—Rebuttals to Objections—
This section outlines rebuttals to several possible objections to Yoggism, including its Justification Ethics argument.

The following objections refuted are as follows, in order:
1. Justification Ethics cannot reject Presuppositions without Contradiction
2. Why must Axioms require Justification?
3. Justification Ethics is just a worse version of Argumentation Ethics
4. Rejecting Interpersonal Justification doesn't make me Irrational
5. Justification Ethics is Begging the Question
6. The Anti-Abuse Principle is Poorly Defined and Cannot Ground Rights
7. The AAP cannot stop a Hoarder of Insulin without invalidating Bodily Autonomy
8. The Is/Ought Gap Objection

9. The Action Spectrum is Arbitrary
10. Why must I justify my Actions to Animals?
11. The Is/Ought Gap is Invalid

12. Yoggism actually just proves the Non-Aggression Principle
13. Rationality cannot derive Morality
 

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-Justification Ethics cannot reject Presuppositions without Contradiction-
Justification Ethics contradicts itself, it says presuppositions are invalid as a way to derive normative claims, while also deriving the idea that interests of an individual can derive normative claims with respect to them, by arguing it is presupposed by instrumental rationality.

It gives the example of someone wanting clean clothes, and saying you can roughly prove the normative "you ought to buy my washing machine" by appealing to their interest in clean clothes. This only works if we accept that they "ought" act rationally according to their own interests.

This claim is a presupposition of debate, argumentation, and a definition of rationality in general. If presuppositions cannot ultimately derive normative claims, then interests ultimately getting normative claims via this presupposition is a contradiction. Thus Justification Ethics contradicts itself.

-Rebuttal-
If someone accepts a normative premise or is currently engaging in an activity that presupposes a normative premise, that premise can be used to derive a normative claim that does apply to them in the moment.
A presupposition is nothing more than a claim that can be derived to be true based on another claim that is already accepted.

By engaging in "peaceful conduct", you derive the claim that "you ought not hurt your friend", not as a universal rule but rather if you do hurt your friend you would no longer be engaging in peaceful conduct. As such, as long as you engage, the normative claim is presupposed that you should not hurt your friend.
The problem with presuppositions and the target Justification Ethics rejects, is presuppositions that attempt to derive universal principles impossible to reject. Such presuppositions almost always involve hidden normative assumptions.

Two examples of this are Hoppe's Argumentation Ethics and Immanuel Kant's transcendental argument based on agency. These both involve hidden normative assumptions and as of now no deduction with all objectively true premises that derive their conclusions has been proven.


 

-Why must Axioms require Justification?-
Why can't axioms derive normative claims? If I prove to someone that a conclusion like "they ought not murder" follows from an axiom like "human life has intrinsic value", they can't dismiss the conclusion because it has an axiom. They also must accept that they rationally ought to accept the conclusion from the premises, because my argument can be entirely valid.
If they reject my axiom I can simply attempt to prove my axiom in ways they would accept, there's no problem here.

-Rebuttal-
Justification Ethics argues that neither raw logical truths, factual statements, presuppositions, nor axioms, can ultimately derive normative claims. This is argued through the is/ought gap, and presupposition-based arguments centered on the norms of some activity involving hidden normative assumptions to universalize any derived normative claims.

When it comes to axioms, the reasoning is that in-order to prove to someone the claim "you ought not murder" for example, to simply appeal to an axiom such as "human life has intrinsic value", doesn't actually prove the claim.
Such a deduction does not actually prove they "rationally ought to accept murder is wrong", rather the deduction proves they "rationally ought to accept murder is wrong, given their acceptance of this axiom", and such a deduction will fail if they reject the axiom because the "given their acceptance" condition will fail.

If you then attempt to further argue in favor of the axiom, or attempt to derive the axiom from other premises, then the axiom you chose isn't actually an 'axiom', it's just another premise. A true axiom, the kind of axiom Justification Ethics targets, is an assumption that is the basis of some system, a fundamental assumption that cannot be 'proven' but rather is a given.

If instead you decide that your "human life has intrinsic value" axiom for example, is not a true axiom but is simply another premise, then this is a normative premise, and must be ultimately derived from another normative premise, due to the is/ought gap. As such, you haven't solved the problem at all and have simply moved the deriving of normatives back a step.

