—Retaliatory Law—
Justification Ethics implies that persuasive arguments necessarily appeal to the value of the interests of others involved in some rational interaction.
Specifically, the premises behind any appeal to rational justification, necessarily appeal to the normative value of interests.
This grants us the Fulfillment of Interests as a value, but not necessarily the clearance to inherently frustrate one's interests to protect some greater good outcome, even in extreme circumstances. The reason for this is that the Fulfillment of Interests as a value is simply the acceptance of the normativity of interests themselves, the very basis of this philosophy and of rational oughts considering more than one person.
Inherently frustrating actions that are not an act of defense against irrational frustration, are thus illegitimate, as such is called out in the Anti-Abuse Principle, which explicitly lays this out.


—Part 1: Defense and Retaliatory Law—
--Basic Recap of Self-Defense--
As explained before, valuing Rational Interests can only mean the right to defend rational interests from irrational transgressions. To have the right over your interests, and to not have the right to defend your interests through proportionate means, is a contradiction.
If the idea that Interests form a right to Property, where certain objects and environments can act as a conduit of your interests, where attacks against personal property is an act of inherent frustration against your interests, this also implies a right to proportionate self-defense of your body, mind, and property, your stuff, belongings, your home; by any means necessary to protect interest fulfillment.

--Proportionate Force and Lethal Retaliation--
Rational Interests win out over Irrational Interests, this comes from the assumption of Normative Rationalism. If someone breaks into your house and tries to destroy all of your stuff and then tries to burn down your house, is lethal force justified to defend what is yours?

The answer is proportionate force is justifiable. If lethal force becomes proportionate, then it is justifiable. It can be argued that the transgressor could tell you explicitly, "You can leave, I won't stop you. If you try to stop me from burning down your house though, I will kill you."

If they say this, assuming you know they are being truthful, you now know that any resistance will be met with lethal force by them. Since force against them to some degree is already justifiable defense of your interests, if they turn to lethal force in retaliation, then since that lethal force is unjustifiable this situation becomes the same as one where they used lethal force from the beginning.

For this reason, since them using lethal force is forseeable anyway, it is thus justifiable for you to engage in lethal force before they do. If you have reasonable foresight that they will use lethal force if threatened in any way, then you have a right to cut to the chase, since your interferrence with them is already justifiable.
 

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—Retaliatory Law—
Based on this reasoning, this then justifies a limited use of justifiable force by government and courts. If a court argues you are inherently frustrating against others to such a degree that it must be stopped, and you try to refuse their justifiable demands, then under Yoggism they have the right to use proportionate force to prevent your transgression.

If you then resist further with lethal force, your resistance becomes an inherent frustration against them and unjustifiable use of force, to which whoever is enforcing demands against you can then defend themselves with their own lethal force.

To be clear, this logic behind enforcement of justified rules immediately fails if said rules are unethical or unjustifiable in and of themselves. In a democratic society, this logic will also fail if rules are contrary to the interests of the public, aka decided undemocratically or in a way not representative of the citizens of some community.


—Part 2: Threshold Deontology—
There is more to ethics than simply what works as a consistent and static system of law, though. In a situation where inaction may result in mass destruction, and mass inherent frustration, but the action to prevent the destruction is itself inherently frustrating, we seemingly run into a problem.

It should also be noted that while it may seem justifiable to kill an innocent person or temporarily violate someone's inherent rights, or interests, to prevent mass death; assuming a best-case scenario where we know for sure the consequences and can measure them; it does not seem justifiable to kill an innocent person to lower death rates globally by 0.2%, even if doing so may technically save many more people.
Instead of simply appealing to intuition itself, the reasons behind the intuition can actually be justified by the Fulfillment of Interests and the rational engine that makes this work.

This threshold deontology, can be argued for based on a valuing of rational deliberation.

--Defense of Interest Structure--
Threshold Deontology is the idea that we ought to act in ways consistent with some deontological ruleset, or principles, such as "Do not murder", or "Actions that are inherently frustrating are illegitimate"; but only up to a point where not violating the deontology creates an existential disaster, like the destruction of a whole country.
It can be reasoned that inaction can result in a breakdown of rational deliberation. Imagine a town of people who have national deliberation days, where every Wednesday, they come together to reason for how best to use resources. This reasoning is held up by each person in the town having the ability to participate in argumentation, the same way democracy works through voting.

Now imagine a disaster strikes, and you have the ability to act. Inaction would result in a breakdown of argumentation, deliberation, of truth-seeking within the town itself.
In such a scenario, it is possible to disrupt or take advantage of the disruption to argumentation, through inaction. Taking advantage of this disruption is irrational, and letting people get away with taking advantage, is also irrational, as it takes away from actual truth-seeking.
For this reason, the violation of someone's interests to protect the overall value of deliberation, may be justifiable; as the inaction becomes a negligence towards defending rationality itself.

