—Inherent Interest Theory—
Some actions are closer to being inaction relative to interests. Some actions require more of a justificatory burden than others. Some actions are inherently frustrating to interests.

Some interests are more inherent than others. Some actions and interests represent a spook against interest fulfillment that cannot be justified.
This is the basis of how to solve conflicts under Justification Ethics.

--A Definition of Inherent Interest--
Inherentness is a spectrum used to directly compare interests.
An interest is more inherent than another if the given interest is entangled with other interests, or acts as a conduit for other interests regardless of external factors; in a way the second interest does not, or to a higher extent.
You can also say such an interest is held by a sentient being as an end in itself, an intrinsic interest.

For example, an interest in not having food taken away, can in most circumstances be a very inherent interest, as it acts as a conduit for an interest in not dying; which itself is a conduit for all other interests.

--More Details--
When we say "an interest acts as a conduit for other interests regardless of external factors" what is meant is that the acting as a conduit is intrinsic to the interest, and remains true even if external conditions change, to a relevant and reasonable extent.
That 'extent change' is the spectrum of inherentness, some interests are more intrinsically foundational to other interests than others.

--Inherent Frustration--
Interests can be ends in themselves, intrinsic to a person, or act as conduits for other interests.
Some actions can be frustrating in a way where the frustration is similarly an end in itself.
If an action frustrates an interest in a way where the frustration occurs regardless of external factors to a reasonable or relevant extent, that action can be said to be inherently frustrating.

For example, the difference between eating a sandwich at a public cafeteria that someone else wanted, and taking and eating a sandwich out of someone's hands after they had already picked it up. In the second scenario, this frustration is more inherent than in the first.

To measure whether an action is inherently frustrating, simply ask whether the frustration is intrinsic to the content of the action. Acting according to an interest in "nobody else wearing a blue shirt" is very different from an interest in "wearing a red shirt myself".


—How Inherent Interests solve Conflicts—
Imagine someone is outside of your house and is dancing weirdly on the sidewalk. Not too close to your house to disturb your yard, not making much noise, either. They just.. look weird, and you can see them being weird out of your window.

Imagine you have an interest in them not doing that. What should you do?
A. To forcibly stop the person from doing what they want.
B. To close your window so them dancing stops getting on your nerves.

The answer is that, all things being equal, their interest in dancing is more inherent than your interest in them not dancing; because their interest in dancing is merely an extension of non-abusive autonomy.
Their interest in autonomy, which their dancing is entangled with, is much more intrinsic to all of their other interests than your interest in them not dancing is to yours.

Meanwhile, your interest against them dancing is an inherently frustrating interest. It is in a sense, an anti-interest, and it is the one requiring justification.

Therefore, their interest is more inherent. Since them dancing doesn't interfere with your interests to anywhere near the same extent your interest in stopping them from dancing interferes with them, acts against them are unjustifiable.

It can then also be said that the action of dancing is not inherently subordinating of other's interests, nor is it inherently frustrating against anyone.
The act of stopping someone from dancing though, is inherently frustrating.

—Interest Entanglement—
As explained earlier, an interest in dancing is entangled with an interest in autonomy to put it simply, and thus dancing is an inherent interest.

This is a concept called Interest Entanglement, and it represents how interests can be entangled with other interests by manner of causal correlation.

The clearest examples include an interest in not dying being entangled with almost all interests of an individual, an interest in driving a car being entangled with the fulfillment of many other interests that require it, an interest in being able to speak freely being entangled with general autonomy, truth, and an interest in voicing your own interests, etc.

The importance of interest entanglement is derived from the idea that Justification Ethics fails to determine strict inaction without defining an Action Spectrum, which must rank interests by how them being frustrated constitutes interference.
To argue such entanglement is meaningless because it lies on a spectrum, and thus clear distinctions cannot be defined and are meaningless, is a Loki's Wager Fallacy, a type of continuum fallacy.
 

 

–Deriving IIT - Unsolved Conflict gives a Contradiction–
An appeal to the normative value of interests of those involved in an interaction is presupposed by the justification of deriving a conclusion with normative ethical force.
Such justification must prove a normative conclusion where the target of the justification is rationally required to accept the conclusion.

Accepting the conclusion requires the premises of the justification to never contradict each-other, otherwise logical normative force breaks down because the truth of premises breaks down or logic itself breaks down.
The way normal Justification Ethics works is if you have one person who is performing an action that frustrates the others interests, that action can be unjustifiable as it cannot be justified relative to interests, since the action is inherently frustrating.

A situation where two people are both frustrating against one another, and both performing actions against one another, makes this naive view stop working, as they are both acting in a way that cannot be directly justified to the other.

