—The Interest Theory of Duty—
Ethical Duty is a concept that, for the purpose of Yoggism, is separate from the ethical legality or rights-based examination of actions.
Justification Ethics particularly examines what actions can be justified and what actions cannot. Estoppel Ethics does the same thing from a different angle.
Both transcendental arguments imply the Anti-Abuse Principle (AAP) which claims intrinsic frustration of interests is illegitimate and defense against such is legitimate via estoppel.

The question is though, what about inaction? Do there exist ethical obligations? If so, what are they? To answer this question we run into a problem. To gather that there exist actions you ought not perform, and actions others ought accept, we stipulate the existence of ethics itself as it pertains to argumentation and debate, as well as deliberation and the justification of self-defense, as well as how ethics is the way of consistently justifying who should win in a conflict over resources or a conflict of interests.

When it comes to whether there are certain actions people ought to perform, where it is unethical to not perform the action, even if you are disconnected from the resulting consequences, we must stipulate duty into existence by saying that inaction requires some minimal justification as well.

This stipulation can either be made an axiom, whereas we argue: "Relative to the existence of ethical duty, what is the least-arbitrary version of such duty given Justification Ethics?", or we could instead say that since true inaction does not exist and everyone so long as they are awake is acting in some way all the time, that there does exist some minimal and least-arbitrary justificatory burden placed upon those who see a child drowning in front of them and choose to start walking away, either way we get to the same conclusion under Yoggism, so we can continue.

To a point, what does it even mean to ask whether duty exists? It is like asking whether ethics as a whole exists, or whether logic exists. The question itself may be meaningless in epistemological weight.
 

—Ethical Duty as prescribed by Yoggism—
We can use Yoggism to define and prescribe three layers of Ethical Duty.
The zeroth layer of course isn't duty at all but rather just the Anti-Abuse Principle itself, generating negative obligations through rationality, obligations to not perform specific actions deemed unjustifiable by the frustration of interests intrinsic to the content of them.
 

—The First Layer of Duty—
We gather from the AAP that the ends always justify the means if no neutral party is both dragged into a situation and unjustifiably transgressed upon. Imagine the situation where someone has the opportunity to either buy five cookies for their friends or buy five cakes, and for some strange reason they are the same price. Assuming their friends have the same interest in a kilogram of cake that they do cookie, by weight, it makes sense to say the ends of more mass of food justifies buying five cakes instead of five cookies. Since nobody is being transgressed upon relative to the AAP, we can apply preference consequentialism and conclude buying five cakes is the better choice. This must not be confused with the idea that the ends justify the means when comparing who to hurt and help, however, nor does it imply it is okay to kill one random person to save five unrelated people.

This is the first layer of duty, it is not standard obligation but rather a weighing of which action neutral to you helps others. Since the actions are neutral to your own interests, this is entirely consistent with strict Justification Ethics and doesn't require extra assumptions besides the recognition of interests as a value itself.
 

—Forming actual Positive Obligations—
The second layer of duty, the lowest and least-arbitrary version of positive obligation to take action to help others even if it might frustrate your own interests, aka the kind that requires the least assumptions and arbitrary stipulations while still qualifying as a legitimate recognition of duty, must be measured relative to interests as to measure it relative to any other standard would be decidedly more arbitrary. The reason for this is that Justification Ethics implies other standards require extra normative assumptions to make principled ethical claims of value, and that interests are the only thing that you can use to prove certain value judgements follow in a way that is other-regarding.

As such, to postulate a principle such as "one ought to make hats for people as much as they can" would fail on two fronts. Firstly, that to perform as much as possible is to claim one must waste themselves away in a way that may frustrate their own interests, which requires a greater justificatory burden and/or epistemic cost in arbitrary stipulations to accept. Secondly, for the central goal of this wasting away to specifically be "making hats" is to appeal to an unprovable axiom for value, that "hats are the greatest thing to exist". Justification Ethics warns directly against this notion, showing that axioms cannot be used to prove something others ought accept, since they are definitionally unjustifiable.

