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Inherent Interest Theory Back to Home Details Step-by-Step Guide Philosophy Menu More Inherent Interest Theory [Full Text] —Inherent Interest Theory— What does "Inherent Interest" really mean? What does inherent mean in terms of inherent frustration? How are different interests weighed against each-other? The answer to this question is crucial to understanding the 'nitty-gritty' of Justification Ethics and the Anti-Abuse Principle. Let us begin. --A Definition of Inherent Interest-- Inherentness is a spectrum used to compare interests. An interest is more inherent than another if the given interest is entangled with other interests, or acts as a conduit for other interests regardless of external factors; in a way the second interest does not, or to a higher extent. For example, an interest in not having food taken away, can in most circumstances be a very inherent interest, as it acts as a conduit for an interest in not dying; which itself is a conduit for all other interests. --More Details-- You can also think of inherent interests as interests a sentient being can hold where the goal or outcome their behavior is tending towards, is an end in itself, meaning that to a reasonable extent, they will maintain said activity regardless of external factors; the interest is itself of intrinsic value. When we say "an interest acts as a conduit for other interests regardless of external factors" what is meant is that the acting as a conduit is intrinsic to the interest, and remains true even if external conditions change, to a relevant and reasonable extent. That 'extent change' is the spectrum of inherentness, some interests are more intrinsically foundational to other interests than others. --Inherent Frustration-- Interests can be ends in themselves, intrinsic to a person, or act as conduits for other interests. Some actions can be frustrating in a way where the frustration is the end itself in a similar fashion. If an action frustrates an interest in a way where the frustration occurs regardless of external factors to a reasonable or relevant extent, that action can be said to be inherently frustrating. For example, the difference between eating a sandwich at a public cafeteria that someone else wanted, and taking and eating a sandwich out of someone's hands after they had already picked it up. In the second scenario, this frustration is more inherent than in the first. Inherent frustration matters more than non-inherent frustration. Inherent frustration of inherent interests matters the most. --Exercise Example-- If you would partake in exercise for example, even if it was entirely neutral in effect towards your and others physical and mental health and you knew this, then you value it intrinsically. If you like something, that simply means your behavior tends towards you doing that thing, and your behavior would tend towards that thing regardless of external factors to some reasonable extent. If your behavior only tends towards exercise because it gives you physical benefits, then you do not view exercise with intrinsic value, it is not an inherent interest. Thus, for someone who doesn't enjoy exercise, exercising isn't an inherent interest. It merely represents the inherent interest in good health. —How Inherent Interests solve Conflicts— Imagine someone is outside of your house and is dancing weirdly on the sidewalk. Not too close to your house to disturb your yard, not making much noise, either. They just.. look weird, and you can see them being weird out of your window. Imagine you have an interest in them not doing that. Said another way, you don't like that they are doing that. What is more reasonable relative to the Fulfillment of Interests? A. To forcibly stop the person from doing what they want. B. To close your window so them dancing stops getting on your nerves. The answer is that, all things being equal, their interest in dancing is more inherent than your interest in them not dancing; because their interest in dancing is merely an extension of non-abusive autonomy. Their interest in autonomy, which their dancing is entangled with, is much more intrinsic to all of their other interests than your interest in them not dancing is to yours. Therefore, their interest is more inherent. Since them dancing doesn't interfere with your interests to anywhere near the same extent your interest in stopping them from dancing interferes with them, acts against them are unjustifiable. —Interest Entanglement— As explained earlier, an interest in dancing is entangled with an interest in autonomy to put it simply, and thus dancing is an inherent interest. This is a concept called Interest Entanglement, and it represents how interests can be entangled with other interests by manner of causal correlation. Some examples include an interest in not dying being entangled with almost all interests of an individual, an interest in driving a car being entangled with the fulfillment of many other interests that require driving, an interest in being able to speak freely being entangled with an interest in both general autonomy and an interest in truth, etc. The importance of interest entanglement is derived from the idea that Justification Ethics fails to determine strict inaction without defining an Action Spectrum, which must rank interests by how them being frustrated constitutes interference. –Deriving IIT - Unsolved Conflict gives a Contradiction– An appeal to the normative value of interests of those involved in an interaction is presupposed by the justification of deriving a conclusion with normative ethical force. Such justification must prove a normative conclusion where the target of the justification is rationally required to accept the conclusion. Accepting the conclusion requires the premises of the justification to never contradict each-other, otherwise logical normative force breaks down because the truth of premises breaks down or logic itself breaks down. The way normal Justification Ethics works is if you have one person who is performing an action that frustrates the others interests, that action can be unjustifiable as it cannot be justified relative to interests, since the action is inherently frustrating. A situation where two people are both frustrating against one another, and both performing actions against one another, makes this naive view stop working, as they are both acting in a way that cannot be directly justified to the other. This is a serious problem, but also helps prove that a weighing of interests in some form is logically required, as it's lack allows the derivation of contradictory ethical claims. So from a proof by contradiction, someone must be right and someone must be wrong. Otherwise, both people's actions seem unjustifiable, which makes justification collapse. –Deriving IIT - The Action Inaction Distinction– The reason for this issue is that when two people are both acting against each-other, you can't call one action unjustified and thus solve the conflict, because in a way both actions cannot be justified directly, since