): If a norm is merely presupposed by participation in an inevitable or universal process, that fact alone cannot justify a normative ethical claim as such presuppositions reduce to mere descriptive facts. –Logic: (L1): From (P2 + P3), neither descriptive facts, purely logical truths, nor axioms or assumptions can ultimately ground justification of normative claims. (L2): From (P1 + L1), normative justifications cannot derive conclusions solely from descriptive facts, purely logical truths, axioms, or assumptions. (L3): From (P4 + P5), normative justifications can derive normative claims by deriving the normativity from an appeal to interests. (L4): From (L2 + L3), interests have the capacity to ground normative justification, whereas descriptive facts, pure logic, and axioms cannot ultimately ground normative justification. (L5): From (L4 + P6), interests and presuppositions are the only available types of premises for the normative grounding of normative claims. (L6): From (P7 + P8), presuppositions cannot consistently justifiably ground normative claims. –Conclusion: From (L5 + L6): Therefore, normative ethical justifications that consistently derive claims in the form “you ought to accept X”, must ultimately appeal to interests as a value, as otherwise they are rendered unjustifiable.

Rebuttals to Objections Back to Home Details Yoggism Guide Philosophy Menu More Rebuttals to possible Objections to Yoggism [Full Text] —Rebuttals to Objections— This section outlines rebuttals to several possible objections to Yoggism, including its Justification Ethics argument. The following objections refuted are as follows, in order: 1. Justification Ethics cannot reject Presuppositions without Contradiction 2. Why must Axioms require Justification? 3. Justification Ethics is just a worse version of Argumentation Ethics 4. Rejecting Interpersonal Justification doesn't make me Irrational 5. Justification Ethics is Begging the Question 6. The Anti-Abuse Principle is Poorly Defined and Cannot Ground Rights 7. The AAP cannot stop a Hoarder of Insulin without invalidating Bodily Autonomy 8. The Is/Ought Gap Objection 9. The Action Spectrum is Arbitrary 10. Actions cannot inherit Justificatory Burden 11. Why must I justify my Actions to Animals? 12. The Is/Ought Gap is Invalid -Justification Ethics cannot reject Presuppositions without Contradiction- Justification Ethics contradicts itself, it says presuppositions are invalid as a way to derive normative claims, while also deriving the idea that interests of an individual can derive normative claims with respect to them, by arguing it is presupposed by instrumental rationality. It gives the example of someone wanting clean clothes, and saying you can roughly prove the normative "you ought to buy my washing machine" by appealing to their interest in clean clothes. This only works if we accept that they "ought" act rationally according to their own interests. This claim is a presupposition of debate, argumentation, and a definition of rationality in general. The Actions Must be Justified section explains this further, but if presuppositions cannot ultimately derive normative claims, then interests ultimately getting normative claims via this presupposition is a contradiction. Thus Justification Ethics contradicts itself. -Rebuttal- If someone accepts a normative premise or is currently engaging in an activity that presupposes a normative premise, that premise can be used to derive a normative claim that does apply to them in the moment. A presupposition is nothing more than a claim that can be derived to be true based on another claim that is already accepted. By engaging in "peaceful conduct", you derive the claim that "you ought not hurt your friend", not as a universal rule but rather if you do hurt your friend you would no longer be engaging in peaceful conduct. As such, as long as you engage, the normative claim is presupposed that you should not hurt your friend. The problem with presuppositions and the target Justification Ethics rejects, is presuppositions that attempt to derive universal principles impossible to reject. Such presuppositions almost always involve hidden normative assumptions. Two examples of this are Hoppe's Argumentation Ethics and Immanuel Kant's transcendental argument based on agency. These both involve hidden normative assumptions and as of now no deduction with all objectively true premises that derive their conclusions has been proven. -Why must Axioms require Justification?- Why can't axioms derive normative claims? If I prove to someone that a conclusion like "they ought not murder" follows from an axiom like "human life has intrinsic value", they can't dismiss the conclusion because it has an axiom. They also must accept that they rationally ought to accept the conclusion from the premises, because my argument can be entirely valid. If they reject my axiom I can simply attempt to prove my axiom in ways they would accept, there's no problem here. -Rebuttal- Justification Ethics argues that neither raw logical truths, factual statements, presuppositions, nor axioms, can ultimately derive normative claims. This is argued through the is/ought gap, and presupposition-based arguments centered on the norms of some activity involving hidden normative assumptions to universalize any derived normative claims. When it comes to axioms, the reasoning is that in-order to prove to someone the claim "you ought not murder" for example, to simply appeal to an axiom such as "human life has intrinsic value", doesn't actually prove the claim. Such a deduction does not actually prove they "rationally ought to accept murder is wrong", rather the deduction proves they "rationally ought to accept murder is wrong, given their acceptance of this axiom", and such a deduction will fail if they reject the axiom because the "given their acceptance" condition will fail. If you then attempt to further argue in favor of the axiom, or attempt to derive the axiom from other premises, then the axiom you chose isn't actually an 'axiom', it's just another premise. A true axiom, the kind of axiom Justification Ethics targets, is an assumption that is the basis of some system, a fundamental assumption that cannot be 'proven' but rather is a given. If instead you decide that your "human life has intrinsic value" axiom for example, is not a true axiom but is simply another premise, then this is a normative premise, and must be ultimately derived from another normative premise, due to the is/ought gap. As such, you haven't solved the problem at all and have simply moved the deriving of normatives back a step. Neither raw logical truths nor factual statements may prove normative claims, so you are stuck with only presuppositions, or interests themselves. True axioms as explained cannot be derived from further premises by definition, and thus cannot ultimately justify normative claims in a way others can be rationally required to accept. The only exception is the axiom that rationality matters in the first place, but pure logic doesn't derive normative ethical claims, it's limited to claims like "you ought accept 1+1=2". -Justification Ethics is just a worse version of Argumentation Ethics- The idea that argumentation or debate more generally, presupposes that your opponent's interests are valuable, is simply a worse and less formal version of Hans-Hermann Hoppe's Argumentation Ethics. -Rebuttal- Hoppe's Argumentation Ethics attempts to derive anarcho-capitalist concepts of self-ownership and the Non-Aggression Principle by arguing they are presupposed by engagement in argumentation and arguing that the idea of solving conflicts through argument rather than force is also presupposed by argumentation. Ultimately it attempts to derive these principles as universal. This is a transcendental argument arising from a presupposition of norms of a specific activity. Justification Ethics is very different from this, the claim of Justification Ethics is that interests are the only thing that can ultimately derive normative claims in a way others are rationally required to accept, thus Ethics must be based on interests, collapsing into Yoggism. This is not an argument about presupposed norms of some specific activity you may or may not engage in, it is not an argument that your ethical arguments are invalidated by rejecting said norms, rather it is an argument about the very logical grounds to justify deductions of claims themselves. One possible objection to Argumentation Ethics is that it cannot prove any ethical theory false, because whether an arguer is performatively contradicting themselves as they are advocating against norms presupposed during argumentation, which is a claim with its own problems, says nothing about the truth value of the arguments being provided. A utilitarian could make a detailed argument in favor of utilitarianism, and the anarcho-capitalist could claim the utilitarian is performatively contradicting themselves by arguing in favor of utilitarianism, but this does not disprove the argument they give itself. If the argument is in deductive form for example, the conclusion of it could still follow from the premises. This same objection does not work against Justification Ethics because it targets what premises can even exist for deriving normative claims, in a way that works universally. -Rejecting Interpersonal Justification does not make me Irrational- Justification Ethics only works if we assume actions should be justified in a way others rationally ought to accept, this is interpersonal justification. If I reject such justification as a standard, as an Egoist might, or if I appeal to a different standard, that does not make me irrational. -Rebuttal- The Actions Must be Justified section of Yoggism explains that, to engage in debate and argumentation about ethics, is to presuppose the idea that beliefs should be interpersonally justified in the way explained. The reason why is because if you engage in ethical debate and reject the idea that beliefs should be justified, that actions should be justified or that ethical claims should be interpersonally justified in the way important to Justification Ethics, you run into a problem where any argument you make in favor of an ethical claim becomes impossible to defend, because you have rejected the very need for defense and the need for others to be able to accept your own objection. An Egoist attempting to reject the idea that beliefs should be interpersonally justified thus falls into the trap of losing not only their own arguments normative force, but also their argumentative force. Nothing they say matters anymore, as they are no longer actually debating, they are simply engaging with others pragmatically. What is for sure is no-one else has any reason to accept their arguments. To argue that beliefs should be interpersonally justified, but actions need not be, creates it's own problem. Some beliefs are action-guiding, 'followed beliefs'. Thus if we accept beliefs should be justified in ways others rationally ought to accept, then it is derived that some actions imply justified or unjustified beliefs; this is what it means to say actions should be justified. Thus actions should be justified which then implies a spectrum of justificatory burden to avoid a collapse of justification in terms of conflict, thus implying Justification Ethics and Inherent Frustration as illegitimate, deriving the Anti-Abuse Principle. -Justification Ethics is Begging the Question- Justification Ethics doesn't prove its actual argument, it's begging the question. You could use the process of elimination present in JE to argue for any standard. Interests being the one thing that can derive normative claims is entirely arbitrary. -Rebuttal- Interests are the only thing that can derive normative claims to an arbitrary individual. If I have an interest in clean clothes, and I have money and have an interest in spending them to solve my problem, you can prove I rationally ought to buy your washing machine by appealing to instrumental rationality with respect to my interests. If we agree with the statement "It is irrational for someone looking for ice cream, to jump into a random sinkhole while walking towards an ice cream truck", then we agree that ultimately you rationally ought to fulfill your interests in the best way possible with respect to other rational standards. That other standard is Justification Ethics itself, and this all implies that your own interests can derive normative claims with respect to yourself, at the very least. This then is one of the premises that allows Justification Ethics to prove that ethical normative claims, claims beholden to others, must appeal to interests to ultimately be justifiable. The argument is not simply "interests are the basis of ethics because interests matter", rather it is "the value of interests is the only kind of premise that can derive normative claims upon others in a way that appeals to nothing more than rationality. -The Anti-Abuse Principle is Poorly Defined and Cannot Ground Rights- The Anti-Abuse Principle as stated is poorly defined and cannot ground rights or a public private split through inherent frustration. For example do I own my body? Do I have a right of bodily autonomy? If someone else's interest over my body is more inherent than my interest, then no. Imagine someone who has to run around and slap people, at least one a day, or else they will die. Do I have an obligation to let them slap me? Must I not defend myself? If so, then I have no right to bodily autonomy, no right to be free from someone slapping me if me being slapped is in service of someone's 'greater good'. -Rebuttal- This is a misuse of the concept of "inherent interests". There is no principle that can be justified that states you must maximize fulfillment of inherent interests and that not wanting someone to slap you is unjustifiable if it fails at that goal, that would be more consistent with preference utilitarianism. The Anti-Abuse Principle is instead about actions, actions being taken that frustrate others' interests in a way intrinsic to the action itself. To slap someone is inherently frustrating against their interest in not being slapped, and that action constitutes a spook against their interests in the sense that their interest in not being slapped is being ignored for your own gain, their interests are being inherently subordinated to you. This is very clearly against the Anti-Abuse Principle and comically, only makes sense if the person you are slapping is a utilitarian themselves. Otherwise, a claim against them of the sort cannot be justified. Thus under the AAP we can derive that you do in-fact have a claim of bodily autonomy, in the sense that attacks against your body that are actions, cannot be justified against you for performing what is in distinction, inaction. Inherent Interests are merely a side-product of this kind of reasoning, not the tool to measure if actions against others is necessarily justified. Inherent interests, interests that act as a conduit for other interests, are more