–Premise by Premise Defense of Deductions–
Major parts of Yoggism, including Justification Ethics, include a deduction that neatly derives the conclusion of the text through logical deduction through a set of premises, such that if the premises are true then the conclusion is true.

This section is dedicated to a defense of each premise of these deductions.
 

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–Justification Ethics–
(P1): Normative Justifications that derive normative claims in the form “you ought to accept X”, must include at least one normative premise.
--This is justified by the general version of the is/ought gap, which is simply the claim that purely descriptive statements cannot directly logically derive normative statements. "Suffering exists" and "Murder causes suffering" do not on their own logically imply "You ought not murder" because that requires the extra premise "You ought not cause suffering" for the conclusion to follow.
--A normative justification by the definition used in the text, is a deduction that proves specific kind of normative claim, thus the gap applies.
--To suggest this premise is wrong would be to claim that some purely descriptive statements can derive normative statements, which is a logical category error.
 

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(P2): Purely descriptive facts and logical truths alone cannot derive normative claims.
--This is the general version of the is/ought gap, that purely descriptive statements cannot directly derive normative statements. To reject it is a category error.
 

(P3): Normative axioms and assumptions cannot constitute an ultimate justification, because the axioms themselves are left unjustified and can be used to support contradicting claims.
--If a claim relies on an assumption that only you accept, and that others reject, and you cannot derive that assumption from some greater premise where it itself you can prove, then you haven't actually defended your claim. I can claim "you ought not murder" based on the principle that "murder is wrong" or "human dignity" but that doesn't actually prove the claim at hand.
--If you can prove an assumption true then it isn't really an 'axiom' in the way relevant to Justification Ethics, and instead the justification of that assumption itself collapses back into one of the categories outlined in Justification Ethics.

--The idea that axioms should be justified is itself presupposed by debate, as debate includes the right of interlocutors to ask "why?" to an arbitrary position.

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(P4): Normative Justifications can derive normative claims by appealing to someone's interests, I.E. “you ought to buy a washing machine” from an interest in clean clothes.
--Oughts from Logic demonstrates from basic rational instrumentality that it is rational to fulfill your interests in the best way possible with respect to other rational standards pertaining to you. Imagine a stick of dynamite, we can say that rationally, a lit stick of dynamite ought to explode, relative to its own tendency to follow the laws of physics.
--Relative to your tendency to act according to your interests, where "interest" is simply that which your behavior tends towards, and relative to the idea that rationally, if you are already acting in accordance with some goal, you ought choose any of the most rational actions you can to best achieve the goal, we can derive that you ought rationally to best fulfill your interests in this sense.
--Rationally speaking, it is irrational to try to get ice cream from an ice cream truck by jumping into a sinkhole randomly. If you accept this, that same rationality is what is applied to the premise, allowing you to prove "you ought to buy a washing machine", through an appeal to your interests and rational ways to fulfill them.

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(P5): Normative justifications must derive their normativity from premises their target is rationally required to accept, as otherwise their target is not rationally required to accept the claim, leaving it unjustified.
--A Normative Justification, as used in Justification Ethics, is some proof that a specific normative ethical claim is a claim you rationally ought to accept. Such a rational ought must be derived from premises that similarly a target rationally ought to accept, because if the premises need not be accepted, the conclusion need not be either.
--Deduction works as premises that imply conclusions, if it is not true that the premises are that which someone rationally ought to accept, then the conclusion has not been proven to be that which someone rationally ought to accept. It still might be, but that has not been shown.
--Thus, the conclusion being a claim that someone rationally ought to accept, has not been justified.
 

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(P6): In deduction, claims are derived from premises; such premises are either descriptive facts, logical truths, interests, axioms, or presuppositions; or reducible thereto.
--No other category exists. Tautologies are logical truths, moral claims are just axioms/assumptions, agency is a presupposition argument, definitions aren't really premises at all but rather tell you what terms or objects a premise states one of these categories apply to.
--Other categories are reducible, imagine a probabilistic claim like "there is a 90% chance this machine will break down". This is a descriptive statement, not a normative one. If it is based on something specific like Bayesian reasoning, then it is a logical truth relative to that discipline, and the discipline itself is an axiom.
--To reject this premise, you must provide a premise that definitively does not fit in any of these categories, while also being able to prove conclusions one rationally ought to accept.

