—Inherent Interest Theory—
What does "Inherent Interest" really mean? What does inherent mean in terms of inherent frustration? How are different interests weighed against each-other?
The answer to this question is crucial to understanding the 'nitty-gritty' of Justification Ethics and the Anti-Abuse Principle. Let us begin.

--A Definition of Inherent Interest--
Inherentness is a spectrum used to compare interests.
An interest is more inherent than another if the given interest is entangled with other interests, or acts as a conduit for other interests regardless of external factors; in a way the second interest does not, or to a higher extent.

For example, an interest in not having food taken away, can in most circumstances be a very inherent interest, as it acts as a conduit for an interest in not dying; which itself is a conduit for all other interests.

--More Details--
You can also think of inherent interests as interests a sentient being can hold where the goal or outcome their behavior is tending towards, is an end in itself, meaning that to a reasonable extent, they will maintain said activity regardless of external factors; the interest is itself of intrinsic value.

When we say "an interest acts as a conduit for other interests regardless of external factors" what is meant is that the acting as a conduit is intrinsic to the interest, and remains true even if external conditions change, to a relevant and reasonable extent.
That 'extent change' is the spectrum of inherentness, some interests are more intrinsically foundational to other interests than others.

--Inherent Frustration--
Interests can be ends in themselves, intrinsic to a person, or act as conduits for other interests.
Some actions can be frustrating in a way where the frustration is the end itself in a similar fashion. If an action frustrates an interest in a way where the frustration occurs regardless of external factors to a reasonable or relevant extent, that action can be said to be inherently frustrating.

For example, the difference between eating a sandwich at a public cafeteria that someone else wanted, and taking and eating a sandwich out of someone's hands after they had already picked it up. In the second scenario, this frustration is more inherent than in the first.

Inherent frustration matters more than non-inherent frustration. Inherent frustration of inherent interests matters the most.

--Exercise Example--
If you would partake in exercise for example, even if it was entirely neutral in effect towards your and others physical and mental health and you knew this, then you value it intrinsically.
If you like something, that simply means your behavior tends towards you doing that thing, and your behavior would tend towards that thing regardless of external factors to some reasonable extent.

If your behavior only tends towards exercise because it gives you physical benefits, then you do not view exercise with intrinsic value, it is not an inherent interest.
Thus, for someone who doesn't enjoy exercise, exercising isn't an inherent interest. It merely represents the inherent interest in good health.


—How Inherent Interests solve Conflicts—
Imagine someone is outside of your house and is dancing weirdly on the sidewalk. Not too close to your house to disturb your yard, not making much noise, either. They just.. look weird, and you can see them being weird out of your window.
Imagine you have an interest in them not doing that. Said another way, you don't like that they are doing that. What is more reasonable relative to the Fulfillment of Interests?
A. To forcibly stop the person from doing what they want.
B. To close your window so them dancing stops getting on your nerves.

The answer is that, all things being equal, their interest in dancing is more inherent than your interest in them not dancing; because their interest in dancing is merely an extension of non-abusive autonomy.
Their interest in autonomy, which their dancing is entangled with, is much more intrinsic to all of their other interests than your interest in them not dancing is to yours.

Therefore, their interest is more inherent. Since them dancing doesn't interfere with your interests to anywhere near the same extent your interest in stopping them from dancing interferes with them, acts against them are unjustifiable.
 

—Interest Entanglement—
As explained earlier, an interest in dancing is entangled with an interest in autonomy to put it simply, and thus dancing is an inherent interest.
This is a concept called Interest Entanglement, and it represents how interests can be entangled with other interests by manner of causal correlation.

Some examples include an interest in not dying being entangled with almost all interests of an individual, an interest in driving a car being entangled with the fulfillment of many other interests that require driving, an interest in being able to speak freely being entangled with an interest in both general autonomy and an interest in truth, etc.

The importance of interest entanglement is derived from the idea that Justification Ethics fails to determine strict inaction without defining an Action Spectrum, which must rank interests by how them being frustrated constitutes interference.
 

​

–Deriving IIT - Unsolved Conflict gives a Contradiction–
An appeal to the normative value of interests of those involved in an interaction is presupposed by the justification of deriving a conclusion with normative ethical force.
Such justification must prove a normative conclusion where the target of the justification is rationally required to accept the conclusion.

Accepting the conclusion requires the premises of the justification to never contradict each-other, otherwise logical normative force breaks down because the truth of premises breaks down or logic itself breaks down.
The way normal Justification Ethics works is if you have one person who is performing an action that frustrates the others interests, that action can be unjustifiable as it cannot be justified relative to interests, since the action is inherently frustrating.