useful when comparing two actions that are both otherwise equally weighed in terms of how much of an interference they represent. -The AAP cannot stop a Hoarder of Insulin without invalidating Bodily Autonomy- For the Anti-Abuse Principle to argue that it is justified to stop someone from hoarding insulin or distributing it at a very high price to exploit diabetic patients, is to fall into the problem of consequentialist thinking. Through this thinking one can justify actions against your own bodily autonomy if your autonomy prevents someone else from accessing some resource. For example having organs and refusing to donate a kidney. How can this be justified relative to the interests of the person who needs a kidney transplant? To claim you have a right over your organs under Yoggism would mean to claim your interests are entangled with the organ, but the same logic can be applied to a pharmacy distributing insulin at a price. Yoggism thus to enforce the Anti-Abuse part of the AAP, must reject bodily autonomy. -Rebuttal- Imagine someone who needs to slap one person every day or else they will die. Does this give them a right, under Justification Ethics, to slap people? Does it mean the people being slapped are not allowed to defend themselves? The answer is a strong no, because the act of slapping is just that, an action, that cannot be justified relative to interests; unless the slapper can convince people to voluntarily let them slap them. To slap someone is an inherently frustrating action, where the frustration of interests is intrinsic to the content of the action itself, and involves a frustration of the inherent interest in bodily autonomy. For the same reasons, involuntary organ harvesting is also illegitimate. With a pharmacy selling insulin at a jacked up price rate, this is an action being performed by the business, continuously paying to supply and sell insulin, and intentionally setting the prices high. Under the Anti-Abuse Principle, such an action cannot be justified. Both conclusions are true at the same time. In terms of a pharmacy restricting access to insulin drugs, the previous argument subtly fails. Having a body is not an action against anyone, but hoarding medicine is. -The Is/Ought Gap Objection- Deriving an ought claim from an is-statement, is impossible under Hume's is/ought gap. Any is-statement, such as "the sky is blue" or "there is a person here / this person does exist", or even "suffering exists" or "suffering is a consequence of this action", cannot logically derive an ought claim. Arguing a given action is bad because it causes suffering, begs the question of whether that causation of suffering is bad itself. If it isn't the argument does not follow. That question is a normative assumption, and such normative assumptions are required to derive normative claims. Justification Ethics cannot cross the is/ought gap. -Rebuttal- The is/ought gap accepted by Justification Ethics is nothing more than the proposition that an is statement cannot derive an ought statement. Neither Justification Ethics nor any other argument within Yoggism attempts to derive an ought-statement directly from an is-statement. Instead, Justification Ethics argues that the only way to justify normative claims in defense of actions is ultimately through an appeal to interests, actions that are inherently frustrating to interests in a way intrinsic to the content of the action itself is thus illegitimate. This is the basis of the Anti-Abuse Principle and the idea that such actions should be justified is a separate question of whether you agree to participate in the context of Ethics itself. When it comes to that, the question turns into whether you can justify claims at all without accepting interpersonal justification in the sense that beliefs and the results of beliefs that guide action, should ultimately be able to be justified in a way those affected rationally ought to accept. Justification Ethics is the way to solve for this justification. Nothing here derives an is-statement from an ought-statement, and every deduction used in Justification Ethics and the Actions Must be Justified section uses normative premises that are either tautology or presupposed from debate. -The Action Spectrum is Arbitrary- Justification Ethics implies normative ethical claims cannot be derived in a way others rationally ought to accept, without an appeal to the interests of those involved, or an appeal to the very standard of Justification Ethics itself. Inherent Interest Theory claims that an action spectrum is valid and can be used to resolve conflicts, but this action spectrum is entirely arbitrary. There is no distinction between action and inaction, this is a farce. Rather, all behavior is action and no action can be proven to be justifiable to everyone, so this universal justification rule cannot ground Ethics. -Rebuttal- If you reject the action spectrum you must reject any way to ground Ethics through interpersonal justification. What that means is, assuming Justification Ethics is correct, you must concede that it is impossible to prove any given ethical standard in a way others are rationally required to accept. This doesn't change the fact that relative to full Yoggism, with the action spectrum included, actions consistent with Yoggism are the only actions that can be justified relative to this measure. It also doesn't change the fact that this measure is the strongest justification measure that can exist, thus Yoggism is the only ethic all are rationally required to accept if we assume the possibility of such an ethic in the first place. The action spectrum is also implied from the asymmetry of having a belief that then requires justification, and not making a claim in the first place. Not making a claim doesn't presuppose justification, and argumentation only presupposes that claims / beliefs posited require justification. To reject that beliefs require justification is to reject the argumentative force of your own objection. To accept this asymmetry is to accept that the followed beliefs, beliefs that are action-guiding, have a justificatory burden, whereas refraining from asserting a claim does not create an equivalent justificatory burden. From here, argumentation presupposes that beliefs can possess differing degrees of justificatory status, some claims can be better justified than others, while some lack sufficient justification entirely. Since actions stem from followed beliefs, this then yields the Action Spectrum. -Actions cannot inherit Justificatory Burden- Why must actions be justified? The argument is that engaging in debate about normatives presupposes as a premise of all arguments begotten during debate, that beliefs have a justificatory burden; and that this burden is then inherited by actions as some beliefs are action-guiding. This inference is simply wrong, I reject the premise. Beliefs can have justificatory burden sure, giving my own objection argumentative force, but you can't prove actions need justification. Ethics is subjective, you can't just get around that. -Rebuttal- Some beliefs are action-guiding, these are followed beliefs. We can think of whatever action you are taking as that which your behavior intentionally tends towards, which is the fulfillment of some interest. We can then think of a belief as an internal action going on within your own head, a mental state or mind state if you will. Followed beliefs are internal actions, mind-states, that then causatively result in an external action being taken, in your body and other stuff being used as a means to achieve some end. For you to take some action then implies a followed belief, a mind-state that caused the action. If mind-states have a justificatory burden in argument, then it becomes possible for an action to imply a justified or unjustified mind-state. This is how actions have justificatory burden. To say actions must be justified, is simply to say actions imply mind-states that have justificatory burden. The action implies the burden upon mind-states, the action need not hold the burden itself. From this it becomes equivalent to the premise that "normative claims supporting an action should be justified" that Justification Ethics uses in the first place. -Why must I justify my Actions to Animals?- Justification Ethics may establish my actions against others require justification, and that such justification requires an appeal to interests. Who says this applies to animals too, though? Debate need not presuppose the justificatory burden of actions against non-humans, debate is done with humans. -Rebuttal through Justification Ethics- Debate presupposes that beliefs face a justificatory burden, to act against an animal and claim it just is to hold a followed belief in that. That belief has a justificatory burden that must be defended. The problem is, species specific claims can't be justified arbitrarily. To prove abusing an animal fulfills your interests and other humans' interests, doesn't actually prove the animal ought accept the claim, which makes it impossible to prove to another human who doesn't hold the arbitrary distinction as truth. Holding extra assumptions to justify animal abuse goes against the idea that beliefs should be justified and can be questioned, holding unquestioned assumptions in general is a problem unless said assumptions are merely the foundation of a particular and useful context, such as the axioms of basic arithmetic. As such, for any sentient being capable of acting rationally or irrationally relative to their own goals, which can be thought of as any being capable of making mistakes relative to their own goals, it can then be evaluated whether a certain claim is something they rationally should accept. This does not mean the being will actually accept it or has the necessary faculties to reason out the claim, but rather that regardless of the being's intelligence, the claim does technically follow, whether they know it or not. To reject this reasoning is to ultimately leave certain beliefs unjustified, which also creates the problem where anyone you arbitrarily refuse to debate is suddenly someone you can act against. You cannot claim to obey justification if you refuse to justify your actions in a way the beings you act against rationally should accept. Thus, actions that inherently frustrate and intrinsically subordinate interests of sentient beings in general, are illegitimate as they cannot be justified. To put it simply, prove you have the right to abuse a dog. You cannot. -Rebuttal through Estoppel Ethics- We can argue for this Absolute Interest Conclusion, that the value of interests of all sentient beings is the utmost rational standard of ethics, in another way too. The Estoppel Argument is the idea that if I attack someone, they can proportionately repeat my behavior back to me, I.E. attack me back. Self-defense ultimately comes from this idea. The justification is that if I punch Bob, I am demonstrating a claim that I have the right to punch people. If Bob returns the favor, he is demonstrating the same claim. For me to reject his claim is for me to either make an arbitrary distinction, or for me to contradict my own claim. The Estoppel can then be used to demonstrate interchangeability of persons, or beings more broadly. To make an agent-specific claim, that I have the right to punch anyone and only I have this right, is to break this interchangeability, because if we swap me and Bob then I would suddenly reject the claim, I would object to any claim giving someone else such an arbitrary right. This interchangeability can then demonstrate a principle of fairness, leading to the Anti-Abuse Principle. The important part is that two beings interacting that are a different species creates the same problematic claim as saying a specific person has a right to punch everyone else. To argue I can kill a cow because I am a human and they are a cow, breaks the interchangeability standard again because if I was a cow and they were a human, I would object to such a claim on it's arbitrarity. This kind of claim thus undermines the Estoppel and renders it trivial. To instead uphold the standard is to accept such arbitrary distinctions need not apply, thus implying from the Anti-Abuse Principle the Absolute Interest Conclusion. -The Is/Ought Gap is Invalid- Justification Ethics is based on the idea that is-statements cannot derive ought-statements, neither can axioms or arbitrary presuppositions, thus interests are the only option to ultimately derive ethical claims. This is wrong though, is-statements can derive ought-statements and to say otherwise is to make it impossible to prove truth is binding at all. If normatives, if what we should act on or should accept, is entirely separated from facts and what exists, then truth is subjective. Furthermore, we can think up an is-statement such as "Human dignity is a virtue", and then derive normatives from it. Why? Because virtues are things you ought act according to by definition. This proves is-statements can derive oughts, and the gap is just invalid. Thus pinpointing interests as "the only thing that can derive normative ethical claims" is nonsense and just assuming true the premise. -Rebuttal- The is/ought gap is not about literal sentences containing the word is. The gap appealed to in Justification Ethics is more specifically, the gap between pure descriptives and normative claims. All of Justification Ethics is based on how normative ethical claims specifically, claims about what actions beings should perform that affect one another, can be derived. These are very special types of normatives, and such normatives cannot be derived from pure descriptive claims. The statement "human dignity is a virtue" is a hidden normative claim. To be true, it relies on the normative definition of virtue, and the statement itself is thus claiming human dignity is in the normative category. This is not non-normative by any definition. A claim such as "the sky is blue" or "suffering exists" are decisively not normative, they are merely facts about the world. A claim that "one rationally ought accept the sky is blue" is normative, but it is only rationally normative, not ethically. As such you can directly derive it from the rationality presupposed during debate. Facts and truth are not subjective, they are objective and that objectivity is what is already being appealed to by comparing and evaluating reasons based on the standard itself, which is expressly being done by you reading these objections and rebuttals. To reject this standard is to reject your own objection to the standard, a contradiction. For similar presuppositions to derive ethical claims though is where Justification Ethics comes in. Interests are the only thing that can derive ethical claims, or so Justification Ethics argues, simply because non-normatives, purely descriptive claims, cannot derive normatives, and axioms are unjustifiable assumptions by definition, and arbitrary presuppositions of norms of some activity can't derive ethics by themselves. All that is left is interests.