both actions are counter to the others interests. The action inaction distinction in Justification Ethics is held up by the basis that action requiring justification is presupposed by the existence of ethics itself, while inaction requiring justification is simply an assumption, thus creating an asymmetry used to define the transgressor. Here we run into a deeper problem that again can solve a larger one. Imagine a clear example of inaction, a child is drowning in a river. Someone sees that, and just keeps walking. Again it seems as if inaction requiring justification cannot be proven in and of itself, yet someone seeing a child in trouble and simply walking away, isn't actually absolute inaction; because they choose to continue walking, and walking is an action. Is inaction an even more limited category then? Not necessarily. A rephrasing of action can solve this issue. –Deriving IIT - The Action Spectrum– The way to solve this problem is the recognition that the presupposition of "actions ought be justified" must refer to action on a spectrum, a spectrum of diverging from previous behavior, and a spectrum of interference with others and the environment. As said before, a way to resolve conflict, a way to weigh interests, is logically required to avoid contradiction. It can be done with the recognition of an action spectrum. Put it simply, nothing about walking is inherently frustrating to interests, inherently in this sense meaning "intrinsically, regardless of external factors to a reasonable and relevant extent". Different types of action, that are more interfering with others, thus should require more justificatory burden, as presupposed by the existence of normative value. In-fact, true inaction may not even exist, as purposefully doing absolutely nothing is to starve oneself to death, and that is ultimately an action requiring you to resist your own body. In this sense, eating food is less of an action than going out of your way to starve yourself, which thus means it has less of a justificatory burden. This has all sorts of implications that will not be explored here, but keep it in mind. –Deriving IIT - Rejection if Action Spectrum is to imply a Contradiction– To reject this action spectrum is thus to deny the existence of most inaction, as well as prevent the measuring of differing justificatory burdens. It also fundamentally messes up the neutrality logic of Justification Ethics, whereas an action neutral to someone else's fulfillment of their interests can be justified to them despite its neutrality, via an appeal to Justification Ethics itself. Without an action spectrum, neutrality doesn't exist as measurable but rather all action becomes unjustifiable towards someone, even if just a little bit, resulting in all ethical claims failing. This contradicts Justification Ethics and contradicts the existence of normative value itself, and again results in the ability to prove contradictory ethical claims. –Deriving IIT - Inherent Interests– Different actions can be more or less interfering to interests. If all interests are taken as equal though, then we once again run into the problem of comparing them. Clearly an action spectrum must imply some actions and thus interests require more justification than others. Why would an action require more justification than another? The answer is because it is less neutral toward the interests of others, and what makes it less neutral is when the content of the action itself intrinsically places it in opposition to another's interests. The important insight is that frustration of certain interests does the same thing, because some interests when frustrated attack something constitutively connected to many other interests. Imagine the difference between someone stopping you from blinking once. Now imagine someone permanently blinding you. The 2nd action is more 'frustrative', more of an interfering action, more inherently frustrating, because the blinding frustrates an interest in seeing that is itself entangled in more overall interest fulfillment. Without an account of why certain frustrations are intrinsically less neutral than others, the measurement of justificatory burdens collapses into arbitrariness. This then explains how to measure actions on the action spectrum. Some actions require more justificatory burden than others, and this implies interests that act as a conduit for other interests, Inherent Interests, require more of a justificatory burden to act against. –Deriving IIT - Thus, Inherent Interest Theory– Thus, Justification Ethics measure of inaction and neutrality imply the Action Spectrum, which imply actions that are more or less interfering towards interests, as the correct measure of justificatory burden. This action spectrum then implies interests that act as a conduit for other interests, when frustrated, represents more of an interference and thus requires more of a justificatory burden. This is the logic explaining why inherent interests and the inherentness spectrum solves conflicts. Justification Ethics -> Conflict Contradiction -> Action Spectrum -> Interest Entanglement From this, we can then derive the following theorem: —Inherent Conflict Theorem— In a conflict, defined as when two or more people's interests contradict each-other in a way that prevents fulfillment of one or more interests, the resolution that grants the most inherent interests priority in a way consistent with Justification Ethics, applies. Actions more intrinsically interfering with interests require justification over actions closer to inaction that are more intrinsically neutral to interests relative to the content of the action itself. This resolution can be further reasoned out by who's interests are more inherent, and whether self defense logic of 'retaliatory law' applies. Specifically, if someone is frustrating someone else's inherent interests, and their behavior's frustration is intrinsic to the content of the action itself, then their behavior is subject to Retaliatory Law; meaning that proportionate resistance to their frustration is legitimate. —Inherent Interest Spectrum and Action Inaction— Inherentness of Interests is thus on a spectrum, of highly relative interests, "I'm personally disgusted by seeing people wear purple hats", and highly inherent interests, "I don't want to be eaten alive by a giant frog". This spectrum is measured based on whether a given interest acts as a conduit of other interests, such as how an interest may relate to basic autonomy which then relates to the protection of all other non-abusive interests. Action is also thus on a spectrum, of highly interfering actions, "Shooting with a gun", and highly inactive actions, "Walking on the sidewalk past someone". The latter is not intrinsically frustrating. —A Misuse of Inherent Interests— Imagine this argument: "You cannot regulate a business, even if the business' activity is abusive towards its consumers! Because, the regulation is itself an inherent frustration upon the business, and such frustration is done in defense of consumer's interests that are less