This is a serious problem, but also helps prove that a weighing of interests in some form is logically required, as it's lack allows the derivation of contradictory ethical claims. So from a proof by contradiction, someone must be right and someone must be wrong.

Otherwise, both people's actions seem unjustifiable, which makes justification collapse.
 

–Deriving IIT - The Action Inaction Distinction–
The reason for this issue is that when two people are both acting against each-other, you can't call one action unjustified and thus solve the conflict, because in a way both actions cannot be justified directly, since both actions are counter to the others interests.

The action inaction distinction in Justification Ethics is held up by the basis that action requiring justification is presupposed by the existence of ethics itself, while inaction requiring justification is simply an assumption, thus creating an asymmetry used to define the transgressor.

Here we run into a deeper problem that again solves a larger one. Imagine a clear example of inaction, a child is drowning in a river. Someone sees that, and just keeps walking.

Again it seems as if inaction requiring justification cannot be proven in and of itself, yet someone seeing a child in trouble and simply walking away, isn't actually absolute inaction; because they choose to continue walking, and walking is an action.

Is inaction an even more limited category then? Not necessarily. A rephrasing of action can solve this issue.
 

–Deriving IIT - Action Spectrum–
Some claims have more or less epistemic cost than other claims, upon others. Such claims are normative and ethical claims that affect others can only be derived via an appeal to interests, through Justification Ethics.
The distinction of action and inaction, of weighing between claims, is required to prevent the derivation of contradictory ethical claims, and to prevent the collapse of justification entirely in the case of conflicts.

These claims must be weighed relative to interests, as interests are the only thing that can derive these sorts of normative ethical claims.

Thus via a proof by contradiction, we derive an action spectrum, of actions weighed by being more or less interfering to interests. Thus actions more inherently frustrating to interests, where the frustration of interests is intrinsic to the content of the action itself, imply stronger claims that require a more justificatory burden, in comparison to what relatively constitutes inaction.

Different types of action, that are more interfering with others, result in their justification implying more epistemically heavy claims, and thus requires more justificatory burden, as presupposed by the existence of normative value. In-fact, true inaction may not even exist, as purposefully doing absolutely nothing is to starve oneself to death, and that is ultimately an action requiring you to resist your own body.

In this sense, eating food is less of an action than going out of your way to starve yourself, which should imply it has less of a justificatory burden.
This has all sorts of implications that will not be explored here, but keep it in mind.
 

–Deriving IIT - Rejection of the Action Spectrum is to imply a Contradiction–
To reject this action spectrum is thus to deny the existence of most inaction, as well as prevent the measuring of differing justificatory burdens. It also fundamentally messes up the neutrality logic of Justification Ethics, whereas an action neutral to someone else's fulfillment of their interests can be justified to them despite its neutrality, via an appeal to Justification Ethics itself.

To reject the idea that the claims upon others implied by the justification of actions, are not of differing epistemic cost, is a rejection of the action spectrum.

Without an action spectrum, neutrality doesn't exist as measurable but rather all action becomes unjustifiable towards someone, even if just a little bit, resulting in all ethical claims failing. This contradicts Justification Ethics and contradicts the existence of normative value itself, and again results in the ability to prove contradictory ethical claims.

Thus, we can derive the action spectrum via a proof by contradiction.
 

–Deriving IIT - Inherent Interests–
We have established that an action spectrum is necessary to prevent the derivation of contradictory claims, and that this spectrum ultimately deals in interest frustration.
How can we directly compare interests themselves?

Imagine the difference between someone stopping you from blinking once. Now imagine someone permanently blinding you. The 2nd action is more 'frustrative', more of an interfering action, more inherently frustrating, because the blinding frustrates an interest in seeing that is itself entangled in more overall interest fulfillment.

As said before, a way to resolve conflict, a way to weigh interests, is logically required to avoid contradiction. It can be done with the recognition of inherent interests and the action spectrum.

This then further explains how to measure actions on the action spectrum. Some actions require more justificatory burden than others, and interests that act as a conduit for other interests, Inherent Interests, require more of a justificatory burden to act against.
 

–Deriving IIT - Thus, Inherent Interest Theory–
Thus, Justification Ethics measure of inaction and neutrality imply the Action Spectrum, which imply actions that are more or less interfering towards interests, as the correct measure of justificatory burden.
This action spectrum then implies inherently frustrating actions are less neutral, and interests that act as a conduit for other interests, when frustrated, represents more of an interference and thus requires more of a justificatory burden.