Actions Must be Justified Back to Home Details Yoggism Guide Philosophy Menu More Actions Must be Justified [Full Text] –Beliefs must be Justified– The Egoist who obtains the ability to be persuaded by sufficient reason must accept beliefs should be justified. Debate itself, regardless if involved in ethics or otherwise, implies beliefs require interpersonal justification, as all debate is to reason about beliefs. –Rejection of Justification forfeits all Argument– To reject the idea that beliefs require justification, is to forfeit all argumentative force, to fully reject all ability to make claims others have any sufficient reason to accept, and to grant yourself the ability to take up any position without justification. For an Egoist to take up this position is to fall for the Igism dilemma. If an Egoist attempts this you may simply respond claiming to be a believer of Igism, where Igism is the idea that one should say 'Ig' once a day, and encourage others to do the same, while attempting to form a coercive government that indoctrinates others into Igism. For an Egoist to reject debate is for them to grant Igism equal weight to their own framework. Any objection to the claim that beliefs should face justification is also to object to the very argumentative force of the objection itself, since a belief in the objection or acceptance of it's conclusion itself counts as a belief and suddenly cannot be justified in a way binding to any agent. –What is a Belief?– What is a belief, though? Ultimately a belief is something you act on, a conclusion you accept and would bet on being correct, and may guide your actions. In a physical sense you can think of it as a pattern within your own brain. Acceptance of beliefs based on justification can then be thought of as internal actions, as actions you take within your own mind. –Actions require Followed Beliefs which face Justification– In-order for Justification Ethics to work, we must derive the claim that actions should be justified normatively in the first place. How can this be shown? Well, this is in effect asking how the justificatory burden of internal actions should imply a justificatory burden on external actions. This can be shown by realizing some beliefs are followed in the present moment and guide action. If you take an action, it can be said that an internal action guided your mind which caused the action to happen, as actions are the output of a mind. We can call such beliefs, "followed beliefs". These followed beliefs, as beliefs, have justificatory burden, thus the beliefs that lead to actions against others must require justification. To reject this is to forfeit all argument as explained earlier. For intentional actions, the actions performed as a consequence of these followed beliefs, a justificatory burden placed on the agent who performed the action is directly implied by the followed belief, as beliefs require justification. –Justification Ethics– If someone is to attack another person, that is an action performed as a consequence of a followed belief. That action being taken implies the existence of the followed belief being accepted by the agent in some form, and that belief requires justification. If said belief cannot be justified, then an action that cannot be normatively justified implies a failure of reason in the sense of the presense of unjustified beliefs. Thus, such intentional actions imply a justificatory burden. This is the fundamental premise of Justification Ethics, which then derives Interests as a value. –Actions Must be Justifiable - Deductively Proven– –Definitions: (Belief): A proposition accepted as true by an agent. (Followed Belief): A belief, principle, or judgement that an agent is presently acting according to. (Interpersonal Justification): A deductive argument that derives the conclusion that another rational agent ought to accept some belief from premises they are rationally required to accept. (Intentional Action): An action intentionally performed according to one or more followed beliefs. –Premises: (P1): Acceptance of any rational deductive argument presupposes that beliefs presented as reasons for action or acceptance of claims, require interpersonal justification. (P2): Intentional actions are performed according to one or more followed beliefs. (P3): If an action is performed according to a followed belief that possesses a justificatory burden, then the action inherits a justificatory burden from that belief. –Logic: (L1): From (P1 + P2), intentional actions performed according to beliefs presented as reasons are performed according to beliefs that require justification. (L2): From (P3), an intentional action derives its justificatory burden from the followed belief according to which it is performed. –Conclusion: From (L1 + L2): Therefore, intentional actions performed according to followed beliefs presented as reasons, are thus actions subject to interpersonal justification. Thus, certain actions do require justification, the fundamental premise of Justification Ethics. To reject this conclusion, is to forfeit the rational force of one's own objection, since an objection is itself an attempt to justify the acceptance of a belief by appeal to reasons.

Normative Will Back to Home Details Yoggism Guide Philosophy Menu More Normative Will [Full Text] Only sentient beings, defined as entities that possess subjective experience, have interests relevant to Justification Ethics and Yoggism more broadly. Below is an explanation as to why, and the logical basis for how rationalism, normative value of preferences, and Justification Ethics all connect. --Yogg Normative Will-- For sentient beings with interests, their behavior can be described relative to more than just the laws of physics as a standard. A water bottle cannot behave irrationally, yet sentient beings can, relative to their interests and relative to the value of truth. This grants a way of describing “free will” that is coherent and non-mystical. The Normative Will of sentient beings is the difference in volition and ability to resist instinct, the ability to act both rationally and irrationally relative to rational standards and relative to one’s own interests, and the ability to act in contradiction with naturally selected preferences. Normative Will is therefore the capacity for normative evaluation of behaviors relative to standards beyond the mere laws of physics; including rationality, ethics, and personal preferences. Every sentient being possesses some degree of this Normative Will, and the stronger the Normative Will, the more clearly Justification Ethics applies; as under strict instinct or structural constraint, both appeals to non-self-interest and adherence to argumentative norms become impaired. Non-sentient life has preferences that can only be described and evaluated from the outside, thus normative evaluation can only measure behaviors relative to their consistency with physical laws, in which case the "behavior" or functioning, of non-sentient life, should never deviate. --Normative Will and Virtue-- Normative Will is thus the grounding capacity that makes interests ethically authoritative. How such dispositions are exercised is thus the grounding of an Interest-based definition of Virtue and Duty, where others should be recognized according to Justification Ethics, as normatively authoritative sources of reason, and holders of the basis of normative value, interests themselves. --Absolute Interest Conclusion-- --Connecting to Justification Ethics-- Justification Ethics is the idea that rational justification presupposes an appeal to the Normative Value of Interests themselves. If you interact with a water bottle, you need not justify your actions to the water bottle, because rationally justifying a claim of "This water bottle ought to accept X idea" makes no sense. The water bottle is not a rational actor at any level. For sentient beings this isn't true. Consider the interaction of "I will steal this child's candy". How can you rationally justify such an interaction? The child would object, and the child's cognition should be complex enough to be able to judge the action on rational grounds, thus the objection is of rational weight. Thus, rational justification requires you to be able to prove "the child ought rationally to accept my interaction as non-contradictory". This is impossible, because you cannot: 1. Prove it's positively rational to steal candy based on rationalism alone, with no explicit or implicit appeal to normative value. 2. Prove it's legitimate to steal candy relative to the normative value of Interests, as the action is inherently frustrating and without reason. Therefore, stealing candy from a child is rationally unjustifiable. Therefore, Normative Will is the way to measure how strictly Justification Ethics applies. --Animal Rights-- Justification Ethics, which implies the Normative Value of Interests, can apply to any sentient being where their cognition is complex enough to judge a given action on rational grounds, relative to the standards or complexity of the action and its affects. In the "stealing candy from a child" example, the child's cognition is complex enough to be able to object to the behavior in a way that makes sense. Similar logic applies to animals, you can simply replace "child" with "monkey/dog/bird/earthworm" and it's fine. Since preference is present in all sentient beings, those beings can object to behavior based on their preferences. Those beings do have the ability to act rationally and irrationally relative to their interests, and relative to how they should act relative to the truth, making it possible to define "rational oughts" that apply to them. If you try to kill a dog for no reason other than you want to, it is impossible to make an argument such that "the dog ought rationally to accept your interaction as non-contradictory". This is impossible, because you cannot: 1. Prove it's positively rational to harm the dog based on rationalism alone, with no explicit or implicit appeal to normative value. 2. Prove it's legitimate to harm the dog relative to the normative value of Interests, as the action is inherently frustrating and without reason. Since the dog has the ability to judge your behavior based on their own preferences, and any attempt to justify your behavior has to appeal to their preferences, your actions are unjustifiable. --Obtaining the Absolute Interest Conclusion-- It has thus been shown that Normative Will is the appropriate measure on how strictly Justification Ethics applies. Killing a dog is unjustifiable because the dog has the ability to rationally object to it, same with killing a monkey, or a child, or a cow, or a human. The logical consequence of this is that any entity that is sentient with Interests, has Justification Ethics apply to it to the rational extent. Any unnecessary inherent frustration of their interests is thus illegitimate as it cannot be justified without appealing either to Interest-free Rationalism, which doesn't work, or appealing to the Normative Value of Interests by trying to appeal to their own standards, which is contradictory. Therefore, the Fulfillment of Interests of all sentient beings, in all reference frames; with priority to Inherent, Rational Interests as a value, is sustained. --What is a Rational Agent? What about theories of God?-- Below is an explanation as to what forms of sentience or some third, God-like form of being, could mean for rationalism. What if a being exists that is not held under the laws of physics, but rather is the originator of the laws of physics themselves? This idea is taken up assuming "the laws of physics" corresponds to some sort of fundamental law of existence; not the inventive and technically constructivist laws humans come up with to describe their observations. This separates an actual God from mere builders of a simulated world, those builders would still be held under some *real* laws of physics, whereas God is the originator of physics. Non-sentient robots cannot act rationally or irrationally, their behavior can only be measured relative to the laws of physics. It doesn't matter to sentient beings what non-sentient robots do to each-other, there is no philosophical reason to care. Sentient beings' actions can be measured relative to their interests, as well as the laws of physics. They always follow the laws of physics, but they do not always best act to fulfill their interests and thus have the capacity to act irrationally. We could imagine a third category of being, where this third being’s actions might be best measured by some third standard outside of the laws of physics, and interests. For such a being, it may have no reason to care about human actions, since it doesn't measure the validity of actions based on interests, but rather some greater construct. This third being could be a God, the top of the value hierarchy, where rational justification breaks down as they are beyond the concept of rationalism itself, or they are above the concept of interests in such a way where they are their interests, they are one and the same thing and thus can never act in a way that is invalid, and are thus utmost rationality itself. This seems to break the whole concept of rationalism though, because if it's definitionally impossible for God to contradict themselves, and God being an infinite being can justify and let be true anything, then it is also impossible for there to be separate true and false statements, which means everything is both true and false. If God breaks rationalism, then all arguments for God, and all arguments prescribing behavior to God, and all arguments prescribing oughts from God, arguing what to do based on God, etc, don't make any sense because their premises destroy their own structure. Thus, reason, rationalism, argumentation, and objective truth itself, are ontologically separate from God, faith, and any other unprovable spiritual beliefs that ultimately stem from God.