Instead, to form the least-arbitrary system of ethical duty, we must advance more fundamentally on both fronts.
 

—The Second Layer of Duty—
The second layer of Duty as prescribed by Yoggism is thus, the obligation to prevent others interests from being intrinsically frustrated as long as doing so does not disproportionately frustrate your interests and doesn't prevent fulfillment of such long-term.

We can include in this layer, the recognition that certain actions may be unethical if duty is not assigned as a presupposition of the action. An example is if you have a job as a firefighter, if you come across a house burning down with a family inside, and decide to not risk your life to save them, you are in effect responsible for their death. This can also be true under strict Justification Ethics and doesn't necessarily require any semblance of ethical duty outside of obligations to not perform certain actions. Why would this be the case?

The reason is that you being a firefighter means other people were not, it is the nature of society. If you refuse to help, the chance of them dying increases relative to their chances of dying if you were never a firefighter in the first place, as someone else would likely have taken your place, as well as your contribution to the bystander effect where one person neglecting to help makes others more likely to do the same, of course here you and your fellow firefighters are not only bystanders but in relation to each-other.

We can then conclude that in the second layer of duty, you must help, and without duty, we can still conclude that you not helping implies unethicality by making your employment as a firefighter itself unethical, as you are acting negligent.

-Ethical Duty Proportionality-
It is disproportionate to say someone must get in the way of a knife to stop a paper cut, if doing so risks you getting a bigger cut, even if such cut isn't that bad. Such proportionality is required to avoid the problems from earlier.

It is also disproportionate to say someone must sacrifice themselves to save someone else because that someone else is "too important", as that creates a utility monster problem that assumes without cause that your interests are ultimately subordinate to everyone else's, an extremely anti-individualist and anti-Yoggist stipulation.
True proportionality is a threshold from whether the risk to you is much lower than the risk to the person you're acting to help, to whether the risk to you is high enough to seriously hurt you while only being naively proportional because the person you're helping is somehow "super important".

Imagine you and your family see a drowning angel. Should you and your whole family be obligated to sacrifice themselves to save the angel? Is that proportional simply because it's an angel? The less arbitrary ethical duty, that requiring less epistemic cost, is that whether helping seriously harms your long-term interest fulfillment trumps whether the harm to you is proportional to them.

Thus proportionality at this level cannot simply mean an arguably arbitrary comparison of harms, but also the absolute measure of the harm done to the person we claim is obligated.
 

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—Implications of Second-Layer Obligation—
A classic philosophical conundrum is to imagine that you have a duty to help others. Must this imply you need to sell all of your possessions, and a kidney, to others, and need this imply an obligation to donate all of your savings for the sake of other people you will never meet?

Does this make almost all people evil for not doing these things? The answer is that this absolutism requires extra normative assumptions and is merely stipulated. It decidedly represents a higher epistemic cost, a greater assumption, than the alternative.

What is the alternative? Imagine you walk outside to find a sea of drowning children, thousands of them. Any you do not save will die, others are there and can help too, but it is impossible to save them all. Now imagine your bank account is hacked and someone begins draining money from it every minute, one hundred dollars every minute.

How long should you spend saving children? Should you do nothing? Should you save 5 children? A dozen? Should you spend the rest of your life at this magic sea saving children?
The Yoggist answer, the least-arbitrary answer, is to say you should probably save at least one, perhaps more depending on how much money you have, but you have no obligation to let all of your money disappear and spend the rest of your life there.

This is the argument against the claim popularized by Peter Singer that all people are obligated to sell their possessions and donate as much money to charity as is possible, that even a sea of drowning children does not obviously obligate you to ruin your life to make a number of saved lives go up indefinitely.
The Interest Theory of Duty, precisely this notion of proportionality and this Second Layer of Yoggist Duty, solves this problem.
 