--Violating Rights is still Wrong--
Note that the logic used does not say it is "right" or "good" to violate someone's rights to prevent existential disaster. Yoggism has specific standards on what actually constitutes a 'right', but an innocent person who isn't inherently frustrating does constitute rights, specifically a right over their continued sentience and non-abusive usage of their interest-based property.

It has been argued before, from a deontological point of view, that given a consequentialist argument scenario such as "Kill this guy or the entire world explodes!", that the looming existential disaster doesn't make it suddenly a good thing the guy dies, and thus killing the guy is still wrong, it's just that both scenarios are terrible.
This intuition is actually a rephrasing of the conclusions here, and the reasons for that intuition have just been derived. This grants us definitions for Good, Right, and Justified.


—Good, Right, and Justified—
There is clearly some difference between giving to the poor, and self-defense, and there is also a difference between self-defense, and frustrating for the purpose of preserving the structure of interests itself.
These differences can be distinguished well in terms of interests and their effects on them. Giving to the poor, assuming your individual giving doesn't somehow harm them, is Good. It's purely good if doing so fulfills your own interests as well, since then no meaningful interests are frustrated by any measure.

Self-defense on the other hand is different. As argued before, it's justifiable as it is the defense of rational interests over irrational interests and inherently frustrating transgression. However, the transgressor's interests are also inherently frustrated, it's fire beats fire. If the transgressor is killed, this is an inherent frustration, just done in defense of the value of interests. This is not purely good as previously described. Long-term such defense is good, but more accurately this action is not purely good, but is Right. It is right, and thus permissible, because it is directly consistent with Interests as a value, along with any other rational action.

To frustrate against someone's interests for the purpose of preserving the structure of interests itself, this would be something like stealing from someone in an emergency to stop a large disaster from occurring. Since the someone you are frustrating against is not a transgressor, they are not acting in a way that is inherently frustrating, which is why it counts as theft, this cannot be called defense against transgressors who are contradicting interests at all. Instead, this can only be justified in instances where the ends are rationally integral to the structures that preserve interest fulfillment in a fundamental sense.

It should also be noted the difference between frustrating as an end in itself, versus frustrating as a mere temporary side-effect, a means to a greater end where said frustration is unnecessary. To lie to save someone's life for example, is to frustrate against someone's interest in the truth, not as an end in itself, but as a side-effect to reach a greater end where the lie becomes unnecessary.

Actions such as this are not inherently frustrating, as what is inconsistent about inherent frustration is that inherently frustrating against another's interests, as an end in itself, is by definition an end inconsistent with the value of Interests. If it is not an end in itself, and is a side-effect separate from the action, or is defense against a transgressor, then it is not inherent frustration in this way. It is no longer inconsistent with, and may be in defense of, Interests.


—Definitions—
Interest - What a sentient being's behavior tends towards; sentient preferences.
Interest Fulfillment - A being's interest being fulfilled or their preferences respected.
Interest Frustration - The violation or contradiction of a being's interest.

Good - An action that is interest fulfilling and is not inherently frustrating to any interests.
Right - An action that is interest fulfilling, and not inherently frustrating unless against irrational interests in defense of rational interests; in a way consistent with Interests as a value.
Justifiable - An action that results in the minimally inconsistent outcome relative to Interests as a value, measured by whether the action is 'right' interest-wise, or if the action is rationally integral to the structures that preserve interest fulfillment fundamentally.

Bad - An action that is frustrating to interests while any fulfillment is limited to irrational interests.
Evil - An action that is inherently frustrating to interests and is frustrating to the very structures that preserve interest fulfillment.

Moral - An action that is consistent with Interests as a value, in some form.
Immoral - An action that is inconsistent with Interests as a value, in some form.
Ethical (Yogg Law) - An action consistent with the Anti-Abuse Principle.
Unethical (Yogg Law) - An action inconsistent with the AAP or is otherwise Immoral.
Existentially Justifiable (Yogg Existentials) - An action consistent with the Anti-Abuse Principle or existentially protective in the sense of protecting the structure of interests themselves.
Unjustifiable (Yogg Existentials) - An action inconsistent with the AAP or is otherwise Immoral, while not being existentially protective, or being diminishing to the structure of interests.


—The Anti-Abuse Principle (AAP)—
Actions that constitute interference with another's non-abusive fulfillment of their own rational and non-contradictory interests, are illegitimate.
Actions that result in the frustration of interests, through overall frustration by misalignment of interests between parties, or due to conduct that is inherently interest-frustrating, are irrational and self-contradictory, constitute ‘abuse’, and are thus illegitimate.
Actions that prevent abuse, or inhibit otherwise interest-frustrating conduct; including conduct that is a product of irrational interest misalignment between parties, and conduct that is inherently irrationally frustrating; are legitimate as they constitute resistance to abuse.