Absolute Interest Conclusion Back to Home Details Yoggism Guide Philosophy Menu More Absolute Interest Conclusion [Full Text] —The Absolute Interest Conclusion— The Absolute Interest Conclusion is the conclusion that: It is utmost rational to uphold the fulfillment of interests of all sentient beings, across all possible reference frames; with priority to existent, rational, Inherent Interests, as a value. This conclusion can be derived logically, using the following argument: (1): Why Future Interests Count Future interests are also valuable as people generally have an interest in their future and the fulfillment of interests they hold in the future. When people do not value their future interests, then we can apply the following argument: A hypothetical large group of people who do not have an interest in their future interests, will on average end up minimizing the fulfillment of interests of a majority of the group. It is utmost rational, relative to each person, of any group, to avoid such a scenario; and this is true regardless of precondition. This logic applies to all future interests, but only interests given from those already or previously sentient. The reason for this is that the minimization of existent interests has no relevant causal relationship with the prevention of the creation of new interests. (2): Reducing everything to Rationality We can thus define oughts as interests, treating the fulfillment of interests as a form of Moral Utility, that we should maximize throughout all of time, across all possible reference frames; assuming present interests are as ultimately meaningful as future interests; which is defendable from the argument already given. Finally, we can now convert all ‘oughts’ and ‘ought-nots’ to simply ‘rationalities’ and ‘irrationalities’. (3): Cooperation for Interests This grants us something similar to the contractarian idea that morality emerges from valuing social cohesion and the need for cooperation through agreements, based on people’s subjective interests; but with one key difference: All sentient beings capable of ‘interests’ are held as morally significant. (4): Fulfillment of Interests vs. Creation of new Interests To maximize interests means to maximize the fulfillment of any existing interests. There is no rational justification for the creation of new Interests, unless it maximizes potential for already existent inherent interests related to certain mental states such as happiness or other Approximate Goods. This is due to it being rational to most rationally fulfill an interest assuming you are acting according to your own interests already, this says nothing about creating new interests to act according to, unless doing so helps to fulfill your existing interests. All of this is to say that forcibly modifying everyone’s brains to really want to lick walls, and then giving them walls to lick, is a terrible way to help anyone, as it is not an ethical thing to do as it does not maximize existent interests and violates basic freedoms which actually minimizes existent interests. Even in situations where everyone ends up happy with their new artificial interests, situations with more rational interests will be more rational and overall more stable, and any situation that tries to force people into some set of interests will be violating their interests in not doing that, continuously. A situation where people are able to fulfill their own individual interests will be much more consistent with the AIC, and much more consistent with the fulfillment of interests as a principle. (5): Overall Rational Outcomes The self-interest of one individual is different from the overall interests of a group. Recognizing and valuing the group interests, the utmost rational, most consistent interests of the most universal group, will give us this Absolute Interest Conclusion. Since the class of all sentient beings represents the largest class actions can be compared and measured according to, it is an Absolute Class, representing the utmost rational standard of intrinsic value. To contradict this utmost rational standard is thus irrational, therefore the intrinsic values that are held consistently among all members of the Absolute Class, must not be contradicted. This intrinsic value is the value of the Fulfillment of Interests itself. It should be noted at this point that the idea of a "collective" is meaningless, as you cannot directly conclude a group collectively has some interest, unless the interest is shared unanimously. Collectives don't exist, only individuals exist in any meaningful way, only individuals can act rationally or irrationally. In this case, the fulfillment of interests is a rational, inherent, and existent value, and interest, intrinsic and inherent to all sentient beings, regardless of external factors. Therefore, it is utmost rational to maximize the Fulfillment of Existent Inherent Interests of all sentient beings in all possible reference frames. (6): Intrinsic Standards, Value Reductionism, and the Axiom of Choice The Axiom of Choice is a mathematical construct, usually added onto Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory mathematics. Set Theory is based on the idea of ‘Sets’, of collections of members. So you can have a Set of all Purple Dogs, and a Set of all Bananas. The Set of all Naturally Purple Dogs is equivalent to the Empty Set, a set containing no elements at all. Now, the Axiom of Choice is the axiom that, phrased crudely: If you have a bunch of sets, and then you take one or a few elements out of each set, and group up all of those specific elements into a new collection, that collection is itself considered a valid set. If every set contains valid elements, then grouping one from each set should also yield a valid set. It seems logical, because if each element of a set is a set itself, I.E. a single element A corresponds to a set [A], the set who's only element is A, and the sets containing them are of course sets themselves, then it seems the ‘set-hood’ of each set emerges from and can be reduced to the set's members. If we simply group up a bunch of random or arbitrarily chosen elements, no matter how we group them, that group’s ‘set-hood’ can be reduced to its members, and its members are all valid both as elements and as single-element sets. So, how could the new collection not constitute a valid set? Especially if it follows all other rules for sets, which it unequivocally does. This intuition appeals to a logical and philosophical system called Reductionism, the idea that some thing's function can correspond to it thought of as a collection of members, and that collection's function, as a mere byproduct of its members behavior. Under reductionism, all things that contain other things, function merely as the sum of their parts. A machine functions not as its own thing, but as a byproduct of the parts making it up. It is not separate from its parts, instead it is equivalent, both in function and ontologically, to the sum of its parts. We can apply this same logic to Rational Standards and Values. Let us use the word Class instead of Set, now imagine the class of all Dogs. If all members of this class value chewing bones, even in slightly different ways, each value of each member shares something in common: the concept of “Chewing Bones” itself. If values are the sum of their parts, following this reductionist logic, then each value members have gets their value from its parts. Thus, each member shares the concept of Chewing Bones in common, and as the value of values is deduced from their parts, value should rationally be present in the concept of Chewing Bones itself. This shared concept should thus rationally be a value of the group. To say it another way, it would be irrational to not accept Chewing Bones as a value, as rationally it can be derived through reductionism. This allows us to define a shared Intrinsic Value, universal across some collection, where to act against that value, is to act against this collection as a standard of value from which we can measure actions. To reject the idea of Intrinsic Value is to act in contradiction with basic logical reductionism. To simply ignore the most rational and universal version of some value, is to contradict the idea that actions can be measured by any sort of rational standard, which is utmost irrational and incoherent. The best standards of value are thus the standards that are the most consistent, I.E. the most intrinsic. For example, the standard of "All judges argue based on assumption X" is more intrinsic and consistent than a more arbitrary standard like "My cousin argues based on assumption X". The latter standard would not be a good justification to appeal to some assumption X, while the first standard would not be perfect, but would be better. The best rational standard of value, or measurement, is the class of all sentient beings itself, as anything outside of this class cannot be judged on the basis of rationality. This makes the class, an Absolute Class. Another example of an Absolute Class is the class of all couches, which is the most rational standard of measuring what attributes are intrinsic of couches. This couch class cannot be used to judge the rationality or consistency of values, nor the rationality of actions, it can only be used to judge how intrinsic the attributes of some specific couch is. The Fulfillment of Interests as a shared concept, is an example of an utmost rational value, as it is intrinsic among all sentient beings, an Absolute Class. Therefore, based on all that has been said here, the Fulfillment of Interests relative to all sentient beings is the most rational standard with which to measure behavior and the consistency of values, and the rationality of actions. (7): Intrinsic Potato Theory Jon values eating potatoes driving a car, Jessie values eating potatoes at the beach, Jessica values eating potatoes driving a truck. Jon, Jessie, and Jessica all value potatoes. For Jon to not value potatoes themselves, is for them to not value “eating potatoes while driving a car” in and of itself; yet removing potatoes would make Jon value it less. Thus, eating potatoes must have value. To say that they only value “themselves eating potatoes” and not “eating potatoes” in and of itself, is wrong. This is because if we remove the reference to potatoes we get that they must value “themselves”, regardless of other factors. Yet the feeling of meaninglessness can exist, thus this is wrong. If we assume basic value reductionism, then values get their value from their parts. Potatoes are a part. Thus, the only consistent value here is the eating of potatoes itself, as an object. Therefore, it can be said that: “All beings value themselves performing actions that fulfill interests.” To remove the reference to yourself, is to give the statement: “All beings value the performing of actions that fulfill interests in general.” To remove the fulfillment of interests, is to give the statement: “All beings value themselves performing actions, in and of itself.” Clearly, the first statement is true to a greater extent than the second statement. The third statement is clearly false as a being cannot value themselves as an end in themselves, regardless of all else that gives life meaning, to an extent that is somehow the same as if they were also fulfilling interests. Yet if it isn’t YOU that itself grants all the value, and it isn’t the performing of actions itself that is the value, then assuming values can be reduced to their parts as all things can, there is only one conclusion: The fulfillment of interests for consistency’s sake, must rationally be valued in and of itself. So, rationally, you should act with reference to the value of the fulfillment of interests itself. (8): Justification Ethics Justification Ethics is a way of proving Yoggism via the claim that the normative value of Interests is implied by rational justification, because any argument that is a rational justification of normative force requires an appeal to the interests of whomever you are interacting with. The only exception is arguments that prove things purely rationally, as rationalism is presupposed by engagement with any argument. Any other kind of argument must appeal to Interests. The way this logic works, is that all interactions rationally ought to be justifiable deductively, meaning normative claims should be derivable. This is presupposed by rational discourse, but if it is true then interests are the only thing that can derive normative claims. Justification Ethics (Simplified) All rational justification of normative claims must appeal to Interests as the source of normative value, because: 1. To prove an action or interaction is rationally justifiable through deductive argument, premises based on arbitrary assumptions need not apply. 