 

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(P7): Presuppositions arising from norms of some external process, cannot consistently ground normative ethical claims, as such process can be evaded and its norms need not apply outside the process.
--This premise is not guaranteed to be true, but a counterexample is yet to be exposed with the exception of basic rationality. Any presupposition of a norm of some activity jumping to anything greater is heavily suspect.
--Kant's transcendental arguments based on agency have hidden normative assumptions within them.
--Hoppe's Argumentation Ethics fails to actually prove false any arguments given in argumentation, and also does not prove norms accepted as part of argumentation are necessarily relevant outside of argumentation.

--It should also be noted that this premise does not contradict Justification Ethics itself because Justification Ethics uses the "action justificatory burden" presupposed by the idea that beliefs and claims should be justified, an idea presupposed by debate. The reason why is that these are not simply norms of some external activity, but rather necessary to engage in the framework of justifying claims itself. See "Rebuttals to Objections" for more detail on this.

 

(P8): If a norm is merely presupposed by participation in an inevitable or universal process, that fact alone cannot justify a normative ethical claim as such presuppositions reduce to mere descriptive facts.
--An objection to this premise is that presuppositions such as "you should act to protect yourself" are universal for humans because humans have a self-preservation instinct. The problem is, such a normative claim doesn't actually follow, because the actual "presupposition" is merely the fact that being alive as a human almost always entails self-preservation as something you are acting according to. You acting according to that instinct is a descriptive fact and nothing else.
--Descriptive facts indeed cannot directly derive normative ethical claims, which is all the premise actually says. It is true such descriptive statements can inform rationale, like how acting according to X principle means you should act most rationally in regards to the principle, but that doesn't imply you should act according to the principle in the first place.
--Therefore, the literal meaning of the premise is still correct, which is all the proof needs to follow.
 

 

–Oughts from Logic–
(P1): All people have interests.
--Interests are defined simply as that which a sentient being's behavior tends towards, as desires and goals, ends a being is acting towards. For people who are awake and currently sentient, this premise is true by definition.
 

(P2): All people act in accordance with the interests they have, and prioritize interests they hold with Intrinsic Value.
--For a person or other being to act in accordance with an interest, is for their behavior to tend towards the interest. For interests the being currently has, this is again true by definition.
--The prioritization of interests they hold with intrinsic value is irrelevant to this proof, but it is also definitionally true, as Yoggism defines an intrinsic interest as an interest that one acts towards regardless of external factors to some extent. This is a prioritization.
 

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(P3): Some actions are better than others at fulfilling interests.
--This is a descriptive fact. If you accept that someone running to an ice cream truck to get ice cream is being dumb by jumping into a sinkhole randomly, then you accept some actions are better than others at accomplishing some goal.
--You are analyzing these defenses in favor of some goal, and you probably already recognize by reading this that actually reading this is more in favor of that goal than eating the device you are using to read this.
 

(P4): Rationally, if you light a stick of dynamite, relative to the laws of physics, and an object’s tendency to follow the laws of physics, it ought to explode.
--This is one of the more interesting premises. It is definitionally true again, but the ought here is an implicative ought, the idea is similar to saying that 1+1 ought to equal 2 relative to how arithmetic works. That ought is a rational ought, rationally you should do this or that, in the sense that if you don't, you are irrational. Rationality is a standard that implies certain things, that is all.
--To deny this premise is to deny the logic of implication itself, which would nullify your own objection.
 