This is the logic explaining why inherent interests and the inherentness spectrum solves conflicts.
Justification Ethics -> Conflict Contradiction -> Action Spectrum -> Interest Entanglement

From this, we can then derive the following theorem:
 

 

—Inherent Conflict Theorem—
In a conflict, defined as when two or more people's interests contradict each-other in a way that prevents fulfillment of one or more interests, the resolution that grants the most inherent interests priority in a way consistent with Justification Ethics, applies.

Actions more intrinsically interfering with interests require justification over actions closer to inaction that are more intrinsically neutral to interests relative to the content of the action itself.
This resolution can be further reasoned out by who's interests are more inherent, and whether self defense logic applies.

Specifically, if someone is frustrating someone else's inherent interests, and their behavior's frustration is intrinsic to the content of the action itself, then their behavior is subject to Retaliatory Law; meaning that proportionate resistance to their frustration is legitimate.
Through this can be derived and applied, the Anti-Abuse Principle.
 

—Inherent Interest Spectrum and Action Inaction—
Inherentness of Interests is thus on a spectrum, of highly relative interests, "I'm personally disgusted by seeing people wear purple hats", and highly inherent interests, "I don't want to be eaten alive by a giant frog". This spectrum is measured based on whether a given interest acts as a conduit of other interests, such as how an interest may relate to basic autonomy which then relates to the protection of all other non-abusive interests.

Action is also thus on a spectrum, of highly interfering actions, "Shooting with a gun", and highly inactive actions, "Walking on the sidewalk past someone". The latter is not inherently frustrating.


—A Misuse of Inherent Interests—
Imagine this argument: "You cannot regulate a business, even if the business' activity is abusive towards its consumers! Because, the regulation is itself an inherent frustration upon the business, and such frustration is done in defense of consumer's interests that are less inherent!"

This argument can be summed up as the following: "Consumer's interests in better products are less inherent of an interest than a business owner's interest in not wanting to be threatened with legal force."
Given the logic laid out in support of Inherent Interests this seems correct, and appears to support Libertarian Anarcho-Capitalism and the Non-Aggression Principle. This intuition is wrong though, because this argument and this conclusion contradict themselves.

Imagine someone breaks into your house and threatens to burn your house to the ground. If necessary, can you use lethal force to defend your house from the person? What if the person tries to non-lethally assault you? According to this logic, you actually cannot, as the aggressor's inherent interest in not dying is more inherent than your interests in both your house and your body.


—The Contradiction with the Non-Aggression Principle—
This presents an immediate Catch-22 against Absolutist Property Rights. Your interest in your house and body is an inherent interest, but if inherent interests work as described then the aggressor’s interest in not dying is still more inherent, and thus appears to take priority.

If we argue against this by saying that the aggressor is invalidating their own inherent interests by threatening your house, then suddenly it's also true that the business owner is invalidating their own inherent interests when applicable, by acting in an inherently frustrating fashion.

To be clear, this invalidation is not tied to responsibility, but rather raw causal relationships. If a drunk guy wandered into your house and started burning down your house, the logic still stands. Ironically this sounds even more like libertarianism, yet it contradicts it if Interests are granted Normative Value.
Therefore, if you CAN defend your property with lethal force, that implies an invalidation of inherent interests caused by acting unethically, which then implies abusive behavior can be met with lethal force when proportionate, in contradiction with absolutist property rights.

This would mean the boss actually can be forcibly stopped from laying off people unfairly, as the boss' behavior is inherently frustrating and thus proportionate resistance is validated, as their own inherent interests in not being resisted is invalidated.

If instead the boss cannot be forcibly stopped because his inherent interest in not having force used against him is more inherent than an interest in not being laid off, then suddenly defending property with lethal force is also illegitimate, as the aggressor’s inherent interest in not dying is more inherent than your interest in your own house not being burned down.

Therefore, either way, absolutist property rights don’t make sense.
The one way out of this mess is to say that the aggressor invalidates his own interest in not dying by trying to kill you in a way that is inconsistent with Interests. And so, any proportionate means to defend rational interests is valid.

This answer fixes both problems and allow both lethal defense of property (when necessary), and defense against abusive contracts, in the way that aligns with the Defense and Retaliatory Law Principles laid out previously.