inherent!" This argument can be summed up as the following: "Consumer's interests in better products are less inherent of an interest than a business owner's interest in not wanting to be threatened with legal force." Given the logic laid out in support of Inherent Interests this seems correct, and appears to support Libertarian Anarcho-Capitalism and the Non-Aggression Principle. This intuition is wrong though, because this argument and this conclusion contradict themselves. Imagine someone breaks into your house and threatens to burn your house to the ground. If necessary, can you use lethal force to defend your house from the person? According to this logic, you actually cannot, as the aggressor's inherent interest in not dying is more inherent than your interest in your house. —The Contradiction with the Non-Aggression Principle— This presents an immediate Catch-22 against Absolutist Property Rights. Your interest in your house not being burned down is an inherent interest, but if inherent interests work as described then the aggressor’s interest in not dying is still more inherent, and thus appears to take priority. If we argue against this by saying that the aggressor is invalidating their own inherent interests by threatening your house, then suddenly it's also true that the business owner is invalidating their own inherent interests when applicable, by acting in an inherently frustrating fashion. To be clear, this invalidation is not tied to responsibility, but rather raw causal relationships. If a drunk guy wandered into your house and started burning down your house, the logic still stands. Ironically this sounds even more like libertarianism, yet it contradicts it if Interests are granted Normative Value. Therefore, if you CAN defend your property with lethal force, that implies an invalidation of inherent interests caused by acting unethically, which then implies abusive behavior can be met with lethal force when proportionate, in contradiction with absolutist property rights. This would mean the boss actually can be forcibly stopped from laying off people unfairly, as the boss' behavior is inherently frustrating and thus proportionate resistance is validated, as their own inherent interests in not being resisted is invalidated. If instead the boss cannot be forcibly stopped because his inherent interest in not having force used against him is more inherent than an interest in not being laid off, then suddenly defending property with lethal force is also illegitimate, as the aggressor’s inherent interest in not dying is more inherent than your interest in your own house not being burned down. Therefore, either way, absolutist property rights don’t make sense. The one way out of this mess is to say that the aggressor invalidates his own interest in not dying by trying to kill you in a way that is inconsistent with Interests. And so, any proportionate means to defend rational interests is valid. This answer fixes both problems and allow both lethal defense of property (when necessary), and defense against abusive contracts, in the way that aligns with the Defense and Retaliatory Law Principles laid out previously. —Deriving Inherent Interest Theory from Justification Ethics— –Premises– (P1): Justification Ethics presupposes that normative conclusions derive their normative force through appeal to the interests of those involved, and therefore cannot derive contradictory ethical conclusions without the normative force of justification breaking down. (P2): If opposing actions cannot be distinguished in terms of justification, then contradictory ethical conclusions can be derived. (P3): The presupposition that actions require justification is implied by the existence of normative ethical value. (Derived by Justification Ethics) (P4): Strict inaction cannot consistently distinguish transgression from non-transgression, because continuing previous behavior is itself an action. (P5): If strict inaction fails to distinguish transgression, then actions must be distinguished relative to their interference with others' behavior. (P6): Actions distinguished relative to one another differ by degrees of interference with others and the environment. (P7): If actions differ by degrees of interference, then they differ by degrees of justificatory burden. (P8): Without differing justificatory burdens, neutrality cannot exist as measurable, causing all actions to become unjustifiable, allowing the derivation of contradictory claims. (P9): Actions whose content is intrinsically more interfering with the interests of others require greater justificatory burden than actions whose content is intrinsically more neutral toward the interests of others. (P10): Frustrating an interest that acts as a conduit for other interests, constitutes greater intrinsic interference with the fulfillment of interests than frustrating an interest that does not. –Logic– (L1): From (P1 + P2), Justification Ethics requires opposing actions to be distinguished in terms of justification. (L2): From (P3 + P4), this distinction cannot be grounded by a strict action/inaction distinction (L3): From (P5 + P6), actions must instead be distinguished on a spectrum of interference with others and the environment. (L4): From (L1 + L3), Justification Ethics therefore implies an Action Spectrum. (L5): From (L4 + P7), the Action Spectrum implies differing justificatory burdens corresponding to differing degrees of interference. (L6): From (L5 + P8), the Action Spectrum requires justificatory burdens to be distinguishable in order for neutrality to exist as measurable and contradictory ethical claims to be avoided. (L7): From (L6 + P9), actions requiring greater justificatory burden are those whose content is intrinsically more interfering with the interests of others. (L8): From (L7 + P10), actions frustrating interests that act as conduits for the fulfillment of other interests require greater justificatory burden than actions frustrating interests that do not. –Conclusion– From (L8): Therefore, actions frustrating interests that act as conduits for the fulfillment of other interests require greater justificatory burden than actions frustrating interests that do not. Such interests are, by definition, Inherent Interests. Therefore, Justification Ethics implies Inherent Interest Theory. —Defense and Retaliatory Law Principles— --Basic Recap of Self-Defense-- As explained before, valuing Rational Interests can only mean the right to defend rational interests from irrational transgressions. To have the right over your interests, and to not have the right to defend your interests through proportionate means, is a contradiction. If the idea that Interests form a right to Property, where certain objects and environments can act as a conduit of your interests, where attacks against personal property is an act of inherent frustration against your interests, this also implies a right to proportionate self-defense of your body, mind, and property, your stuff, belongings, your home; by any means necessary to protect interest fulfillment. --Proportionate Force