Neither raw logical truths nor factual statements may prove normative claims, so you are stuck with only presuppositions, or interests themselves. True axioms as explained cannot be derived from further premises by definition, and thus cannot ultimately justify normative claims in a way others can be rationally required to accept. The only exception is the axiom that rationality matters in the first place, but pure logic doesn't derive normative ethical claims, it's limited to claims like "you ought accept 1+1=2".

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It should also be noted that to engage in argumentation or debate more broadly, includes the right of the interlocutor to give counterarguments, which includes the right and argumentative validity of arguing against or requesting further argument in favor of, axioms.
Axioms get brought up in the context of debate wherein someone is trying to derive their conclusion from first principles, in such a context the burden of proof standard being appealed to is whether you can prove your claim follows for someone else. This is the rational interpersonal justification standard of Justification Ethics.
In such a standard, axioms cannot be appealed to at a whim, they must be defended.

 

-Justification Ethics is just a worse version of Argumentation Ethics-
The idea that argumentation or debate more generally, presupposes that your opponent's interests are valuable, is simply a worse and less formal version of Hans-Hermann Hoppe's Argumentation Ethics.

-Rebuttal-
Hoppe's Argumentation Ethics attempts to derive anarcho-capitalist concepts of self-ownership and the Non-Aggression Principle by arguing they are presupposed by engagement in argumentation and arguing that the idea of solving conflicts through argument rather than force is also presupposed by argumentation. Ultimately it attempts to derive these principles as universal.

This is a transcendental argument arising from a presupposition of norms of a specific activity.
Justification Ethics is very different from this, the claim of Justification Ethics is that interests are the only thing that can ultimately derive normative claims in a way others are rationally required to accept, thus Ethics must be based on interests, collapsing into Yoggism.

This is not an argument about presupposed norms of some specific activity you may or may not engage in, it is not an argument that your ethical arguments are invalidated by rejecting said norms, rather it is an argument about the very logical grounds to justify deductions of claims themselves.

One possible objection to Argumentation Ethics is that it cannot prove any ethical theory false, because whether an arguer is performatively contradicting themselves as they are advocating against norms presupposed during argumentation, which is a claim with its own problems, says nothing about the truth value of the arguments being provided.

A utilitarian could make a detailed argument in favor of utilitarianism, and the anarcho-capitalist could claim the utilitarian is performatively contradicting themselves by arguing in favor of utilitarianism, but this does not disprove the argument they give itself. If the argument is in deductive form for example, the conclusion of it could still follow from the premises.

This same objection does not work against Justification Ethics because it targets what premises can even exist for deriving normative claims, in a way that works universally.

 

-Rejecting Interpersonal Justification does not make me Irrational-
Justification Ethics only works if we assume actions should be justified in a way others rationally ought to accept, this is interpersonal justification. If I reject such justification as a standard, as an Egoist might, or if I appeal to a different standard, that does not make me irrational.

-Rebuttal-

The problem with Egoism is that it cannot be proven to be true, nor can it be argued for. The reason why applies to any other ethic that rejects the justification of actions.
Egoism, as well as say Utilitarianism, are both ethics (one being the Stirner Anti-Ethic), that tell you how actions should be justified. Egoism says actions are merely justified relative to your own interests, Utilitarianism says actions are justified by what maximizes pleasure and minimizes pain.

These are, ultimately, ethical claims over actions. Such claims cannot be proven. True egoism specifically cannot even be argued for in a way others ought accept at all because to engage in true argumentation necessitates the recognition that beliefs, propositions, have justificatory burden. Egoism rejects this by rejecting objective truth as a spook, which contradicts any argumentative force that could be used to argue for it.
Utilitarianism, and any other ethic that does not inherently reject objective truth or the justification of beliefs, simply fails to be proven anyway.

The conclusions given by the theory in different conflicts are conclusions, ethical claims, that cannot be proven correct without simply referring back to the theory itself.
Yoggism is the only theory that can be proven to be true, whose claims can be proven to be true to those they affect, either by them being consistent with the interests of the person you're proving a claim to, or by the implied insistence that such claims can be provable at all.

Argumentation about ethics at all presupposes that we recognize some ethical claims as more or less arbitrary than others, so Justification Ethics showing ethical claims must be derived from interests creates the least-arbitrary type of ethical claim.
To reject this is to reject ethics which is to forfeit the ability to argue coherently about actions in the first place, which breaks your own objection.
 