2. Premises based on simple truths will not derive normative claims. Thus, interactions ought to be rationally justifiable to others involved in the interaction, and that rational justification requires an appeal to the normative value of Interests, otherwise you forfeit all ability to justify normative force. You cannot prove someone ought to buy a washing machine, without appealing to the normative value of their interest in clean clothes. See 'Justification Ethics' for further details. This logic expanded derives the Fulfillment of Interests. —Logical Deduction via Absolute Classes— Finally, to fully disassemble Naive Egoism, we can use the following Logical Deduction: –Definitions: (Intrinsic Value): Something that is valued / acted upon in a way regardless of external factors to some extent; I.E. by most sentient beings in most circumstances, to a reasonable extent. If it is actually valued / acted upon by all sentient beings in all circumstances and all situations, it is intrinsic relative to the class of all sentient beings. Specific values such as individual preferences can give way to broad, all-encompassing values if the preference is intrinsically shared, especially among all beings. (Interest): Something that a sentient being’s behavior tends towards. An interest is Inherent if your behavior tends towards your goal regardless of external factors to some reasonable extent. (Absolute Class): An absolute class is a class where no greater class can be imagined that values and variables can be compared to or measured by, relative to the members of said class. (Rational Standards of Value): Actions and variables can be measured and compared, and rationally judged, relative to some standards of value, I.E. a set of rules or values. The more universal this standard, the least arbitrary and thus most consistent, all-encompassing, and most rational. An Absolute Class is the only utmost rational standard of value that can be defined by definition, as it is the only thing actions and variables can be compared to or measured by, relative to the members of the class. An action that is contradictory to what is utmost rational relative to an Absolute Class, is inconsistent with the only rational standard of value that can be defined relative to that specific class. Said another way, that action in contradicting the standard, would violate the concept of action comparison itself. This is based on the idea of Intrinsic Standards which is derived via Reductionism. –Premises: (P1): Rationally, you ought to fulfill your own interests in the most rational ways possible, relative to you acting in accordance with your own interests, which all are. (P2): Something that is acted upon by all sentient beings under all conditions, is a highly Intrinsic Value. (P3): Rationally, the recognition of Intrinsic Values is utmost logically consistent. (P4): Rationally, acting with reference to your recognitions, with reference to what is true, is most logical. (P5): The class of all sentient beings represent an Absolute Class, the only rational standard of value that can be defined relative to the class. (P6): A value or interest, like "I like mashed potatoes", can through reductionism be reduced to its parts, those parts being "Me", "Liking of mashed foods", "Liking of potatoes"; where each part is itself something held has a rationally necessary value, and the original value is the sum of its parts. (P7): From (Definition of "Intrinsic Value"): Intrinsic values can be defined relative to some large class of things. If something is held as a value or interest, or a value that is rational to act according to as well as possible, universally among the class of things, then that value is intrinsic to said class. (P8): Rationally, all actions and situations can be measured relative to some set of standards. Standards that are the least arbitrary are the most rational of standards to measure by, and can be referred to as specific values and interests. (P9): From (P6 + P7 + P8), An action that is contradictory to what is utmost rational relative to an Absolute Class, is itself a fundamentally irrational action as it is inconsistent with the only rational standard of value that can be defined relative to the class. The action violates the concept of rational comparison and measure itself. –Logic: (L1): From (P1), The utmost rational outcome relative to all sentient beings is the upholding of the fulfillment of existent interests of all sentient beings, non-contradiction with rational oughts. (L2): From (P5), The class of all sentient beings represent an Absolute Class. (L3): From (L1 + L2), The utmost rational outcome relative to the most rational standard of value is the maximization of the fulfillment of existent interests of all sentient beings. (L4): From (L3 + P9), An action that is contradictory to the utmost rational outcome relative to all sentient beings, is itself fundamentally irrational as it is inconsistent to the most rational standard of value definable. –Conclusion: From (L4 + L1), You ought to act in alignment with the value of the fulfillment of interests of all sentient beings. Therefore: It is utmost rational to uphold the fulfillment of existent interests of all sentient beings, across all possible reference frames; with priority to existent, rational, Inherent Interests. This is the Absolute Interest Conclusion. Priority should be given to rational Inherent Interests, as these are the most consistent of interests, and preservation and fulfillment of Inherent Interests will allow the most fulfillment of interests in general; protecting non-inherent interests may result in inherently frustrating behavior. It is also utmost rational to act in alignment with the inference of this conclusion, as to violate it is to act against what is rational relative to the most rational standard of value, which would be logically inconsistent. L4 also grants us something interesting, the Absolute Interest Principle, the principle that it is inconsistent and irrational, to act against or in contradiction with the utmost rational outcome, that which upholds the fulfillment of existent interests of all sentient beings. —The Absolute Interest Principle— The most rational outcome overall, relative to the Absolute Class of all sentient beings, is that which upholds the fulfillment of interests of all sentient beings, across all possible reference frames; with priority to existent, rational, Inherent Interests, as a value. Therefore, it is inconsistent and irrational, to act against or in contradiction with this most rational outcome, and it is irrational to act against others rational interests as an end in itself, and to act against the fulfillment of interests on small scales as well; as it is in contradiction with the only coherent rational standards of value. Value Reductionism Rational Outcomes

Inherent Interest Theory Back to Home Details Yoggism Guide Philosophy Menu More Inherent Interest Theory [Full Text] —Inherent Interest Theory— Some interests are more inherent than others. Some interests are more important to other interests, acting upon some interests require more of a justificatory burden than others. This is the basis of how to solve conflicts under Justification Ethics. --A Definition of Inherent Interest-- Inherentness is a spectrum used to compare interests. An interest is more inherent than another if the given interest is entangled with other interests, or acts as a conduit for other interests regardless of external factors; in a way the second interest does not, or to a higher extent. For example, an interest in not having food taken away, can in most circumstances be a very inherent interest, as it acts as a conduit for an interest in not dying; which itself is a conduit for all other interests. --More Details-- You can also think of inherent interests as interests a sentient being can hold where the goal or outcome their behavior is tending towards, is an end in itself, meaning that to a reasonable extent, they will maintain said activity regardless of external factors; the interest is itself of intrinsic value. When we say "an interest acts as a conduit for other interests regardless of external factors" what is meant is that the acting as a conduit is intrinsic to the interest, and remains true even if external conditions change, to a relevant and reasonable extent. That 'extent change' is the spectrum of inherentness, some interests are more intrinsically foundational to other interests than others. --Inherent Frustration-- Interests can be ends in themselves, intrinsic to a person, or act as conduits for other interests. Some actions can be frustrating in a way where the frustration is similarly an end in itself'. If an action frustrates an interest in a way where the frustration occurs regardless of external factors to a reasonable or relevant extent, that action can be said to be inherently frustrating. For example, the difference between eating a sandwich at a public cafeteria that someone else wanted, and taking and eating a sandwich out of someone's hands after they had already picked it up. In the second scenario, this frustration is more inherent than in the first. To measure whether an action is inherently frustrating, simply ask whether the frustration is intrinsic to the content of the action. Acting according to an interest in "nobody else wearing a blue shirt" is very different from an interest in "wearing a red shirt myself". —How Inherent Interests solve Conflicts— Imagine someone is outside of your house and is dancing weirdly on the sidewalk. Not too close to your house to disturb your yard, not making much noise, either. They just.. look weird, and you can see them being weird out of your window. Imagine you have an interest in them not doing that. What should you do? A. To forcibly stop the person from doing what they want. B. To close your window so them dancing stops getting on your nerves. The answer is that, all things being equal, their interest in dancing is more inherent than your interest in them not dancing; because their interest in dancing is merely an extension of non-abusive autonomy. Their interest in autonomy, which their dancing is entangled with, is much more intrinsic to all of their other interests than your interest in them not dancing is to yours. Meanwhile, your interest against them dancing is an inherently frustrating interest. It is in a sense, an anti-interest, and it is the one requiring justification. Therefore, their interest is more inherent. Since them dancing doesn't interfere with your interests to anywhere near the same extent your interest in stopping them from dancing interferes with them, acts against them are unjustifiable. —Interest Entanglement— As explained earlier, an interest in dancing is entangled with an interest in autonomy to put it simply, and thus dancing is an inherent interest. This is a concept called Interest Entanglement, and it represents how interests can be entangled with other interests by manner of causal correlation. The clearest examples include an interest in not dying being entangled with almost all interests of an individual, an interest in driving a car being entangled with the fulfillment of many other interests that require it, an interest in being able to speak freely being entangled with general autonomy, truth, and an interest in voicing your own interests, etc. The importance of interest entanglement is derived from the idea that Justification Ethics fails to determine strict inaction without defining an Action Spectrum, which must rank interests by how them being frustrated constitutes interference. –Deriving IIT - Unsolved Conflict gives a Contradiction– An appeal to the normative value of interests of those involved in an interaction is presupposed by the justification of deriving a conclusion with normative ethical force. Such justification must prove a normative conclusion where the target of the justification is rationally required to accept the conclusion. Accepting the conclusion requires the premises of the justification to never contradict each-other, otherwise logical normative force breaks down because the truth of premises breaks down or logic itself breaks down. The way normal Justification Ethics works is if you have one person who is performing an action that frustrates the others interests, that action can be unjustifiable as it cannot be justified relative to interests, since the action is inherently frustrating. A situation where two people are both frustrating against one another, and both performing actions against one another, makes this naive view stop working, as they are both acting in a way that cannot be directly justified to the other. This is a serious problem, but also helps prove that a weighing of interests in some form is logically required, as it's lack allows the derivation of contradictory ethical claims. So from a proof by contradiction, someone must be right and someone must be wrong. Otherwise, both people's actions seem unjustifiable, which makes justification collapse. –Deriving IIT - The Action Inaction Distinction– The reason for this issue is that when two people are both acting against each-other, you can't call one action unjustified and thus solve the conflict, because in a way both actions cannot be justified directly, since both actions are counter to the others interests. The action inaction distinction in Justification Ethics is held up by the basis that action requiring justification is presupposed by the existence of ethics itself, while inaction requiring justification is simply an assumption, thus creating an asymmetry used to define the transgressor. Here we run into a deeper problem that again can solve a larger one. Imagine a clear example of inaction, a child is drowning in a river. Someone sees that, and just keeps walking. Again it seems as if inaction requiring justification cannot be proven in and of itself, yet someone seeing a child in trouble and simply walking away, isn't actually absolute inaction; because they choose to continue walking, and walking is an action. Is inaction an even more limited category then? Not necessarily. A rephrasing of action can solve this issue. –Deriving IIT - The Action Spectrum– The way to solve this problem is the recognition that the presupposition of "actions ought be justified" must refer to action on a spectrum, a spectrum of diverging from previous behavior, and a spectrum of interference with others and the environment. As said before, a way to resolve conflict, a way to weigh interests, is logically required to avoid contradiction. It can be done with the recognition of an action spectrum. Put it simply, nothing about walking is inherently frustrating to interests, inherently in this sense meaning "intrinsically, regardless of external factors to a reasonable and relevant extent". Different types of action, that are more interfering with others, thus should require more justificatory burden, as presupposed by the existence of normative value. In-fact, true inaction may not even exist, as purposefully doing absolutely nothing is to starve oneself to death, and that is ultimately an action requiring you to resist your own body. In this sense, eating food is less of an action than going out of your way to starve yourself, which thus means it has less of a justificatory burden. This has all sorts of implications that will not be explored here, but keep it in mind. –Deriving IIT - Rejection if Action Spectrum is to imply a Contradiction– To reject this action spectrum is thus to deny the existence of most inaction, as well as prevent the