A situation where two people are both frustrating against one another, and both performing actions against one another, makes this naive view stop working, as they are both acting in a way that cannot be directly justified to the other.

This is a serious problem, but also helps prove that a weighing of interests in some form is logically required, as it's lack allows the derivation of contradictory ethical claims. So from a proof by contradiction, someone must be right and someone must be wrong.
Otherwise, both people's actions seem unjustifiable, which makes justification collapse.
 

–Deriving IIT - The Action Inaction Distinction–
The reason for this issue is that when two people are both acting against each-other, you can't call one action unjustified and thus solve the conflict, because in a way both actions cannot be justified directly, since both actions are counter to the others interests.

The action inaction distinction in Justification Ethics is held up by the basis that action requiring justification is presupposed by the existence of ethics itself, while inaction requiring justification is simply an assumption, thus creating an asymmetry used to define the transgressor.

Here we run into a deeper problem that again can solve a larger one. Imagine a clear example of inaction, a child is drowning in a river. Someone sees that, and just keeps walking.
Again it seems as if inaction requiring justification cannot be proven in and of itself, yet someone seeing a child in trouble and simply walking away, isn't actually absolute inaction; because they choose to continue walking, and walking is an action.

Is inaction an even more limited category then? Not necessarily. A rephrasing of action can solve this issue.
 

–Deriving IIT - The Action Spectrum–
The way to solve this problem is the recognition that the presupposition of "actions ought be justified" must refer to action on a spectrum, a spectrum of diverging from previous behavior, and a spectrum of interference with others and the environment.

As said before, a way to resolve conflict, a way to weigh interests, is logically required to avoid contradiction. It can be done with the recognition of an action spectrum.
Put it simply, nothing about walking is inherently frustrating to interests, inherently in this sense meaning "intrinsically, regardless of external factors to a reasonable and relevant extent".

Different types of action, that are more interfering with others, thus should require more justificatory burden, as presupposed by the existence of normative value. In-fact, true inaction may not even exist, as purposefully doing absolutely nothing is to starve oneself to death, and that is ultimately an action requiring you to resist your own body.

In this sense, eating food is less of an action than going out of your way to starve yourself, which thus means it has less of a justificatory burden.
This has all sorts of implications that will not be explored here, but keep it in mind.
 

–Deriving IIT - Rejection if Action Spectrum is to imply a Contradiction–
To reject this action spectrum is thus to deny the existence of most inaction, as well as prevent the measuring of differing justificatory burdens. It also fundamentally messes up the neutrality logic of Justification Ethics, whereas an action neutral to someone else's fulfillment of their interests can be justified to them despite its neutrality, via an appeal to Justification Ethics itself.

Without an action spectrum, neutrality doesn't exist as measurable but rather all action becomes unjustifiable towards someone, even if just a little bit, resulting in all ethical claims failing. This contradicts Justification Ethics and contradicts the existence of normative value itself, and again results in the ability to prove contradictory ethical claims.
 

–Deriving IIT - Inherent Interests–
Different actions can be more or less interfering to interests. If all interests are taken as equal though, then we once again run into the problem of comparing them.
Clearly an action spectrum must imply some actions and thus interests require more justification than others. Why would an action require more justification than another? The answer is because it is less neutral toward the interests of others, and what makes it less neutral is when the content of the action itself intrinsically places it in opposition to another's interests.

The important insight is that frustration of certain interests does the same thing, because some interests when frustrated attack something constitutively connected to many other interests.
Imagine the difference between someone stopping you from blinking once. Now imagine someone permanently blinding you. The 2nd action is more 'frustrative', more of an interfering action, more inherently frustrating, because the blinding frustrates an interest in seeing that is itself entangled in more overall interest fulfillment.
Without an account of why certain frustrations are intrinsically less neutral than others, the measurement of justificatory burdens collapses into arbitrariness.

This then explains how to measure actions on the action spectrum. Some actions require more justificatory burden than others, and this implies interests that act as a conduit for other interests, Inherent Interests, require more of a justificatory burden to act against.
 

–Deriving IIT - Thus, Inherent Interest Theory–
Thus, Justification Ethics measure of inaction and neutrality imply the Action Spectrum, which imply actions that are more or less interfering towards interests, as the correct measure of justificatory burden.
This action spectrum then implies interests that act as a conduit for other interests, when frustrated, represents more of an interference and thus requires more of a justificatory burden. This is the logic explaining why inherent interests and the inherentness spectrum solves conflicts.