 

 

-Justification Ethics is Begging the Question-
Justification Ethics doesn't prove its actual argument, it's begging the question. You could use the process of elimination present in JE to argue for any standard. Interests being the one thing that can derive normative claims is entirely arbitrary.

-Rebuttal-
Interests are the only thing that can derive normative claims to an arbitrary individual. If I have an interest in clean clothes, and I have money and have an interest in spending them to solve my problem, you can prove I rationally ought to buy your washing machine by appealing to instrumental rationality with respect to my interests.

If we agree with the statement "It is irrational for someone looking for ice cream, to jump into a random sinkhole while walking towards an ice cream truck", then we agree that ultimately you rationally ought to fulfill your interests in the best way possible with respect to other rational standards. That other standard is Justification Ethics itself, and this all implies that your own interests can derive normative claims with respect to yourself, at the very least.
This then is one of the premises that allows Justification Ethics to prove that ethical normative claims, claims beholden to others, must appeal to interests to ultimately be justifiable.

The argument is not simply "interests are the basis of ethics because interests matter", rather it is "the value of interests is the only kind of premise that can derive normative claims upon others in a way that appeals to nothing more than rationality.

 

-The Anti-Abuse Principle is Poorly Defined and Cannot Ground Rights-
The Anti-Abuse Principle as stated is poorly defined and cannot ground rights or a public private split through inherent frustration. For example do I own my body? Do I have a right of bodily autonomy? If someone else's interest over my body is more inherent than my interest, then no. Imagine someone who has to run around and slap people, at least one a day, or else they will die.

Do I have an obligation to let them slap me? Must I not defend myself? If so, then I have no right to bodily autonomy, no right to be free from someone slapping me if me being slapped is in service of someone's 'greater good'.

-Rebuttal-
This is a misuse of the concept of "inherent interests". There is no principle that can be justified that states you must maximize fulfillment of inherent interests and that not wanting someone to slap you is unjustifiable if it fails at that goal, that would be more consistent with preference utilitarianism.

The Anti-Abuse Principle is instead about actions, actions being taken that frustrate others' interests in a way intrinsic to the action itself.

To slap someone is inherently frustrating against their interest in not being slapped, and that action constitutes a spook against their interests in the sense that their interest in not being slapped is being ignored for your own gain, their interests are being inherently subordinated to you.

This is very clearly against the Anti-Abuse Principle and comically, only makes sense if the person you are slapping is a utilitarian themselves. Otherwise, a claim against them of the sort cannot be justified. Thus under the AAP we can derive that you do in-fact have a claim of bodily autonomy, in the sense that attacks against your body that are actions, cannot be justified against you for performing what is in distinction, inaction.

Inherent Interests are merely a side-product of this kind of reasoning, not the tool to measure if actions against others is necessarily justified. Inherent interests, interests that act as a conduit for other interests, are more useful when comparing two actions that are both otherwise equally weighed in terms of how much of an interference they represent.

 

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-The AAP cannot stop a Hoarder of Insulin without invalidating Bodily Autonomy-
For the Anti-Abuse Principle to argue that it is justified to stop someone from hoarding insulin or distributing it at a very high price to exploit diabetic patients, is to fall into the problem of consequentialist thinking. Through this thinking one can justify actions against your own bodily autonomy if your autonomy prevents someone else from accessing some resource.

For example having organs and refusing to donate a kidney. How can this be justified relative to the interests of the person who needs a kidney transplant? To claim you have a right over your organs under Yoggism would mean to claim your interests are entangled with the organ, but the same logic can be applied to a pharmacy distributing insulin at a price.
Yoggism thus to enforce the Anti-Abuse part of the AAP, must reject bodily autonomy.

-Rebuttal-
Imagine someone who needs to slap one person every day or else they will die. Does this give them a right, under Justification Ethics, to slap people? Does it mean the people being slapped are not allowed to defend themselves?

The answer is a strong no, because the act of slapping is just that, an action, that cannot be justified relative to interests; unless the slapper can convince people to voluntarily let them slap them.
To slap someone is an inherently frustrating action, where the frustration of interests is intrinsic to the content of the action itself, and involves a frustration of the inherent interest in bodily autonomy. For the same reasons, involuntary organ harvesting is also illegitimate.