measuring of differing justificatory burdens. It also fundamentally messes up the neutrality logic of Justification Ethics, whereas an action neutral to someone else's fulfillment of their interests can be justified to them despite its neutrality, via an appeal to Justification Ethics itself. Without an action spectrum, neutrality doesn't exist as measurable but rather all action becomes unjustifiable towards someone, even if just a little bit, resulting in all ethical claims failing. This contradicts Justification Ethics and contradicts the existence of normative value itself, and again results in the ability to prove contradictory ethical claims. –Deriving IIT - Inherent Interests– Different actions can be more or less interfering to interests. If all interests are taken as equal though, then we once again run into the problem of comparing them. Clearly an action spectrum must imply some actions and thus interests require more justification than others. Why would an action require more justification than another? The answer is because it is less neutral toward the interests of others, and what makes it less neutral is when the content of the action itself intrinsically places it in opposition to another's interests. The important insight is that frustration of certain interests does the same thing, because some interests when frustrated attack something constitutively connected to many other interests. Imagine the difference between someone stopping you from blinking once. Now imagine someone permanently blinding you. The 2nd action is more 'frustrative', more of an interfering action, more inherently frustrating, because the blinding frustrates an interest in seeing that is itself entangled in more overall interest fulfillment. Without an account of why certain frustrations are intrinsically less neutral than others, the measurement of justificatory burdens collapses into arbitrariness. This then explains how to measure actions on the action spectrum. Some actions require more justificatory burden than others, and this implies interests that act as a conduit for other interests, Inherent Interests, require more of a justificatory burden to act against. –Deriving IIT - Thus, Inherent Interest Theory– Thus, Justification Ethics measure of inaction and neutrality imply the Action Spectrum, which imply actions that are more or less interfering towards interests, as the correct measure of justificatory burden. This action spectrum then implies inherently frustrating actions are less neutral, and interests that act as a conduit for other interests, when frustrated, represents more of an interference and thus requires more of a justificatory burden. This is the logic explaining why inherent interests and the inherentness spectrum solves conflicts. Justification Ethics -> Conflict Contradiction -> Action Spectrum -> Interest Entanglement From this, we can then derive the following theorem: —Inherent Conflict Theorem— In a conflict, defined as when two or more people's interests contradict each-other in a way that prevents fulfillment of one or more interests, the resolution that grants the most inherent interests priority in a way consistent with Justification Ethics, applies. Actions more intrinsically interfering with interests require justification over actions closer to inaction that are more intrinsically neutral to interests relative to the content of the action itself. This resolution can be further reasoned out by who's interests are more inherent, and whether self defense logic applies. Specifically, if someone is frustrating someone else's inherent interests, and their behavior's frustration is intrinsic to the content of the action itself, then their behavior is subject to Retaliatory Law; meaning that proportionate resistance to their frustration is legitimate. —Inherent Interest Spectrum and Action Inaction— Inherentness of Interests is thus on a spectrum, of highly relative interests, "I'm personally disgusted by seeing people wear purple hats", and highly inherent interests, "I don't want to be eaten alive by a giant frog". This spectrum is measured based on whether a given interest acts as a conduit of other interests, such as how an interest may relate to basic autonomy which then relates to the protection of all other non-abusive interests. Action is also thus on a spectrum, of highly interfering actions, "Shooting with a gun", and highly inactive actions, "Walking on the sidewalk past someone". The latter is not inherently frustrating. —A Misuse of Inherent Interests— Imagine this argument: "You cannot regulate a business, even if the business' activity is abusive towards its consumers! Because, the regulation is itself an inherent frustration upon the business, and such frustration is done in defense of consumer's interests that are less inherent!" This argument can be summed up as the following: "Consumer's interests in better products are less inherent of an interest than a business owner's interest in not wanting to be threatened with legal force." Given the logic laid out in support of Inherent Interests this seems correct, and appears to support Libertarian Anarcho-Capitalism and the Non-Aggression Principle. This intuition is wrong though, because this argument and this conclusion contradict themselves. Imagine someone breaks into your house and threatens to burn your house to the ground. If necessary, can you use lethal force to defend your house from the person? What if the person tries to non-lethally assault you? According to this logic, you actually cannot, as the aggressor's inherent interest in not dying is more inherent than your interests in both your house and your body. —The Contradiction with the Non-Aggression Principle— This presents an immediate Catch-22 against Absolutist Property Rights. Your interest in your house and body is an inherent interest, but if inherent interests work as described then the aggressor’s interest in not dying is still more inherent, and thus appears to take priority. If we argue against this by saying that the aggressor is invalidating their own inherent interests by threatening your house, then suddenly it's also true that the business owner is invalidating their own inherent interests when applicable, by acting in an inherently frustrating fashion. To be clear, this invalidation is not tied to responsibility, but rather raw causal relationships. If a drunk guy wandered into your house and started burning down your house, the logic still stands. Ironically this sounds even more like libertarianism, yet it contradicts it if Interests are granted Normative Value. Therefore, if you CAN defend your property with lethal force, that implies an invalidation of inherent interests caused by acting unethically, which then implies abusive behavior can be met with lethal force when proportionate, in contradiction with absolutist property rights. This would mean the boss actually can be forcibly stop ped from laying off people unfairly, as the boss' behavior is inherently frustrating and thus proportionate resistance is validated, as their own inherent interests in not being resisted is invalidated. If instead the boss cannot be forcibly stopped because his inherent interest in not having force used against him is more inherent than an interest in not being laid off, then suddenly defending property with lethal force is also illegitimate, as the aggressor’s inherent interest in not dying is more inherent than your interest in your own house not being burned down. Therefore, either way, absolutist property rights don’t make sense. The one way out of this mess is to say that the aggressor invalidates his own interest in not dying by trying to kill you in a way that is inconsistent with Interests. And so, any proportionate means to defend rational interests is valid. This answer fixes both problems and allow both lethal defense of property (when necessary), and defense against abusive contracts, in the way that aligns with the Defense and Retaliatory Law Principles laid out previously. —Deriving Inherent Interest Theory from Justification Ethics— –Premises– (P1): Justification Ethics presupposes that normative conclusions derive their normative force through appeal to the interests of those involved, and therefore cannot derive contradictory ethical conclusions without the normative force of justification breaking down. (P2): If opposing actions cannot be distinguished in terms of justification, then contradictory ethical conclusions can be derived. (P3): The presupposition that actions require justification is implied by the existence of normative ethical value. (Derived by Justification Ethics) (P4): Strict inaction cannot consistently distinguish transgression from non-transgression, because continuing previous behavior is itself an action. (P5): If strict inaction fails to distinguish transgression, then actions must be distinguished relative to their interference with others' behavior. (P6): Actions distinguished relative to one another differ by degrees of interference with others and the environment. (P7): To avoid contradictory ethical conclusions, opposing actions must not be weighed equally. (P8): Without differing justificatory burdens, neutrality cannot exist as measurable, causing all actions to become unjustifiable, allowing the derivation of contradictory claims. (P9): Actions whose content is intrinsically more interfering with the interests of others require greater justificatory burden than actions whose content is intrinsically more neutral toward the interests of others. (P10): Frustrating an interest that acts as a conduit for other interests, constitutes greater intrinsic interference with the fulfillment of interests than frustrating an interest that does not. –Logic– (L1): From (P1 + P2), Justification Ethics requires opposing actions to be distinguished in terms of justification. (L2): From (P3 + P4), this distinction cannot be grounded by a strict action/inaction distinction (L3): From (P5 + P6), actions must instead be distinguished on a spectrum of interference with others and the environment. (L4): From (L1 + L3), Justification Ethics therefore implies an Action Spectrum. (L5): From (L4 + P7), the Action Spectrum implies differing justificatory burdens corresponding to differing degrees of interference. (L6): From (L5 + P8), the Action Spectrum requires justificatory burdens to be distinguishable in order for neutrality to exist as measurable and contradictory ethical claims to be avoided. (L7): From (L6 + P9), actions requiring greater justificatory burden are those whose content is intrinsically more interfering with the interests of others. (L8): From (L7 + P10), actions frustrating interests that act as conduits for the fulfillment of other interests require greater justificatory burden than actions frustrating interests that do not. –Conclusion– From (L8): Therefore, actions frustrating interests that act as conduits for the fulfillment of other interests require greater justificatory burden than actions frustrating interests that do not. Such interests are, by definition, Inherent Interests. Therefore, Justification Ethics implies Inherent Interest Theory. —Defense and Retaliatory Law Principles— --Basic Recap of Self-Defense-- As explained before, valuing Rational Interests can only mean the right to defend rational interests from irrational transgressions. To have the right over your interests, and to not have the right to defend your interests through proportionate means, is a contradiction. If the idea that Interests form a right to Property, where certain objects and environments can act as a conduit of your interests, where attacks against personal property is an act of inherent frustration against your interests, this also implies a right to proportionate self-defense of your body, mind, and property, your stuff, belongings, your home; by any means necessary to protect interest fulfillment. --Proportionate Force and Lethal Retaliation-- Rational Interests win out over Irrational Interests, this comes from the assumption of Normative Rationalism. If someone breaks into your house and tries to destroy all of your stuff and then tries to burn down your house, is lethal force justified to defend what is yours? The answer is proportionate force is justifiable. If lethal force becomes proportionate, then it is justifiable. It can be argued that the transgressor could tell you explicitly, "You can leave, I won't stop you. If you try to stop me from burning down your house though, I will kill you." If they say this, assuming you know they are being truthful, you now know that any resistance will be met with lethal force by them. Since force against them to some degree is already justifiable defense of your interests, if they turn to lethal force in retaliation, then since that lethal force is unjustifiable this situation becomes the same as one where they used lethal force from the beginning. For this reason, since them using lethal force is foreseeable anyway, it is thus justifiable for you to engage in lethal force before they do. If you have reasonable foresight that they will use lethal force if threatened in any way, then you have a right to cut to the chase, since your interference with them is already justifiable. —Retaliatory Law— Based on this reasoning, this then justifies a limited use of justifiable force by government and courts. If a court argues you are inherently frustrating against others to such a degree that it must be stopped, and you try to refuse their justifiable demands, then under Yoggism they have the right to use proportionate force to prevent your transgression. If you then resist further with lethal force, your resistance becomes an inherent frustration against them and unjustifiable use of force, to which whoever is enforcing demands against you can then defend themselves with their own lethal force. To be clear, this logic behind enforcement of justified rules immediately fails if said rules are unethical or unjustifiable in and of themselves. In a democratic society, this logic will also fail if rules are contrary to the interests of the public, aka decided undemocratically or in a way not representative of the citizens of some community.