and Lethal Retaliation-- Rational Interests win out over Irrational Interests, this comes from the assumption of Normative Rationalism. If someone breaks into your house and tries to destroy all of your stuff and then tries to burn down your house, is lethal force justified to defend what is yours? The answer is proportionate force is justifiable. If lethal force becomes proportionate, then it is justifiable. It can be argued that the transgressor could tell you explicitly, "You can leave, I won't stop you. If you try to stop me from burning down your house though, I will kill you." If they say this, assuming you know they are being truthful, you now know that any resistance will be met with lethal force by them. Since force against them to some degree is already justifiable defense of your interests, if they turn to lethal force in retaliation, then since that lethal force is unjustifiable this situation becomes the same as one where they used lethal force from the beginning. For this reason, since them using lethal force is foreseeable anyway, it is thus justifiable for you to engage in lethal force before they do. If you have reasonable foresight that they will use lethal force if threatened in any way, then you have a right to cut to the chase, since your interference with them is already justifiable. —Retaliatory Law— Based on this reasoning, this then justifies a limited use of justifiable force by government and courts. If a court argues you are inherently frustrating against others to such a degree that it must be stopped, and you try to refuse their justifiable demands, then under Yoggism they have the right to use proportionate force to prevent your transgression. If you then resist further with lethal force, your resistance becomes an inherent frustration against them and unjustifiable use of force, to which whoever is enforcing demands against you can then defend themselves with their own lethal force. To be clear, this logic behind enforcement of justified rules immediately fails if said rules are unethical or unjustifiable in and of themselves. In a democratic society, this logic will also fail if rules are contrary to the interests of the public, aka decided undemocratically or in a way not representative of the citizens of some community.

Retaliatory Law Back to Home Details Step-by-Step Guide Philosophy Menu More Retaliatory Law [Full Text] —Retaliatory Law— Justification Ethics implies that rational justification of actions necessarily appeals to the normative value of the interests of others involved in some rational interaction. This grants us the Fulfillment of Interests as a value, but not necessarily the clearance to inherently frustrate one's interests to protect some greater good outcome, even in extreme circumstances. The reason for this is that the Fulfillment of Interests as a value is simply the acceptance of the normativity of interests themselves, the very basis of this philosophy and of rational oughts considering more than one person. Inherently frustrating actions that are not an act of defense against irrational frustration, are thus illegitimate, as such is called out in the Anti-Abuse Principle, which explicitly lays this out. —Part 1: Defense and Retaliatory Law— --Basic Recap of Self-Defense-- As explained before, valuing Rational Interests can only mean the right to defend rational interests from irrational transgressions. To have the right over your interests, and to not have the right to defend your interests through proportionate means, is a contradiction. If the idea that Interests form a right to Property, where certain objects and environments can act as a conduit of your interests, where attacks against personal property is an act of inherent frustration against your interests, this also implies a right to proportionate self-defense of your body, mind, and property, your stuff, belongings, your home; by any means necessary to protect interest fulfillment. --Proportionate Force and Lethal Retaliation-- Rational Interests win out over Irrational Interests, this comes from the assumption of Normative Rationalism. If someone breaks into your house and tries to destroy all of your stuff and then tries to burn down your house, is lethal force justified to defend what is yours? The answer is proportionate force is justifiable. If lethal force becomes proportionate, then it is justifiable. It can be argued that the transgressor could tell you explicitly, "You can leave, I won't stop you. If you try to stop me from burning down your house though, I will kill you." If they say this, assuming you know they are being truthful, you now know that any resistance will be met with lethal force by them. Since force against them to some degree is already justifiable defense of your interests, if they turn to lethal force in retaliation, then since that lethal force is unjustifiable this situation becomes the same as one where they used lethal force from the beginning. For this reason, since them using lethal force is foreseeable anyway, it is thus justifiable for you to engage in lethal force before they do. If you have reasonable foresight that they will use lethal force if threatened in any way, then you have a right to cut to the chase, since your interference with them is already justifiable. --Proportionality must be based on Necessity, not Category of Harm-- Someone may argue that it is disproportionate to enforce action against inherent frustration that does not violate bodily autonomy, for example. The logic goes like this, if someone is underpaying workers or discriminating in hiring and service unjustifiably, enforcing regulations and civil rights statutes to stop them is disproportionate force because you are using force against someone who isn't, that is a fundamental difference between categories of harm and is thus disproportionate. This standard of proportionality is the idea that force is proportional if the force is at the same level, same category of harm, of what injustice is being thwarted. This standard immediately breaks, because if there is a disabled person stuck in a wheelchair and all they have is a gun, they may be unable to defend themselves or their property without going from yelling to full on lethal force. By the category of harm logic, they may as well not own their property since jumping to lethal force is "disproportionate". Justification Ethics solves this problem. Since all harm becomes subcategories of inherent interest frustration, there is no "category claim" that can be made because these categories simply don't exist in the way they've been explained. Imagine being slapped in the face vs. being fired from your job for no reason. Both are unjustifiable given Justification Ethics and an appeal to the value of interests, yet being fired from your job may be much worse than simply being slapped in the face. Yet, in terms of harm categories, being slapped in the face is a direct violation of bodily autonomy, while being fired is not. This grants a form of proportionality based in the necessity of the use of force, and here even