—The Third Layer of Duty - Self-Sacrificial Duty—
What happens if terrorists trap an innocent man and you know with a 95% certainty that either you let them murder the innocent man or they will destroy multiple cities with stolen nuclear weapons?
This implies a form of self-sacrificial duty, not only in the sense that it is justified to do something otherwise unethical to prevent a massive catastrophe, but also in the sense that one may be obligated to sacrifice themselves for the sake of others.

How could we possibly derive this by any means? The acceptance of obligation doesn't imply it directly, Justification Ethics definitely doesn't, this logic is inherently consequentialist in nature.
It is an ends justify the means argument through and through. Clearly those consequences should be measured relative to the fulfillment of interests of course, granting something most close to preference utilitarianism for situations where the ends are bad enough, this idea is called Threshold Consequentialism and sometimes confusingly also referred to as Threshold Deontology or "deontology at the threshold", as you stay deontological (or rules-based) up until a critical point is reached.

There is a way this third layer would seem to make sense though. Firstly the threshold nature of it is implied by least-arbitrarity. It would seem stipulative to simply say "you can kill ten random innocent people to save eleven others" just because bigger number, but to say "you cannot justify murder even if it saves millions of lives for certain because murder is wrong" feels just as stipulative, and relative to obligation that can frustrate interests it makes sense to say at a certain point this indeed can work.

This has just been intuition though. Is there another way?
 

—Threshold Consequentialism as a consequence of Argumentative Norms—
To engage in argumentation surrounding ethics or otherwise is only possible if you are alive. To engage in argumentation and argue that one should never argue is a straightforward performative contradiction because you are doing the very thing you argue against.

This doesn't actually imply what you're arguing for is wrong, but what it does mean is arguing that you should never argue as a normative claim based on the assumed normative evaluative authority of argumentation as a practice is contradictory and unjustifiable.

To argue that one should never murder even if it causes everyone to stop arguing or more fundamentally causes everyone to stop being able to evaluate or recognize ethical claims at all, because everyone dies, does seem to run into a similar problem. If the situation ever arises where the choice really is either murder one person or everyone dies, the everyone dying consequence would seem to be impossible to argue for consistently because to claim it is normatively just to not murder the one person is effectively to claim it is normatively just to allow the consequence of everyone dying.

This isn't the same thing as saying everyone should die, but it could be argued that it actually is, same as saying we should not control the weather at all implies there should be earthquakes.

If it can be distilled down to everyone should die, because the consequences leading to that should happen, because the alternative should not, because the alternative is murder, then suddenly we reach a normative and performative contradiction. As explained before this becomes a logical contradiction in the argument itself.

Thus, the situation's resolution perhaps can be justified based on argumentation. It doesn't make sense to claim such resolution is irrational outside of argumentation either, because that would imply conclusions made within argumentation are invalid outside of the activity. This betrays the very purpose of argumentation itself and renders the objection itself, if argued for, invalid outside of argumentation.
 

—Hoppe's Argumentation Ethics is still Invalid—
Hans-Hermann Hoppe's Argumentation Ethics posits that the Non-Aggression Principle and absolutist first-possessor private property norms are presupposed by engagement in argumentation, as norms constitutive of the activity, and thus to argue in opposition to the NAP is a performative contradiction.

This reasoning feels suspiciously similar to the reasoning just described, but it is not. This argument is invalid because one can accept that argumentation is a peaceful endeavor without claiming the NAP as the defining ethical framework.

The reason why is actually quite simple, the norms dictating how to properly decipher the truth of intellectual claims, are not logically equivalent to the norms dictating how we should resolve physical conflicts over resources.
Hoppe's argument conflates two different notions of conflict, the conflict between ideas and claims, including claims of rightful use of property, and the conflict between the actual physical resources themselves.

Who gets to use force against who is an intellectual claim. The use of the force itself is the physical action. Argumentation presupposes that peaceful means should be employed to evaluate the truth of intellectual claims on the use of force. That does not imply any constitutive property norms must also be employed in the physical actions done to distribute resources justly.

This is the core category error of Argumentation Ethics, an error the previous argument does not exploit but rather avoids.