Estoppel Ethics Back to Home Details Yoggism Guide Philosophy Menu More Estoppel Ethics (The EE Argument) [Full Text] —Ethics from Estoppel (EE)— The estoppel is the following concept: Bob punches Alice, so now if Alice punches Bob back, if Bob tries to object to Alice punching, he contradicts himself, because Bob already set the norm that punching is justified. Bob, by punching, is said to be 'estopped' from objecting to Alice's self-defense. Some right-libertarians, specifically Hoppeans, argue such an estoppel implies the Non-Aggression Principle. This intuition is incorrect, because it assumes one action involving force is necessarily equivalent to any other action involving force. That claim is only true if the NAP is true, thus it is begging the question. Instead, we can think of the Estoppel as a measure of whether a coercive claim can be justified. Whenever a person invokes force, or any semblance of obligation upon others, including negative obligation, they advance a claim about what others may do, a claim about what others may be prevented from doing, or a claim about whose interests may be protected or overridden. We can then think of this as the measure of whether it is justified or whether the actor in a situation is 'estopped' aka their justification can survive when the people involved are treated as interchangeable. If it cannot, then the claim defeats itself. This will be defended shortly. The NAP is thus not the foundation of estoppel, but one possible consequence. We will now argue that the acceptance of the estoppel as normatively binding, derives the Anti-Abuse Principle of Yoggism, that actions inherently frustrating and constituting intrinsic subordination of interests, are illegitimate. —Estoppel Begins with Consistency— The original case of punching, of violent aggression, reveals the first requirement for the estoppel. An aggressor initiates force against another person, and when defensive force is used in response, the aggressor objects. This aggressor's position contains two incompatible claims. His action asserts that force is permissible under these circumstances, while his objection asserts similar force is impermissible under the same circumstances. The aggressor attempts to reject the principle that his own action has already asserted, this is the source of the inconsistency of the objection. However, this alone reveals a limitation in how the estoppel is used. —The Problem of Special Pleading— What if the aggressor simply claims, "Only I have the right to use force under these circumstances"? This claim may be internally consistent, but that causes the estoppel to stop working entirely. If another person uses identical force against them, they suddenly can object because their new principle distinguishes between persons, granting them special privilege. Following this logic, anyone could claim "my group may rule another group, uninhibited" and get off scot-free. If this special pleading were sufficient, estoppel would no longer distinguish between justified and unjustified coercion. Any person could escape estoppel merely by defining themselves as uniquely immune to objection. An account of estoppel that permits such arbitrary privilege is not an account of estoppel at all. A true estoppel, and a true grounding of self-defense in the estoppel, is thus required to recognize that a justification needs to not just be consistent but also be valid independently of who happens to benefit from it. This is interchangeability, of persons. This requirement is necessary and becomes clear as such through proportional defense. Because estoppel is traditionally used to justify proportionate self-defense, it necessarily presupposes some criterion for determining when two claims are comparable. Consider this question: "When are two conflicting claims similar enough that they should be evaluated under the same principle?" There must be an answer to this question, otherwise proportionality has no coherent meaning. The answer cannot simply be when two claims are identical in every way including subject. —Estoppel Implies Interchangeability— Imagine a disabled person stuck in a wheelchair. Due to his disability, he is unable to restrain or otherwise thwart a trespasser with an ordinary use of force, instead his only practical means of resistance may be limited to verbal objection and the use of a firearm within his reach. Now imagine a drunk homeless person enters his home at night and begins stealing food from his refrigerator. To argue the disabled person is not allowed to use lethal force at all because the trespassers' life is worth more than the disabled person's property, is to deny the disabled person any property rights at all, simply due to his physical limitations. The principle becomes: "A person's rights depend on their abilities" This is not a self-defense right, and libertarians would immediately object to this and call this use of the estoppel invalid. The reason ultimately comes back to interchangeability of persons. Just because the disabled person is disabled, doesn't change what claims are inconsistent to object to. If we apply interchangeability, this problem goes away. Looking at interchangeability, if the positions were exchanged, the able-bodied person would not accept a rule that reduced his own rights merely because he occupied a disabled person's position. Likewise, the intruder could not consistently object to the disabled person's defense while claiming that, if he were in the disabled person's position, he would still reject being denied the only effective means of protection. If proportionality is not evaluated according to interchangeable claims, then the disabled person's rights become contingent upon his physical abilities rather than the principle being defended. Proportionality itself becomes position-dependent, contradicting the reciprocal structure estoppel requires. Without interchangeability, the estoppel cannot distinguish between genuine justification and arbitrary privilege. Any contradiction can always be avoided by assigning oneself a special exemption. Therefore, proportionality cannot be determined by comparing physical acts alone. It must compare the competing justifications, by looking at claims, not the specific subjects of a justification. This is precisely what interchangeability requires. —Reciprocity, Interests, and the Structure of Claims— Interchangeability reveals a deeper requirement. A difference between people can matter only if the reason for treating them differently survives exchanged positions. Otherwise, the difference is reduced to a mere basis for privilege, violating interchangeability. Once it is established that justifications must survive interchangeable positions for self-defense rights to apply via estoppel, reciprocity follows for the estoppel too. A person cannot demand a principle for others that they would reject if they occupied the other position. This does not imply all interests have equal priority though, what it does imply is that every person's interests must be capable of counting as reasons within the justification, which is equal standing, not equal result. Every normative claim implicitly advances some account of which interests are protected, restricted, or overridden. Bodily rights claims protect interests in physical security, property claims protect an interest in specific resources and objects, contract claims protect people's ability to communicate and act upon their own interests with others cooperatively. Whenever force is invoked against a person, one person's interests are being protected against competing interests. The actual question is, "Is this conflict resolved by a principle that can be accepted from either side, or does it depend upon one side being inherently privileged?" —Subordination violates Interchangeability— The truth derived from the estoppel is that not every property claim is automatically justified by someone claiming ownership over something. Suppose a property owner claims that ownership alone automatically settles every conflict of interests involving that property. Such a case would fail interchangeability, it is the same special pleading as previously described, and creates the same problem relative to the estoppel. This logic can be taken further. Consider a racist landlord who wants to evict a tenant simply for being black. The lease doesn't explicitly say the landlord can do that, but he wrote into the lease that he has the final say. The relevant claim is not merely: "I wish to control my property". That claim may be compatible with a general principle of ownership, but the claim is so general that it fails the aforementioned interchangeability. We must actually discuss the relevant claim at hand, and this claim coems out to be: "My interest in racial exclusion overrides your interest in equal participation." This claim violates interchangeability. Exchange races, suppose the landlord was black and the excluded tenants were white, and the justification immediately collapses. The person defending exclusion would not accept the principle if they occupied the excluded position, the problem is therefore not property ownership itself but rather that the justification inherently subordinates one person's interests to another. Such a claim defeats itself through estoppel. —Intrinsic Subordination— The estoppel does not imply all differences between people are illegitimate. Rather, different roles can be justified based on knowledge and claims of justified authority, a doctor may have limited authority in the context of medicine because the distinction rests on expertise and consent, a parent may have limited authority over a child due to the relationship involving responsibility and dependency, a property owner may have limited authority over a resource if the justification for that authority passes reciprocal evaluation. A legitimate distinction is based on a reason that remains valid when positions are exchanged. An illegitimate distinction is one whose justification depends upon assigning one person's interests inherently greater justificatory standing than another's. The estoppel argument rejects the second distinction. —Deriving the Anti-Abuse Principle— The examples demonstrate the same underlying failure, the problem is not that interests conflict, as such conflict is avoidable. It is also not merely that outcomes differ, different outcomes may arise from legitimate reasons. The problem is a specific type of coercive justification: "A justification where the frustration of another person's interests is not merely an effect of the rule, but part of what the rule is fundamentally doing." In such cases, the action or institution does not merely create an unequal result, but requires another person's interests be treated as having inferior standing in the justification itself. The frustration is built into the principle being defended. The frustration of interests is not an accidental consequence of applying the norm, but rather a part of what the norm itself is built to accomplish. Thus, from a correct account of estoppel, we derive the Anti-Abuse Principle of Yoggism: —The Anti-Abuse Principle (AAP)— Actions that are intrinsically frustrating to another's non-abusive fulfillment of interests, or inherently subordinate another's interests, constitute abuse, and are thus illegitimate. Actions that proportionately defend against abuse, or inhibit conduct that is inherently frustrating of interests, are legitimate insofar as they constitute self-defense. —Conclusion— The use of "inherent" means the frustration of interests is intrinsic to the content and justification of the action itself, not merely an external consequence that isn't generalizable. An action violates this principle when defending it requires saying: "this person's interests count less because this person occupies X position". Such a claim cannot survive interchangeability, it cannot satisfy reciprocity. Thus, such a claim defeats itself through the estoppel. This estoppel argument does not only apply after rights are established, instead it can be used to derive rights through the AAP. Assuming rights to apply the estoppel to is begging the question and risks self-contradiction. Rights are themselves claims, claims that face a justificatory burden when it comes to whether using force or otherwise to defend such rights is justified. That is not exempt from the estoppel. To accept the estoppel as normative for justifying self-defense rights, thus implies some semblance of reciprocity such that the Anti-Abuse Principle is a consequence. An action inconsistent with the AAP thus cannot be defended via estoppel. —Universal Application— The estoppel argument applies whenever a coercive claim is made against a sentient being whose interests are such that the claim's justification can be meaningfully evaluated. For example, we can take the original example at the onset and reuse it with a non-human animal. Bob punches a dog, so now if the dog hits Bob back, Bob loses the ability to consistently make a claim against the hit, because Bob already set the norm that hitting is justified. Bob, by punching, is said to be 'estopped' from objecting to the dog's self-defense. Any argument that Bob being a special species is a direct recreation of the interchangeability problem from before, creating the same problem as saying Bob is a special sex or Bob is a special person who has the right to punch anyone but nobody else is allowed to punch him. Suppose Bob claims humans may abuse dogs because they are humans. If positions are exchanged by species, Bob would no longer accept the principle. The justification thus depends on which party occupies the privileged role rather than upon a reciprocal reason. This violates interchangeability. If defensive force is justified because the coercive claim fails estoppel, then that failure does not depend on who performs the defensive act. The same failed justification may thus be resisted by third parties acting to defend the victim. Therefore, accepting the dog has the right to defend themselves, also implies via estoppel that other beings, including other humans, are allowed to defend the dog from unjustified transgressions. The estoppel therefore is not restricted to human beings. It applies whenever there exists a sentient being whose interests are capable of being the object of a coercive claim that can be said to be justified or unjustified. A being need not consciously formulate moral arguments for this to be true, rather it is enough that the being possesses interests and preferences such that it is meaningful to ask whether another person's claim against those interests is justified. If it is meaningful to evaluate a claim against a being as justified or unjustified, that abuse against them is unjustified, or that it is inconsistent to object to that being's proportionate defense, then estoppel already applies. Restricting estoppel only to members of a particular species would simply recreate the same arbitrary privilege that interchangeability rejects. —The Absolute Interest Conclusion— This directly implies by the estoppel that animal cruelty is unjustifiable and impossible to consistently defend. If we accept animal cruelty as unjustifiable this implies a human attacking another human for abusing an animal, is justified, and if the animal abuser pulls out a weapon, the other human gains the right to defend themselves with lethal force. This implies humans have the right to defend animals from other humans with lethal force. If every sentient being possesses interests that cannot be assigned lesser justificatory standing merely because of species or other arbitrary classification, then ethical justification must treat the recognition of the value of their interests as universal. From this we derive the Absolute Interest Conclusion: It is utmost rational to uphold the fulfillment of interests of all sentient beings, across all possible reference frames; with priority to existent, rational, inherent interests, as a value. This conclusion is not an optimization principle, but an upholding of interests as a value. —The Problem with Utilitarianism vs. Principles— This also functions as an argument against Utilitarianism and similar consequentialist arguments. Under Utilitarianism, in an isolated circumstance, we are forced to conclude that if a human attacks an animal, they must not be stopped with lethal force, because killing a human is worse than killing an animal at least if the animal will have a shorter lifespan than the human. Estoppel Ethics goes in direct contradiction of this by claiming based on principle, that consequences are not the end all be all of ethics, and animal rights are derived from principle. Thus even in a isolated circumstance, killing a human to defend an animal is justified if necessary. –Deduction of Estoppel Ethics– –Definitions: (Estoppel): A person is estopped when they cannot consistently object to a principle that their own conduct has already asserted. (Proportionality): The requirement that a defensive response bear an appropriate relationship to the conduct it answers. (Right): A right is a guaranteed permission that an action, interest, or property is justified, together with the normative validity of defending it as necessary. –Premises: (P1): Estoppel rejects any justification that requires a special exemption from the principle it invokes. (P2): Estoppel grounds the justified self-defense of existing rights. (P3): Differences in physical ability can prevent equally situated persons from using equivalent defensive acts or escalating force in the same manner. (P4): Any account of proportionality that denies self-defense rights solely because of physical ability or social position undermines the rights estoppel is meant to justify. (P5): Estoppel evaluates whether the claims involved in coercive conflicts are justified. (P6): A coercive justification inherently subordinates another person's interests when it gives those interests lesser justificatory standing solely because of that person's position. (P7): A coercive action is legitimate only if its justification survives estoppel. –Logic: (L1): From (P2 + P4), if estoppel grounds rights, then proportionality cannot deny self-defense rights solely because of physical ability or social position. (L2): From (L1 + P3), proportionality cannot be determined solely by comparing equivalent physical acts, because physical differences would make the availability of self-defense depend upon ability. (L3): From (P2 + L2), the standard used to determine proportionality must preserve the justified self-defense of rights rather than depend upon differences in physical ability. (L4): From (P5 + L3), proportionality must evaluate the justification of defensive actions rather than merely the physical equivalence of those actions. (L5): From (P1 + L4), a justification that depends only upon who holds a position rather than independent reasons supporting the position implies a special exemption and fails estoppel. (L6): From (P6 + L4), a coercive justification that inherently subordinates interests depends upon treating one person's interests as having lesser justificatory standing because of their position. (L7): From (L5 + L6), coercive justifications that inherently subordinate interests fail estoppel because they rely on position-dependent standards. (L8): From (L7 + P7), coercive actions based on inherently subordinating justifications are illegitimate, while proportionate resistance to such conduct is legitimate. –Conclusion: From (L6 + L7): Therefore, actions that inherently subordinate another person's interests are illegitimate, while proportionate resistance to such conduct is legitimate as self-defense.