Libertarians will agree. The disabled person owns their property, and all that is necessary to enforce what is right is permitted. Thus, enforcement of regulations against unfair treatment, discrimination, and other non-violent yet anti-interest abusive activity is actually justifiable under Justification Ethics. —Retaliatory Law— Based on this reasoning, this then justifies a limited use of justifiable force by some form of court system. If a court justifiably and soundly argues you are inherently frustrating against others to such a degree that it must be stopped, and you try to refuse their justifiable demands, then under Yoggism they have the right to use proportionate force to prevent your transgression. If you then resist further with lethal force, your resistance becomes an inherent frustration against them and unjustifiable use of force, to which whoever is enforcing demands against you can then defend themselves with their own lethal force. To be clear, this logic behind enforcement of justified rules immediately fails if said rules are unethical or unjustifiable in and of themselves. In a democratic society, this logic will also fail if rules are contrary to the interests of the public, aka decided undemocratically or in a way not representative of the citizens of some community. —Part 2: Threshold Deontology— There is more to ethics than simply what works as a consistent and static system of law, though. In a situation where inaction may result in mass destruction, and mass inherent frustration, but the action to prevent the destruction is itself inherently frustrating, we seemingly run into a problem. It should also be noted that while it may seem justifiable to kill an innocent person or temporarily violate someone's inherent rights, or interests, to prevent mass death; assuming a best-case scenario where we know for sure the consequences and can measure them; it does not seem justifiable to kill an innocent person to lower death rates globally by 0.2%, even if doing so may technically save many more people. Instead of simply appealing to intuition itself, the reasons behind the intuition can actually be justified by the Fulfillment of Interests and the rational engine that makes this work. This threshold deontology, can be argued for based on a valuing of rational deliberation. --Defense of Interest Structure-- Threshold Deontology is the idea that we ought to act in ways consistent with some deontological ruleset, or principles, such as "Do not murder", or "Actions that are inherently frustrating are illegitimate"; but only up to a point where not violating the deontology creates an existential disaster, like the destruction of a whole country. It can be reasoned that inaction can result in a breakdown of rational deliberation. Imagine a town of people who have national deliberation days, where every Wednesday, they come together to reason for how best to use resources. This reasoning is held up by each person in the town having the ability to participate in argumentation, the same way democracy works through voting. Now imagine a disaster strikes, and you have the ability to act. Inaction would result in a breakdown of argumentation, deliberation, of truth-seeking within the town itself. In such a scenario, it is possible to disrupt or take advantage of the disruption to argumentation, through inaction. Taking advantage of this disruption is irrational, and letting people get away with taking advantage, is also irrational, as it takes away from actual truth-seeking. For this reason, the violation of someone's interests to protect the overall value of deliberation, may be justifiable; as the inaction becomes a negligence towards defending rationality itself. --Violating Rights is still Wrong-- Note that the logic used does not say it is "right" or "good" to violate someone's rights to prevent existential disaster. Yoggism has specific standards on what actually constitutes a 'right', but an innocent person who isn't inherently frustrating does constitute rights, specifically a right over their continued sentience and non-abusive usage of their interest-based property. It has been argued before, from a deontological point of view, that given a consequentialist argument scenario such as "Kill this guy or the entire world explodes!", that the looming existential disaster doesn't make it suddenly a good thing the guy dies, and thus killing the guy is still wrong, it's just that both scenarios are terrible. This intuition is actually a rephrasing of the conclusions here, and the reasons for that intuition have just been derived. This grants us definitions for Good, Right, and Justified. —Good, Right, and Justified— There is clearly some difference between giving to the poor, and self-defense, and there is also a difference between self-defense, and frustrating for the purpose of preserving the structure of interests itself. These differences can be distinguished well in terms of interests and their effects on them. Giving to the poor, assuming your individual giving doesn't somehow harm them, is Good. It's purely good if doing so fulfills your own interests as well, since then no meaningful interests are frustrated by any measure. Self-defense on the other hand is different. As argued before, it's justifiable as it is the defense of rational interests over irrational interests and inherently frustrating transgression. However, the transgressor's interests are also inherently frustrated, it's fire beats fire. If the transgressor is killed, this is an inherent frustration, just done in defense of the value of interests. This is not purely good as previously described. Long-term such defense is good, but more accurately this action is not purely good, but is Right. It is right, and thus permissible, because it is directly consistent with Interests as a value, along with any other rational action. To frustrate against someone's interests for the purpose of preserving the structure of interests itself, this would be something like stealing from someone in an emergency to stop a large disaster from occurring. Since the someone you are frustrating against is not a transgressor, they are not acting in a way that is inherently frustrating, which is why it counts as theft, this cannot be called defense against transgressors who are contradicting interests at all. Instead, this can only be justified in instances where the e nds are rationally integral to the structures that preserve interest fulfillment in a fundamental sense. It should also be noted the difference between frustrating as an end in itself, versus frustrating as a mere temporary side-effect, a means to a greater end where said frustration is unnecessary. To lie to save someone's life for example, is to frustrate against someone's interest in the truth, not as an end in itself, but as a side-effect to reach a greater end where the lie becomes unnecessary. Actions such as this are not inherently frustrating, as what is inconsistent about inherent frustration is that inherently frustrating against another's interests, as an end in itself, is