With a pharmacy selling insulin at a jacked up price rate, this is an action being performed by the business, continuously paying to supply and sell insulin, and intentionally setting the prices high.
Under the Anti-Abuse Principle, such an action cannot be justified. Both conclusions are true at the same time.

In terms of a pharmacy restricting access to insulin drugs, the previous argument subtly fails.
Having a body is not an action against anyone, but hoarding medicine is.
 

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-The Is/Ought Gap Objection-
Deriving an ought claim from an is-statement, is impossible under Hume's is/ought gap. Any is-statement, such as "the sky is blue" or "there is a person here / this person does exist", or even "suffering exists" or "suffering is a consequence of this action", cannot logically derive an ought claim. Arguing a given action is bad because it causes suffering, begs the question of whether that causation of suffering is bad itself. If it isn't the argument does not follow.
That question is a normative assumption, and such normative assumptions are required to derive normative claims. Justification Ethics cannot cross the is/ought gap.

-Rebuttal-
The is/ought gap accepted by Justification Ethics is nothing more than the proposition that an is statement cannot derive an ought statement. Neither Justification Ethics nor any other argument within Yoggism attempts to derive an ought-statement directly from an is-statement.

Instead, Justification Ethics argues that the only way to justify normative claims in defense of actions is ultimately through an appeal to interests, actions that are inherently frustrating to interests in a way intrinsic to the content of the action itself is thus illegitimate. This is the basis of the Anti-Abuse Principle and the idea that such actions should be justified is a separate question of whether you agree to participate in the context of Ethics itself.

When it comes to that, the question turns into whether you can justify claims at all without accepting interpersonal justification in the sense that beliefs and the results of beliefs that guide action, should ultimately be able to be justified in a way those affected rationally ought to accept.

Justification Ethics is the way to solve for this justification. Nothing here derives an is-statement from an ought-statement, and every deduction used in Justification Ethics uses normative premises that are either tautology or presupposed from debate about ethics itself.

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-The Action Spectrum is Arbitrary-
Justification Ethics implies normative ethical claims cannot be derived in a way others rationally ought to accept, without an appeal to the interests of those involved, or an appeal to the very standard of Justification Ethics itself.

Inherent Interest Theory claims that an action spectrum is valid and can be used to resolve conflicts, but this action spectrum is entirely arbitrary. There is no distinction between action and inaction, this is a farce. Rather, all behavior is action and no action can be proven to be justifiable to everyone, so this universal justification rule cannot ground Ethics.

-Rebuttal-

If you reject the action spectrum you must reject any way to ground Ethics through interpersonal justification. What that means is, assuming Justification Ethics is correct, you must concede that it is impossible to prove any given ethical standard in a way others are rationally required to accept.

This doesn't change the fact that relative to full Yoggism, with the action spectrum included, actions consistent with Yoggism are the only actions that can be justified relative to this measure.

It also doesn't change the fact that this measure is the strongest justification measure that can exist, thus Yoggism is the only ethic all are rationally required to accept if we assume the possibility of such an ethic in the first place.
The action spectrum is also implied from the asymmetry of holding a proposition that requires justification, and not making a claim in the first place. Not making a claim doesn't presuppose justification, and argumentation only presupposes that claims / beliefs posited require justification.

To reject that propositions, claims, require justification, is to reject the argumentative force of your own objection. To accept this asymmetry is to accept that the propositions that are action-guiding, have a justificatory burden, whereas refraining from asserting a claim does not create an equivalent justificatory burden.
To argue action-guiding propositions do not need a justification is to either contradict the norms of argument or reject all argumentative force in favor of your own actions.

From here, argumentation presupposes that propositions can possess differing degrees of justificatory status, some claims can be better justified than others, while some lack sufficient justification entirely. Since actions stem from action-guiding propositions, this then yields the Action Spectrum.

 

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-Why must I justify my Actions to Animals?-
Justification Ethics may establish my actions against others require justification, and that such justification requires an appeal to interests. Who says this applies to animals too, though?
Debate need not presuppose the justificatory burden of actions against non-humans, debate is done with humans.

-Rebuttal through Justification Ethics-
Debate presupposes that beliefs face a justificatory burden, to act against an animal and claim it just is to hold a followed belief in that. That belief has a justificatory burden that must be defended.
The problem is, species specific claims can't be justified arbitrarily. To prove abusing an animal fulfills your interests and other humans' interests, doesn't actually prove the animal ought accept the claim, which makes it impossible to prove to another human who doesn't hold the arbitrary distinction as truth.