Justification Ethics -> Conflict Contradiction -> Action Spectrum -> Interest Entanglement
From this, we can then derive the following theorem:
 

 

—Inherent Conflict Theorem—
In a conflict, defined as when two or more people's interests contradict each-other in a way that prevents fulfillment of one or more interests, the resolution that grants the most inherent interests priority in a way consistent with Justification Ethics, applies.

Actions more intrinsically interfering with interests require justification over actions closer to inaction that are more intrinsically neutral to interests relative to the content of the action itself.
This resolution can be further reasoned out by who's interests are more inherent, and whether  self defense logic of 'retaliatory law' applies.

Specifically, if someone is frustrating someone else's inherent interests, and their behavior's frustration is intrinsic to the content of the action itself, then their behavior is subject to Retaliatory Law; meaning that proportionate resistance to their frustration is legitimate.

—Inherent Interest Spectrum and Action Inaction—
Inherentness of Interests is thus on a spectrum, of highly relative interests, "I'm personally disgusted by seeing people wear purple hats", and highly inherent interests, "I don't want to be eaten alive by a giant frog". This spectrum is measured based on whether a given interest acts as a conduit of other interests, such as how an interest may relate to basic autonomy which then relates to the protection of all other non-abusive interests.
Action is also thus on a spectrum, of highly interfering actions, "Shooting with a gun", and highly inactive actions, "Walking on the sidewalk past someone". The latter is not intrinsically frustrating.

 

—A Misuse of Inherent Interests—
Imagine this argument: "You cannot regulate a business, even if the business' activity is abusive towards its consumers! Because, the regulation is itself an inherent frustration upon the business, and such frustration is done in defense of consumer's interests that are less inherent!"

This argument can be summed up as the following: "Consumer's interests in better products are less inherent of an interest than a business owner's interest in not wanting to be threatened with legal force."
Given the logic laid out in support of Inherent Interests this seems correct, and appears to support Libertarian Anarcho-Capitalism and the Non-Aggression Principle. This intuition is wrong though, because this argument and this conclusion contradict themselves.

Imagine someone breaks into your house and threatens to burn your house to the ground. If necessary, can you use lethal force to defend your house from the person? According to this logic, you actually cannot, as the aggressor's inherent interest in not dying is more inherent than your interest in your house.


—The Contradiction with the Non-Aggression Principle—
This presents an immediate Catch-22 against Absolutist Property Rights. Your interest in your house not being burned down is an inherent interest, but if inherent interests work as described then the aggressor’s interest in not dying is still more inherent, and thus appears to take priority.

If we argue against this by saying that the aggressor is invalidating their own inherent interests by threatening your house, then suddenly it's also true that the business owner is invalidating their own inherent interests when applicable, by acting in an inherently frustrating fashion.
To be clear, this invalidation is not tied to responsibility, but rather raw causal relationships. If a drunk guy wandered into your house and started burning down your house, the logic still stands. Ironically this sounds even more like libertarianism, yet it contradicts it if Interests are granted Normative Value.

Therefore, if you CAN defend your property with lethal force, that implies an invalidation of inherent interests caused by acting unethically, which then implies abusive behavior can be met with lethal force when proportionate, in contradiction with absolutist property rights.
This would mean the boss actually can be forcibly stopped from laying off people unfairly, as the boss' behavior is inherently frustrating and thus proportionate resistance is validated, as their own inherent interests in not being resisted is invalidated.

If instead the boss cannot be forcibly stopped because his inherent interest in not having force used against him is more inherent than an interest in not being laid off, then suddenly defending property with lethal force is also illegitimate, as the aggressor’s inherent interest in not dying is more inherent than your interest in your own house not being burned down.

Therefore, either way, absolutist property rights don’t make sense.
The one way out of this mess is to say that the aggressor invalidates his own interest in not dying by trying to kill you in a way that is inconsistent with Interests. And so, any proportionate means to defend rational interests is valid.

This answer fixes both problems and allow both lethal defense of property (when necessary), and defense against abusive contracts, in the way that aligns with the Defense and Retaliatory Law Principles laid out previously.