by definition an end inconsistent with the value of Interests. If it is not an end in itself, and is a side-effect separate from the action, or is defense against a transgressor, then it is not inherent frustration in this way. It is no longer inconsistent with, and may be in defense of, Interests. —Definitions— Interest - What a sentient being's behavior tends towards; sentient preferences. Interest Fulfillment - A being's interest being fulfilled or their preferences respected. Interest Frustration - The violation or contradiction of a being's interest. Good - An action that is interest fulfilling and is not inherently frustrating to any interests. Right - An action that is interest fulfilling, and not inherently frustrating unless against irrational interests in defense of rational interests; in a way consistent with Interests as a value. Justifiable - An action that results in the minimally inconsistent outcome relative to Interests as a value, measured by whether the action is 'right' interest-wise, or if the action is rationally integral to the structures that preserve interest fulfillment fundamentally. Bad - An action that is frustrating to interests while any fulfillment is limited to irrational interests. Evil - An action that is inherently frustrating to interests and is frustrating to the very structures that preserve interest fulfillment. Moral - An action that is consistent with Interests as a value, in some form. Immoral - An action that is inconsistent with Interests as a value, in some form. Ethical (Yogg Law) - An action consistent with the Anti-Abuse Principle. Unethical (Yogg Law) - An action inconsistent with the AAP or is otherwise Immoral. Existentially Justifiable (Yogg Existentials) - An action consistent with the Anti-Abuse Principle or existentially protective in the sense of protecting the structure of interests themselves. Unjustifiable (Yogg Existentials) - An action inconsistent with the AAP or is otherwise Immoral, while not being existentially protective, or being diminishing to the structure of interests. —The Anti-Abuse Principle (AAP)— Actions that constitute interference with another's non-abusive fulfillment of their own inherent and non-contradictory interests, are illegitimate. Actions that inherently result in the frustration of interests, through overall frustration by misalignment of interests between parties, or due to conduct that frustrates against inherent interests, are unjustifiable, constitute ‘abuse’, and are thus illegitimate. Actions that prevent abuse, or inhibit otherwise unjustifiable conduct; including conduct that is a product of interest misalignment between parties, and conduct that is inherently frustrating to interests; are legitimate as they constitute resistance to abuse.

Yoggism as a Procedural Norm Back to Home Details Step-by-Step Guide Philosophy Menu More Yoggism as a Procedural Norm [Full Text] This is an addition to the text of Justification Ethics . It explains procedural norms as well as why normative rationalism is a valid assumption. It also provides a more direct alternative to NAP Argumentation Ethics . —How Non-Abuse is a norm of Argumentation— Rational argumentation can only happen if the members of a debate feel free to speak their mind and argue for themselves freely. What ‘freely’ means though, is interest-based, not just aggression-based. And the reasons for why freedom of this respect is important, and the reasons for why freedom of thought, expression, and argumentation are important, inherently apply to more situations than just argumentation. (1): Coercion and Argument If a person is dying in the desert from dehydration and they find another person who has water bottles, but this other person then says “I won't give you water, unless you grant me intimate favors”, this clear coercion renders rational argumentation between the two impossible. It also violates Consent as previously explained, which rational argumentation and deliberation rely upon. Rational argumentation cannot function if your debater is also your landlord and says they will just evict you if you disagree with them. (2): Why the Use of Force is Coercive The problems here are actually the same reasons for why the threat of violent force invalidates rational argumentation: It forces one party to capitulate to the interests of the coercer, due to the alternative being forced to be much worse, and this is true regardless of how irrational or nonsensical the interests of the coercer are. In the same way, when the alternative is eviction, or worse even starvation or dehydration, it does the same thing albeit to a sometimes lesser extent. Functionally, it forces capitulation to the coercive party in a way that sidesteps reason. What's clear from this is the process of argumentation actually requires both non-aggression and non-abuse, not just non-aggression, since abuse can come about non-aggressively. (3): Rational Dealings and Discouraging of Deliberation Two rational people from different places should be able to interact rationally, without fear. If one person goes insane and kills the other, that is clearly conflicting with rational dealings. If one person tries to trick the other for some scam, that is clearly conflicting with rational dealings. If one person takes advantage of another for their own gain, where the other is functionally forced to do their bidding, that also conflicts with rational dealings. Coercion means pressuring someone to act against their interests by undermining their ability to make a free choice through the threat of consequences. This is obviously contradictory with Interests as a value, and it is also conflicting with the norms required for rational argumentation and cooperation, as coercion does not track truth and in-fact undermines it by functioning more similarly to might-makes-right behavior. Imagine trying to make a semi-decent argument that God does exist, or the reverse, in a society where the vast majority of people believe the exact opposite of whatever conclusion you are arguing for, and will ostracize as well as discriminate against you of their own volition, if your argument is too explicit or offensive. There is no use of force, or threat of force, yet very clearly this non-violent coercion is contradictory and actively discourages rational and truth-seeking deliberation. It is also inherently frustrating. That is not a coincidence. (4): Conclusion of Anti-Abuse Argumentation Procedural Norms This points in the direction of the AAP, and interestingly, this thought process also holds up to rational scrutiny, unlike NAP Argumentation Ethics. What's different is that with AAP Procedural Norms, this standard actually makes sense to apply to many circumstances universally, because it is baked into what is required as a premise, to justify interactions rationally. To justify an interaction, or method of interaction, you must appeal to the normative value of your opponent's interests; otherwise you forfeit any justification of normative force. With NAP Argumentation Ethics it can be argued that aggression