Holding extra assumptions to justify animal abuse goes against the idea that beliefs should be justified and can be questioned, holding unquestioned assumptions in general is a problem unless said assumptions are merely the foundation of a particular and useful context, such as the axioms of basic arithmetic.
As such, for any sentient being capable of acting rationally or irrationally relative to their own goals, which can be thought of as any being capable of making mistakes relative to their own goals, it can then be evaluated whether a certain claim is something they rationally should accept.

This does not mean the being will actually accept it or has the necessary faculties to reason out the claim, but rather that regardless of the being's intelligence, the claim does technically follow, whether they know it or not.
To reject this reasoning is to ultimately leave certain beliefs unjustified, which also creates the problem where anyone you arbitrarily refuse to debate is suddenly someone you can act against. You cannot claim to obey justification if you refuse to justify your actions in a way the beings you act against rationally should accept.
Thus, actions that inherently frustrate and intrinsically subordinate interests of sentient beings in general, are illegitimate as they cannot be justified.

To put it simply, prove you have the right to abuse a dog. You cannot.

-Rebuttal through Estoppel Ethics-
We can argue for this Absolute Interest Conclusion, that the value of interests of all sentient beings is the utmost rational standard of ethics, in another way too.
The Estoppel Argument is the idea that if I attack someone, they can proportionately repeat my behavior back to me, I.E. attack me back. Self-defense ultimately comes from this idea.

The justification is that if I punch Bob, I am demonstrating a claim that I have the right to punch people. If Bob returns the favor, he is demonstrating the same claim. For me to reject his claim is for me to either make an arbitrary distinction, or for me to contradict my own claim.

The Estoppel can then be used to demonstrate interchangeability of persons, or beings more broadly. To make an agent-specific claim, that I have the right to punch anyone and only I have this right, is to break this interchangeability, because if we swap me and Bob then I would suddenly reject the claim, I would object to any claim giving someone else such an arbitrary right.

This interchangeability can then demonstrate a principle of fairness, leading to the Anti-Abuse Principle. The important part is that two beings interacting that are a different species creates the same problematic claim as saying a specific person has a right to punch everyone else.

To argue I can kill a cow because I am a human and they are a cow, breaks the interchangeability standard again because if I was a cow and they were a human, I would object to such a claim on it's arbitrarity. This kind of claim thus undermines the Estoppel and renders it trivial.

To instead uphold the standard is to accept such arbitrary distinctions need not apply, thus implying from the Anti-Abuse Principle the Absolute Interest Conclusion.


 

-The Is/Ought Gap is Invalid-
Justification Ethics is based on the idea that is-statements cannot derive ought-statements, neither can axioms or arbitrary presuppositions, thus interests are the only option to ultimately derive ethical claims.
This is wrong though, is-statements can derive ought-statements and to say otherwise is to make it impossible to prove truth is binding at all. If normatives, if what we should act on or should accept, is entirely separated from facts and what exists, then truth is subjective.

Furthermore, we can think up an is-statement such as "Human dignity is a virtue", and then derive normatives from it. Why? Because virtues are things you ought act according to by definition.
This proves is-statements can derive oughts, and the gap is just invalid. Thus pinpointing interests as "the only thing that can derive normative ethical claims" is nonsense and just assuming true the premise.

-Rebuttal-
The is/ought gap is not about literal sentences containing the word is. The gap appealed to in Justification Ethics is more specifically, the gap between pure descriptives and normative claims.
All of Justification Ethics is based on how normative ethical claims specifically, claims about what actions beings should perform that affect one another, can be derived. These are very special types of normatives, and such normatives cannot be derived from pure descriptive claims.

The statement "human dignity is a virtue" is a hidden normative claim. To be true, it relies on the normative definition of virtue, and the statement itself is thus claiming human dignity is in the normative category. This is not non-normative by any definition.

A claim such as "the sky is blue" or "suffering exists" are decisively not normative, they are merely facts about the world. A claim that "one rationally ought accept the sky is blue" is normative, but it is only rationally normative, not ethically. As such you can directly derive it from the rationality presupposed during debate. Facts and truth are not subjective, they are objective and that objectivity is what is already being appealed to by comparing and evaluating reasons based on the standard itself, which is expressly being done by you reading these objections and rebuttals.