 

—Deriving Inherent Interest Theory from Justification Ethics—
–Premises–
(P1): Justification Ethics presupposes that normative conclusions derive their normative force through appeal to the interests of those involved, and therefore cannot derive contradictory ethical conclusions without the normative force of justification breaking down.
(P2): If opposing actions cannot be distinguished in terms of justification, then contradictory ethical conclusions can be derived.
(P3): The presupposition that actions require justification is implied by the existence of normative ethical value. (Derived by Justification Ethics)
(P4): Strict inaction cannot consistently distinguish transgression from non-transgression, because continuing previous behavior is itself an action.
(P5): If strict inaction fails to distinguish transgression, then actions must be distinguished relative to their interference with others' behavior.
(P6): Actions distinguished relative to one another differ by degrees of interference with others and the environment.
(P7): If actions differ by degrees of interference, then they differ by degrees of justificatory burden.
(P8): Without differing justificatory burdens, neutrality cannot exist as measurable, causing all actions to become unjustifiable, allowing the derivation of contradictory claims.
(P9): Actions whose content is intrinsically more interfering with the interests of others require greater justificatory burden than actions whose content is intrinsically more neutral toward the interests of others.
(P10): Frustrating an interest that acts as a conduit for other interests, constitutes greater intrinsic interference with the fulfillment of interests than frustrating an interest that does not.

–Logic–
(L1): From (P1 + P2), Justification Ethics requires opposing actions to be distinguished in terms of justification.
(L2): From (P3 + P4), this distinction cannot be grounded by a strict action/inaction distinction
(L3): From (P5 + P6), actions must instead be distinguished on a spectrum of interference with others and the environment.
(L4): From (L1 + L3), Justification Ethics therefore implies an Action Spectrum.
(L5): From (L4 + P7), the Action Spectrum implies differing justificatory burdens corresponding to differing degrees of interference.
(L6): From (L5 + P8), the Action Spectrum requires justificatory burdens to be distinguishable in order for neutrality to exist as measurable and contradictory ethical claims to be avoided.
(L7): From (L6 + P9), actions requiring greater justificatory burden are those whose content is intrinsically more interfering with the interests of others.
(L8): From (L7 + P10), actions frustrating interests that act as conduits for the fulfillment of other interests require greater justificatory burden than actions frustrating interests that do not.

–Conclusion–
From (L8): Therefore, actions frustrating interests that act as conduits for the fulfillment of other interests require greater justificatory burden than actions frustrating interests that do not. Such interests are, by definition, Inherent Interests. Therefore, Justification Ethics implies Inherent Interest Theory.
 

—Defense and Retaliatory Law Principles—
--Basic Recap of Self-Defense--
As explained before, valuing Rational Interests can only mean the right to defend rational interests from irrational transgressions. To have the right over your interests, and to not have the right to defend your interests through proportionate means, is a contradiction.

If the idea that Interests form a right to Property, where certain objects and environments can act as a conduit of your interests, where attacks against personal property is an act of inherent frustration against your interests, this also implies a right to proportionate self-defense of your body, mind, and property, your stuff, belongings, your home; by any means necessary to protect interest fulfillment.

--Proportionate Force and Lethal Retaliation--
Rational Interests win out over Irrational Interests, this comes from the assumption of Normative Rationalism. If someone breaks into your house and tries to destroy all of your stuff and then tries to burn down your house, is lethal force justified to defend what is yours?

The answer is proportionate force is justifiable. If lethal force becomes proportionate, then it is justifiable. It can be argued that the transgressor could tell you explicitly, "You can leave, I won't stop you. If you try to stop me from burning down your house though, I will kill you."

If they say this, assuming you know they are being truthful, you now know that any resistance will be met with lethal force by them. Since force against them to some degree is already justifiable defense of your interests, if they turn to lethal force in retaliation, then since that lethal force is unjustifiable this situation becomes the same as one where they used lethal force from the beginning.

For this reason, since them using lethal force is foreseeable anyway, it is thus justifiable for you to engage in lethal force before they do. If you have reasonable foresight that they will use lethal force if threatened in any way, then you have a right to cut to the chase, since your interference with them is already justifiable.


—Retaliatory Law—
Based on this reasoning, this then justifies a limited use of justifiable force by government and courts. If a court argues you are inherently frustrating against others to such a degree that it must be stopped, and you try to refuse their justifiable demands, then under Yoggism they have the right to use proportionate force to prevent your transgression.

If you then resist further with lethal force, your resistance becomes an inherent frustration against them and unjustifiable use of force, to which whoever is enforcing demands against you can then defend themselves with their own lethal force.

To be clear, this logic behind enforcement of justified rules immediately fails if said rules are unethical or unjustifiable in and of themselves. In a democratic society, this logic will also fail if rules are contrary to the interests of the public, aka decided undemocratically or in a way not representative of the citizens of some community.