may not be valid in the process of argumentation, but may be valid in other circumstances, and you can argue that without a performative contradiction. With AAP Procedural Norms though, arguing that abuse is not valid in the process of argumentation is actually correct, but arguing abuse is valid for other circumstances may not make sense if the structure of civil interaction, in argumentation, is at all similar to the structure of the interaction of the other circumstance. It is also impossible to rationally justify such abuse on the basis of interests not having normative value, as such justification requires assuming and appealing to your opponent's interests for them to agree with the premises of any argument you give. —Abuse, and Interest-Frustration, is Anti-Rational— Similar reasons for the norms of argumentation can be applied to other circumstances. For example, the reason argumentation should be non-aggressive and more broadly non-abusive, is because those things prevent people from feeling free to express their actual thoughts and thus may prevent rational speech, which hinders seeking of truth. You can't argue rationally with your landlord if he reserves the right to just evict you for arguing too well, even though he's doing so non-aggressively. This gives a second requirement to argumentation, or a more refined requirement; that of non-abuse where abuse is some organized inherent frustration of another's interests, usually at the feet of two or more people or parties where one has opposing interests to the other, yet also has virtually all the power. Any other scenario where the goal of the interaction is to reach some sort of mutually beneficial agreement, for the benefit of both parties, can be directly compared to argumentation in this respect as that mutual benefit cannot be realized if people's interests are not respected or given fair weight. This is why it can be said that engagement of argumentation and acceptance of its specific norms can be used to rationally derive the reasons for why the AAP really is applicable in most situations directly, and for how the AAP being applied to all situations upholds civility as a principle more consistently than the NAP and other moral principles. It is for this reason that Argumentation Ethics on its own is valid for deriving the AAP in situations where civility, defined as mutual benefit, is important, and invalid for deriving the NAP. –Normative Rationalism is assumed by any Argument– Any persuading argument must appeal to Normative Rationalism, the idea that those ought to do what is utmost-rational. Any rational argument that aims to persuade people of an “ought” presupposes that rationality has normative authority. Therefore, any argument against normative rationalism cannot be persuasive without contradicting itself. Any deductive argument or argument that can be reduced ultimately to a deductive argument, as well as any engagement in argumentation for the purpose of seeking the truth, and/or creating justifiable or valid deductive arguments, must also presuppose the validity of rationalism and presuppose normative rationalism for such argumentation to be able to have any weight. This is the justification for Normative Rationalism as an a-priori assumption. Below is a more explicit deductive proof for the Persuasive Argument case: ---Normative Rationalism is an assumption necessary for all Persuading Arguments to Stand--- –Definitions: (Persuading Argument): An argument that validly deduces people ought to do something, or that people ought to believe something, including the central claim of the argument. (Normative Rationalism): Defined as used elsewhere, in its weak form, the idea that normative claims, oughts and ought-nots, can be derived via rational deduction. –Premises: (P1): A persuading argument is only meaningful if its deduction rationally holds given the premises, I.E. follows proper rules of inference. (P2): A persuading argument gives a conclusion that is normative, such as the claim that "therefore, people ought to believe in Santa Claus" or the claim that "therefore, people ought to eat more milk and cookies". (P3): Rational arguments that use rational deduction to deduce a conclusion, necessarily presuppose the validity of rational deduction itself. (P4): If a rational argument deduces a normative claim, the argument must assume the normativity, or if possible derive it within the argument from the premises. (P5): An appeal to rationality's normativity in a particular case, while restricting it to other cases, requires a rational justification. Using rational justification presupposes general normative rationalism though, therefore any appeal to general normative rationalism is inconsistent unless applied universally. –Logic: (L1): From (P1), Any meaningful persuasive argument is thus a rational argument. (L2): From (P2), Any rational persuasive argument gives a normative claim. (L3): From (L1 + L2), Normative claims given by meaningful, persuading arguments, must be derived from a basis of rational deduction. (L4): From (L3 + P3), Meaningful, persuading arguments, must appeal to the idea that normative claims can be derived through rational deduction. (L5): From (L4 + P5), Meaningful, persuading arguments, if they appeal to general normative rationalism in a specific case, rationally must appeal to it as a universal principle. (L6): From (L4 + P4), Meaningful, persuading arguments, as they derive normative claims, they must appeal to general normative rationalism, as if normative rationalism was false, then rational deduction would be disconnected from normativity, making the deduction of the argument invalid as the rationality of a deduction would be irrelevant to whether the conclusion was normatively true, making the conclusion given by the argument an irrational claim. (L7): From (L6 + L5), Meaningful, persuading arguments, must appeal to general normative rationalism as a universal principle. –Conclusion: From (L6): All meaningful, persuading arguments that derive a claim over what people ought to do, or ought to believe, necessarily appeals to general normative rationalism. So, to argue against general normative rationalism, must either be irrational, or must not attempt to make people disbelieve in normative rationalism. Any argument against normative rationalism, is thus entirely rational to reject, and holds no normative weight, even if someone thinks they should believe in that which is rational, since that belief contradicts the argument itself. Therefore, all meaningful persuasive arguments must appeal to general normative rationalism, and any argument against normative rationalism, holds no weight even if you assume rational claims should be believed. If you do, the argument just contradicts itself.