To reject this standard is to reject your own objection to the standard, a contradiction.
For similar presuppositions to derive ethical claims though is where Justification Ethics comes in.
Interests are the only thing that can derive ethical claims, or so Justification Ethics argues, simply because non-normatives, purely descriptive claims, cannot derive normatives, and axioms are unjustifiable assumptions by definition, and arbitrary presuppositions of norms of some activity can't derive ethics by themselves. All that is left is interests.

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-Yoggism actually just proves the Non-Aggression Principle-
Justification Ethics implies claims cannot be justified that are inconsistent with interests. Inherent Interest Theory implies that the distinction of inaction and action is necessary for any such ethic to function at all, thus actions inherently frustrating of interests are illegitimate when compared to conflicts involving non-inherent frustration.

The examples given include things like "John likes to wear red shirts, Alice hates red shirts", where the latter interest is inherently frustrating against John, while John simply wearing red shirts is not inherently frustrating against Alice.

It can be argued instead though, that the most inherent way to frustrate another's interests, and thus the best way to separate inaction from action, is whether an action constitutes using some property as a means to a contradictory end upon another's scarce means that is entangled with their interests.
This is suspiciously close to the "contradictory ends on scarce means" idea of property aggression from Murray Rothbard's libertarianism, and this thus implies the Non-Aggression Principle.

The idea of the first actor being the one who requires first justification, is true under Yoggism, where the one who acts against the first actor is the one who can justify it as defense against the first actor's unjustified actions.

In this way, if for example a landlord wants to exclude a tenant from their home because the landlord is racist and the tenant is black, and the tenant attempts to enter the home anyway or use State coercion or force of any sort to get what they want, the tenant is the first actor performing contradictory ends upon the landlord's scarce means entangled with their interests.

As such, the tenant is the one who faces a justificatory burden, not the landlord. The landlord thus in defending themselves, is defending against the inherent frustration of the tenant trying to make a claim over property originally entangled with the landlord.

-Rebuttal-
This is one of the more convincing objections to Yoggism, much better than just denying that ethical claims should be proven at all.

The biggest problem with this is that "contradictory ends upon another's scarce means that is entangled with their interests" doesn't just include the person's homesteaded property under anarcho-capitalist homesteading theories, it also includes property acquired by other people that someone else's interests are intrinsically entangled with.

Imagine a landlord named Yenolds has a tenant named Bob, and Yenolds wants to evict Bob because Bob likes eating crackers, This action of eviction is an action, cancelling an existing contract is also an action, and in this case it is very clearly an action that is illegitimate.

If a landlord named Todd wants to exclude someone from the opportunity to buy Todd's home, because Todd is racist and the customer / tenant is black, this is in a sense a contradictory end being placed upon the home, that is indeed scarce means, and is indeed entangled with the tenant's interests; for a simple reason: Access to housing is an interest entangled with many other interests, and access to this house is an extension of that interest.

It could be argued that since the customer is not already a tenant who has a rental agreement, the landlord is not acting by excluding them, for the same reason I am not acting by not letting someone slap me in the face. If someone tries to slap me, they are the actor, not me. This distinction is necessary as explained in Inherent Interest Theory.

Even here though, the situation doesn't always work. For example, depending on how scarce exactly the property is, hoarding resources or using critical resources and excluding people unfairly, is overall an action against others. The act of any sense of homesteading is just that, an action.
Such an action needs to not be provably unjustifiable, as such a landlord like Todd forming a business around excluding black people, is performing an action that is illegitimate, a whole series of actions in-fact.

 

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-Rationality cannot derive Morality-
Justification Ethics may follow, but it does not and cannot derive a moral ought.
Moral oughts can only follow from moral premises. There are no moral premises presupposed by any actions involved in debate, it is impossible for Yoggism to prove morality.

-Rebuttal-
Justification Ethics and its corresponding sections are not about morality at all, they are about ethics. An ethic is just a derived system of who ought to do what and who ought not do what.
Yoggism is that type of system and is derived from rationalism and the nature of justifying claims itself. It may be possible though, to show that the least-arbitrary moral system possible, is either the Anti-Abuse Principle itself, or the expanded Yogg Virtue Theory ethics.

The trick of saying "if we first assume morality exists, and then we assume this ethic, what is the last-arbitrary morality that follows from this ethic?" This question can be answered.