Interest Praxeology Back to Home Details Yoggism Guide Philosophy Menu More Interest Praxeology (Yogg-Economics) [Full Text] —Interest Praxeology— Praxeology is, traditionally, the theory of human action, of why humans take certain actions in certain circumstances through purposeful behavior. In Yoggist terms this would translate to how followed beliefs, or action-guiding beliefs, cause one to act to achieve some end; aka to fulfill some interest. Interest here is defined as merely that which a sentient being's behavior tends towards. The end a being is attempting to achieve by engaging in a purposeful action, is the interest. —Behavior and Wants are Separate— Here we can define a "want" or an intrinsic interest: That which a being's behavior tends towards, regardless of external factors. Regardless of external factors here is a distinguisher between interests that are merely due to some current limiting factor, and interests more inherent to the being possessing them. Imagine a person stuck in a cage, with a guard stationed outside ready to shoot them if they attempt to leave. In such a situation, the person does not have an interest in leaving the cage, in the sense that their behavior will not tend toward that end, because doing so will result in bodily harm. With this being said, they do have an intrinsic interest in leaving the cage, they 'want' to leave the cage, which is what is normally meant by someone saying they have an interest in leaving the cage. It isn't that they will try to leave the cage right now, instead right now they would rather stay in the cage, not because of their own preferences, but rather due to an external factor beyond their control that artificially limits the fulfillment of their interests. This immediately demonstrates a critical difference between a being having a mere interest in something in some sense, and them actually wanting something, having an intrinsic interest in some end. In this case we can say they may have an interest in leaving the cage, because absent the external factors "spooking" them into staying in the cage, they would leave it immediately. We can then say them not leaving the cage is merely them placing a separate interest above their own freedom of movement, their interest in not dying. Such an interest acts as a conduit for many other interests, as dying prevents fulfillment of most other interests that are relative to a being's actions in the world. Such an interest that acts as a conduit for other interests can be described as being entangled with many other interests, such an interest is an "Inherent Interest" and is the interest appealed to when acting against an Intrinsic Interest. —The Problem of Market Demand— The problem with the Austrian conception of "free markets", markets that are mostly or entirely unregulated, or Pure Markets as they will be referred to as here as to not confuse moral language with legal detail, is that the logic in favor of them confuses market demand with people's wants. The traditional praxeological argument in favor of Pure Markets is the idea that people's wants generate economic demand, and in an unregulated marketplace sellers will prop up to take advantage of the demand. The demand creates an incentive to give a fairly priced supply, specifically the pricing necessary to make a profit. With competition, overpricing when possible becomes rarer because it becomes less possible, as people can simply go to another seller. Depending on the good being sold, they can also simply stop buying the good. This is the basis of most economics, supply and demand. The more people willing to buy, the more people are incentivized to sell. This demand is not the same thing as actual wants though, as this only measures non-intrinsic interests, or Relative Interests, interests that are relative to the present conditions, taking in all 'spooking' external factors influencing how someone acts according to their interests. This includes economic externalities, coercion, irrational judgement, cultural spooks, lack of information, among many other things. Because of this, a Pure Market only works well if there is fair and plentiful competition. Some industries are harder to enter than others, which creates a loophole wherein if an industry is hard to enter but easy to stay afloat, competition will be low and incentive to act against people's actual wants will be high. —Where Austrian Economics Loses its Grip— Especially for libertarians wanting deregulation, they run into a problem where they make a sharp distinction between someone being coerced by force into acting against their actual wants, and someone being coerced by their own conditions, manipulations, and other "spooking" external factors into acting against their actual wants, or into allowing their wants to be frustrated. The libertarian argument is that the latter isn't coercion at all, and that any circumstance where they make a voluntary exchange isn't inconsistent with their interests or anything else because such an exchange is always mutually beneficial. They then say this is true because any exchange that isn't mutually beneficial is an exchange a rational human would not partake in. The problem here is that, relative to interests, the distinction between what they consider coercion and not, is arbitrary; and the exact same logic can be used against involuntary exchange as well. For someone to stay in a cage because the alternative is death, is them engaging in a mutually beneficial exchange. The guard doesn't want them to leave the cage, and probably doesn't want them dead, just imprisoned. The prisoner doesn't want to die, and views their interest in not dying above their interest in freedom of movement. Yet the libertarians argue allowing criminals to hold people at gunpoint and use that to their advantage in the market, would not protect anyone or ensure adequate supply of goods relative to people's actual wants. This is a contradiction. —Economic Information is Concealed by Absolute Property— Libertarians talk of economic information, a possible argument in their favor is that use of force conceals information in the economy. If Bob is offered a purchase of their land for $100,000, this brings the information of whether they value their land more or less than $100,000 into the market, allowing supply and demand for such land to adjust accordingly. If Bob is instead threatened with force to lose their land, well.. information is still revealed, they value their land less than their own life. The argument from libertarians is such information is less meaningful, less relevant to the economy, that such information doesn't change supply and demand for such land because any seller can assume most people value their own life over their land, or other property for that manner. As such, markets that don't allow such force conceal less information which in turn leads to the market being more efficient, and allowing supply and demand function better. The problem with this idea is that it may be true in a simplistic example such as this, but information is still concealed when people's interests are not given bargaining power; and interests are still frustrated without the use of force. As explained before, the coercive nature of force expands to other domains, and results in very similar results. Imagine a situation where a gay man lives in a town that hates gay people. The threat of him being ostracized acts as a "spook" against his interests, leading to the information of him being gay, being concealed from the market. Similarly, a situation where someone is forced to pay extra for rent from a landlord or work in a very dangerous job simply because they are impoverished and have nowhere else to go, is a situation where their preferences are being hidden from the market. Any case of this will create inefficiency, and this can be logically proven. Inefficiency in a market is measurable by whether there exists an allocation of resources that could make someone better off without making anyone else worse off than they were before. The more such allocations exist, the more inefficient. It can also be measured as whether decentralized actors are unable to coordinate production between each-other using relevant knowledge. If a market contains external factors that distort the expression of intrinsic interests, market demand cannot be assumed to accurately represent those interests, which results in an inefficiency in both market coordination and supply and demand. This can be shown regardless of which measure of inefficiency you choose. —A Proof that Austrian Economics results in Inefficiency— –Premises: (P1): Market demand reflects the behavior of people under their existing conditions, and therefore reflects their relative interests, rather than necessarily their intrinsic interests or wants independent of external constraints. (P2): An interest that is fulfilled or pursued only because of the present conditions affecting an agent's behavior, is a relative interest rather than an intrinsic interest. (Definition) (P3): External factors can alter the conditions under which a person acts according to their interests, causing them to pursue relative interests that differ from their intrinsic interests. (P4): When a person's relative interests differ from their intrinsic interests due to external factors, their behavior does not fully reveal to the market the intrinsic interests that would otherwise guide their actions. (P5): A market allocation is inefficient when there exists an alternate allocation that can better fulfill the interests of at least one person without reducing the fulfillment of the interests of others, or when relevant information necessary for decentralized coordination is concealed. –Logic: (L1): From (P2), interests that are relative to the existing conditions of an agent are distinguishable from intrinsic interests that would remain present regardless of those conditions. (L2): From (P3), external factors can cause a person's behavior to be directed towards a relative interest rather than the intrinsic interest that would otherwise guide their behavior. (L3): From (L1 + L2), when external factors cause a person's behavior to be directed towards a relative interest that differs from their intrinsic interest, the behavior of the person is not necessarily representative of their intrinsic interest. (L4): From (P4), when a person's behavior is directed towards a relative interest that differs from their intrinsic interest, their behavior does not fully reveal the intrinsic interest that would otherwise guide their actions. (L5): From (L3 + L4), when external factors cause a person's behavior to be directed towards a relative interest that differs from their intrinsic interest, the intrinsic interest that would otherwise guide their behavior can be concealed from the market. (L6): From (P1 + L5), market demand can therefore reflect behavior directed towards relative interests while failing to reveal the intrinsic interests of the people generating that demand. (L7): From (P5), when relevant information necessary for decentralized coordination is concealed, the resulting market allocation is inefficient. (L8): From (L6 + L7), whenever market demand fails to reveal intrinsic interests that are relevant to the allocation of resources, the resulting market allocation can be inefficient. –Conclusion: From (L8): Therefore, Pure Markets do not necessarily produce efficient allocations, because market demand can reflect relative interests created by external conditions rather than the intrinsic interests of the people involved, allowing relevant information about interests to be concealed from the market. —Libertarian Slavery and Wage Labor— Some might think that market efficiency and ethics are separate, based on the idea that slave labor for example can be used to enhance market efficiency, making production of goods cheaper. Libertarians who follow Austrian Economics would instead argue such slavery conceals important information from the market such as which people are best at which labor, since the labor is supplied involuntarily giving an incentive to hide your skills from your slave owner. Information is also hidden involving how much of specific products to make, whereas extra production can be done in areas that might not make much sense, simply because production in certain industries may have a disproportionate advantage given by slave labor. In the same way though, abusive wage labor also conceals information even when force is not used. In an unregulated market, people who seek employment simply because of their external conditions and not as an intrinsic interest, conceal from the market information about what jobs they actually want, what jobs are actually needed, and how much their own labor is worth. —Worker-Ownership, Interest Alignment, and Information— The hidden information and thus inefficiency is a side-effect of Interest Misalignment, where the interests of employee and employer, worker and owner, are misaligned to the detriment of the market. Interest Alignment on the other-hand, implies an ability to ensure proper coordination relative to the interests of the parties involved, and thus knowledge of how they manage scarce resources. An enterprise that is entirely worker-owned, has all the knowledge of the interests of all parties involved internally, as such no information is lost in internal organization. Consumer bargaining power has a similar effect, the NAP though can disincentivize these types of arrangements, because in an absence of appropriate regulation those looking to hold on to "dictatorial" power over enterprise and the overall economy will use every means to do so, and this is true historically. The more interests are not being subordinated, the more information is revealed to the market and the better the outcomes.