–The value of Interests, derived from the existence of Normative Force itself–

 

​--Basic Clarifications--

A. Interests are not presuppositions onto themselves. This argument is based on the concept of examining that which can be justified relative to someone who already rationally values their own interests. The normative value of interests is agent-relative, someone who values nothing at all simply forfeits all normative force and cannot justify their actions or claims.

B. In this context we can assume normative claims deduced from premises, must require at least one normative premise; this is justified by the is/ought gap.

C. Interests are defined as any preferences, wants, desires, goals, that which a being's behavior tends towards; they are inherently and definitionally action-guiding.

 

--The Argument Step-By-Step--
0. Acceptance of any deductive argument, presupposes reason and deduction according to logic.
1. Normative Justifications prove a conclusion of "Therefore, you ought to believe X" by definition.
2. Proving a conclusion in any deductive argument, requires premises. (basic deduction)
3. If normative justifications prove normative claims to some opponent, based on premises, those premises must apply to the opponent as otherwise the conclusion would not follow.
4. Normative conclusions must derive their normativity from normative premises. (is-ought gap)
5. For a normative premise to apply to some opponent, it must derive its normative force from claims already valid for the opponent; facts, logic, or values they hold as having force.
6. An opponent's wants, desires, beliefs, preferences; definition-wise these are their interests, and they are values the opponent holds with normative force relative to themselves.
7. A normative justification cannot be grounded on axioms or assumptions, as the axioms themselves are left unjustified and can be used to support contradicting claims.
8. Thus, for a normative premise to apply to some opponent, it must derive normative force from an appeal to truth, reason, presupposed norms, or the opponent's value of their own interests.
8. It is impossible to derive normative claims in the form "You ought not murder" from true facts alone. This is the is/ought fallacy. Thus epistemic truths and reason, fail to derive normative force.
9. Presuppositions arising from norms of a specific process cannot derive ethical force, as such process can be evaded and its norms need not apply outside the process.
10. Any argument that hinges on or argues for normative ethical force, thus must ultimately derive that normative force from an appeal to interests, as otherwise the conclusion need not apply.
11. Acceptance of the validity of normative ethical force thus presupposes that normative force can be justified, thus appealing to the value of interests.
 

–Acceptance of Normative Force presupposes a value of Interests–
Therefore, to assume the existence of normative force rationally requires the presupposition of the normative value of Interests, as otherwise such normative force would be impossible to justify.
To reject the normative value of Interests as they apply to all beings, is to make all arguments for normative force of any kind unjustifiable.
To reject Interests as the source of normative value is thus to forfeit all normative force.

​

--The Argument as a Deduction--
–Definitions:
(Normative Justification): A deductive argument that derives a normative claim in the form “you ought to accept X” or “you ought not act against or inconsistent with X”.
(Ultimate Justification): A normative justification of a claim that does not ultimately depend on unjustified normative premises, except for the rules of logic themselves.
(Descriptive Facts): Is-statements, claims that are not normative but explain facts about the world, I.E. “the sky is blue”.
(Interests): That which the behavior of a sentient being tends towards.
(Interests as a value): The appeal to interests as the source of normativity that derives a normative claim.

–Premises:
(P1): Normative Justifications that derive normative claims in the form “you ought to accept X”, must include at least one normative premise.
(P2): Purely descriptive facts and logical truths alone cannot derive normative claims. (The is-ought gap)
(P3): Normative axioms and assumptions cannot constitute an ultimate justification, because the axioms themselves are left unjustified and can be used to support contradicting claims.
(P4): Normative Justifications can derive normative claims by appealing to someone's interests, I.E. “you ought to buy a washing machine” from an interest in clean clothes.
(P5): Normative justifications must derive their normativity from premises their target is rationally required to accept, as otherwise their target is not rationally required to accept the claim, leaving it unjustified.
(P6): In deduction, claims are derived from premises; such premises are either descriptive facts, logical truths, interests, axioms, or presuppositions; or reducible thereto.
(P7): Presuppositions arising from norms of some external process, cannot consistently ground normative ethical claims, as such process can be evaded and its norms need not apply outside the process.
(P8): If a norm is merely presupposed by participation in an inevitable or universal process, that fact alone cannot justify a normative ethical claim as such presuppositions reduce to mere descriptive facts.

–Logic:
(L1): From (P2 + P3), neither descriptive facts, purely logical truths, nor axioms or assumptions can ultimately ground justification of normative claims.
(L2): From (P1 + L1), normative justifications cannot derive conclusions solely from descriptive facts, purely logical truths, axioms, or assumptions.
(L3): From (P4 + P5), normative justifications can derive normative claims by deriving the normativity from an appeal to interests.
(L4): From (L2 + L3), interests have the capacity to ground normative justification, whereas descriptive facts, pure logic, and axioms cannot ultimately ground normative justification.
(L5): From (L4 + P6), interests and presuppositions are the only available types of premises for the normative grounding of normative claims.
(L6): From (P7 + P8), presuppositions cannot consistently justifiably ground normative claims.

–Conclusion:
From (L5 + L6): Therefore, normative ethical justifications that consistently derive claims in the form “you ought to accept X”, must ultimately appeal to interests as a value, as otherwise they are rendered unjustifiable.