(P5 from P4): Rationally, if you are acting in accordance with an interest, you ought to choose any of the most rational actions you can, to best fulfill the interest.
--This is logically equivalent to Premise 4 as long as it is also accepted that "most rational actions" also requires acting with coherence to other rational standards that may weigh over your interests.
--Such standards are very hard to prove, but Justification Ethics itself is an example of it. If you accept that actions should be justified, and you accept Justification Ethics, then acting in a way that cannot be justified relative to interests, is irrational, even if that action is consistent with your own interests.
--You only rationally ought to fulfill an interest if you are currently acting in accordance with it already, and some interests are overall irrational to act according to in the first place. You have the ability to change what interests you are acting in accordance with, and sometimes you should.
--As long as that caveat is accepted, this premise follows.

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–Inherent Interest Theory–
(P1): Justification Ethics requires normative ethical conclusions to derive their normative force through an appeal to the interests of those involved, such that differences in how those interests are affected constitute differences in the normative force of the conclusions.
--Inherent Interest Theory is an addition upon Justification Ethics. This premise is definitionally correct, Justification Ethics claims that normative ethical claims can only be derived through an appeal to interests.
--For such ethic to be accepted while it derives contradictory conclusions is for the ethic to contradict itself, which causes the standard of Normative Justification to break down.
--A Normative Justification is a deduction that proves a claim in the form "you rationally ought to accept X". Such a deduction is meaningless if it contradicts itself.
 

(P2): Different claims can have different epistemic costs, such that the epistemic cost and corresponding justificatory burden of a claim varies according to differences in how the interests through which its normative force is derived are affected.
--Statements in general can require different assumptions to be correct. Whether these assumptions are themselves true is its own question, which is where the epistemic cost comes from.
--For normative ethical claims, as their justification must ultimately rest on interests according to Justification Ethics, this then implies the justificatory burden of the claim rests on the assumptions required for the claim to be true. These assumptions are themselves claims upon interests, thus their justification rests on these interests.
 

(P3): The justification of an intentional action toward another person makes a normative claim concerning the interests affected by that action.
--This is only false if an action is somehow entirely neutral to the interests of the person affected by it, implying they weren't affected by it at all. If this is the case, that person's interests do not grant it extra justificatory burden under Inherent Interest Theory, so the action can't really be said to be "toward another person" or toward said person it is hypothetically neutral to.
 

(P4): A strict distinction between action and inaction cannot determine differing justificatory burdens, because behavior that appears to be inaction can consist of continued or alternative action.
--Appealing to absolute inaction renders the distinction meaningless because absolute inaction doesn't really exist, if simply walking on the sidewalk not doing much of anything constitutes an action, and the distinction between action and inaction is binary, then all actions are of the same justificatory burden and suddenly all actions are unjustifiable because all actions frustrate some arbitrary interest.
--This causes justification to collapse which contradicts the assumption that some actions are justified, which is necessary for the question of justification to make sense at all.
 

(P5): If differences in epistemic cost are denied, there is no basis for distinguishing stronger from weaker justificatory burdens, causing normative justification itself to collapse.
--This premise is specifically talking about differences in the epistemic cost of claims required to justify intentional actions.
--To deny differences in this cost is to deny the justificatory burden differences between actions, which is a rejection of the action spectrum and just like in P4, causes justification to collapse.
 

(P6): The degree to which an action interferes with the fulfillment of interests determines how those interests are affected by the action.
--What it means for an action to interfere with the fulfillment of interests is for it to frustrate or fulfill interests. The degree of interference then determines the specifics of how interests are frustrated and in what circumstances.
 

(P7): Interests can be more or less affected by an action, and an action can inherently frustrate an interest rather than merely be neutral toward it; when an interest is entangled with the fulfillment of other interests, frustrating it also interferes with the fulfillment of those interests.
--This is based on the definition of interest entanglement and of inherent frustration.
--Some actions, such as punching someone, are more inherently frustrating to the someone's interests than simply walking down the street wearing a blue shirt.
--This distinction is that the action of punching someone is frustrating in a way intrinsic to the content of the action itself, rather than to external conditions. More explicitly, this frustration is intrinsic to the content of the action, relative to the act of simply wearing a blue shirt.
--Relative to that, it is much more intrinsic to the content of the action. This then makes it more inherently frustrating.