 

—Deriving Inherent Interest Theory from Justification Ethics—
–Premises–
(P1): Justification Ethics requires normative ethical conclusions to derive their normative force through an appeal to the interests of those involved, such that differences in how those interests are affected constitute differences in the normative force of the conclusions.
(P2): Different claims can have different epistemic costs, such that the epistemic cost and corresponding justificatory burden of a claim varies according to differences in how the interests through which its normative force is derived are affected.
(P3): The justification of an intentional action toward another person makes a normative claim concerning the interests affected by that action.
(P4): A strict distinction between action and inaction cannot determine differing justificatory burdens, because behavior that appears to be inaction can consist of continued or alternative action.
(P5): If differences in epistemic cost are denied, there is no basis for distinguishing stronger from weaker justificatory burdens, causing normative justification itself to collapse.
(P6): The degree to which an action interferes with the fulfillment of interests determines how those interests are affected by the action.
(P7): Interests can be more or less affected by an action, and an action can inherently frustrate an interest rather than merely be neutral toward it; when an interest is entangled with the fulfillment of other interests, frustrating it also interferes with the fulfillment of those interests.

–Logic–
(L1): From (P1 + P2), differences in how the interests through which a claim derives its normative force are affected constitute corresponding differences in the epistemic cost and justificatory burden of that claim.
(L2): From (P3 + L1), the epistemic cost and justificatory burden of an action's justification vary according to differences in how the interests affected by that action are affected.
(L3): From (P6 + L2), differences in the degree to which an action interferes with the fulfillment of interests constitute corresponding differences in the epistemic cost and justificatory burden of the action's justification.
(L4): From (P4 + L3), the relevant differences in epistemic cost and justificatory burden concern the degree to which actions interfere with the fulfillment of interests rather than a strict action/inaction distinction.
(L5): From (P5 + L4), differences in epistemic cost and justificatory burden must be preserved as distinctions within normative justification.
(L6): From (P7 + L5), inherent frustration constitutes interference with the fulfillment of an interest, and where that interest is entangled with the fulfillment of other interests, that interference extends to those interests.
(L7): From (L3 + L6), actions that inherently frustrate interests entangled with the fulfillment of other interests produce a greater degree of interference with the fulfillment of interests than actions whose interference does not extend through such entanglement.
(L8): From (L3 + L7), actions that produce a greater degree of interference with the fulfillment of interests, through inherent frustration of interests, and frustration of interests entangled with other interests, carry a correspondingly greater epistemic cost and justificatory burden.

–Conclusion–
From (L8): Therefore, Justification Ethics implies an Action Spectrum in which actions are distinguished according to the degree of interference produced by their inherent frustration of interests, such that actions producing greater interference through the frustration of more deeply entangled interests carry a greater epistemic cost and justificatory burden.

Such interests are, by definition, Inherent Interests. Therefore, Justification Ethics implies Inherent Interest Theory.

 

—Defense and Retaliatory Law Principles—
--Basic Recap of Self-Defense--
As explained before, valuing Rational Interests can only mean the right to defend rational interests from irrational transgressions. To have the right over your interests, and to not have the right to defend your interests through proportionate means, is a contradiction.

If the idea that Interests form a right to Property, where certain objects and environments can act as a conduit of your interests, where attacks against personal property is an act of inherent frustration against your interests, this also implies a right to proportionate self-defense of your body, mind, and property, your stuff, belongings, your home; by any means necessary to protect interest fulfillment.

--Proportionate Force and Lethal Retaliation--
Rational Interests win out over Irrational Interests, this comes from the assumption of Normative Rationalism. If someone breaks into your house and tries to destroy all of your stuff and then tries to burn down your house, is lethal force justified to defend what is yours?

The answer is proportionate force is justifiable. If lethal force becomes proportionate, then it is justifiable. It can be argued that the transgressor could tell you explicitly, "You can leave, I won't stop you. If you try to stop me from burning down your house though, I will kill you."

If they say this, assuming you know they are being truthful, you now know that any resistance will be met with lethal force by them. Since force against them to some degree is already justifiable defense of your interests, if they turn to lethal force in retaliation, then since that lethal force is unjustifiable this situation becomes the same as one where they used lethal force from the beginning.

For this reason, since them using lethal force is foreseeable anyway, it is thus justifiable for you to engage in lethal force before they do. If you have reasonable foresight that they will use lethal force if threatened in any way, then you have a right to cut to the chase, since your interference with them is already justifiable.


—Retaliatory Law—
Based on this reasoning, this then justifies a limited use of justifiable force by government and courts. If a court argues you are inherently frustrating against others to such a degree that it must be stopped, and you try to refuse their justifiable demands, then under Yoggism they have the right to use proportionate force to prevent your transgression.

If you then resist further with lethal force, your resistance becomes an inherent frustration against them and unjustifiable use of force, to which whoever is enforcing demands against you can then defend themselves with their own lethal force.

To be clear, this logic behind enforcement of justified rules immediately fails if said rules are unethical or unjustifiable in and of themselves. In a democratic society, this logic will also fail if rules are contrary to the interests of the public, aka decided undemocratically or in a way not representative of the citizens of some community.