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Yoggism, also called Yogg Interest Theory, is a philosophical framework based on the idea that the Fulfillment of Interests is the ultimate value. Home Step-by-Step Guide Conclusions Theories Implications Concepts Philosophy Menu More Anti-Abuse Principle Justification Ethics Inherent Interest Theory Normative Will More Conclusions Theories Implications Yoggism - Yogg Interest Theory Yoggism, aka Yogg Interest Theory, is an individualist philosophical framework built on the Fulfillment of Interests as the source of Ethics. Interests as a value is justified as being necessary for the deduction of normative claims. This concept is called Justification Ethics . Acts that stop beings from doing what they want, and interfere with one's interests, are illegitimate. Defense of interests is the imperative. --Content Usage-- The Texts, Theories, Ideas, and Info Post ers present on this page, relating to Yoggism, can be freely redistributed with credit to TonyTCB . Page Version: v5.4.1 Details of the Theory - Info Posters Yogg Interest Theory, is the idea that the Fulfillment of Interests, with priority to Inherent Interests, and the defense against Inherently Frustrating Interests, is the most justifiable and universal normative standard that can be defined. It is the logical consequence of Justification Ethics , the idea that accepting the need to rationally justify normative claims presupposes interests as the source of value, as due to the is/ought gap, not logic nor norms nor mere facts can derive normative claims. To reject justification is thus to forfeit all normative force. Inherent Interests as priority is justified by Inherent Interest Theory . Inherent Interests are defined as interests that act as a conduit of other interests, that are casually connected to the capacity to fulfill other interests; I.E. they are intrinsically foundational to interests. Below is a slideshow containing 'Info Posters' that explain overviews of different parts of the philosophy. Step-by-Step Guide Yoggism has various sections that act as justification and answers to different questions of how the framework works. Basic Definitions:: 1. Interest - A preference / goal, that which a sentient being's behavior tends towards. 2. Inherent Interest - An interest that acts as a conduit for other interests, other fundamental interests depend upon it. 3. Normative Will - The capacity for normative and rational claims to be evaluate-able; aka ethical agency. 4. Abusive Interests - Interests that enforce through misaligned interests, active frustration/violation of inherent interests. Anti-Abuse Principle - The core principle of Yoggism, that unjustifiable frustration against inherent interests is illegitimate. [see overview] www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text1_anti-abuse-principle Justification Ethics - The justification for why Interests as a Value is presupposed by any attempt to rationally justify normative claims. [see overview] www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text2_justification-ethics Inherent Interest Theory - The basis of how interests are weighed against each-other, and how 'Inherent Interests' act as conduits for other interests. [see overview] www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text9_inherent-interest-theory Retaliatory Law - Justification of Self-Defense, of defense of inherent interests over 'abusive' interests. www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text6_retaliatory-law Normative Will - This theory justifies what kind of life the framework applies to. Yoggism grants all sentient beings value through Interests. [see overview] www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text5_normative-will --Implications of Yoggism-- Markets and Interest Alignment [see full text] - How Worker-Owned Cooperatives are more Ethical and Prosperous as they allow greater Interest Alignment and prevent abuse via the AAP Omnilibertarian Communities [see full text] - How Private Communities have a duty of Fairness to all members, and how Yoggism prescribes True Individualist Freedom in all domains Environmentalism from Interests [coming soon] - How Entanglement of Interests generate environmental rights and justify anti-pollution sentiment via individualism better than the NAP Interest Property Theory [see full text] - How a value of Interests implies non-abusive Property Rights Yogg Virtue Theory [see overview] - The art of a Good Character is in Respect of Interests Definition of Inherent Interest (from Inherent Interest Theory ): An interest is more inherent than another if the given interest is entangled with other interests, or acts as a conduit for other interests regardless of external factors; in a way the second interest does not, or to a higher extent. For example, an interest in not having food taken away, can depending on circumstance be a very inherent interest, as it acts as a conduit for an interest in not dying; which itself is a conduit for all other interests. Anti-Abuse Principle (AAP) Actions that constitute interference with another's non-abusive fulfillment of their own inherent and non-contradictory interests, are illegitimate. Actions that inherently result in the frustration of interests, through overall frustration by misalignment of interests between parties, or due to conduct that frustrates against inherent interests, are unjustifiable, constitute ‘abuse’, and are thus illegitimate. Actions that prevent abuse, or inhibit otherwise unjustifiable conduct; including conduct that is a product of interest misalignment between parties, and conduct that is inherently frustrating to interests; are legitimate as they constitute resistance to abuse. --- (Inherent Interests vs. Non-Inherent Interests) Inherent Interests are defined as interests that intrinsically act as a conduit for other interests, interests foundational or causally connected to other interests. --- (Simplified Principle) This principle can be stated in essence in a simple sentence: "Do what you want, unless it stops others from doing what they want, unless it constitutes proportionate defense against the latter." This principle is justified by Justification Ethics . The use of "inherent interest" is derived from Inherent Interest Theory . [see full text] [see justification ethics] [see inherent interest theory] Justification Ethics Justification Ethics is the backbone of Yoggism, used to derive the key parts of the philosophy. The way it works is a step by step exploration of how normative ethical claims can be derived. The overall claim is that rational justification of normative force requires an appeal to the interests of whomever you are interacting with. Types of Premises The different kinds of premises that can be used to derive claims are: 1. Truth Claims (true facts about the world, is-statements) 2. Reason (logical truths, A=A, if A implies B and A is true then B is true, I think therefore I am) 3. Interests (wants, desires, preferences, goals; of some sentient being) 4. Axioms (assumptions, statements assumed to be true without justification) 5. Presuppositions (norms presupposed by things actors are already doing) Is-Ought Gap limits Normative Proofs Is-Statements (the sky is blue) cannot be used to derive Ought-Statements (you ought not break a chair). This is called the is-ought gap and it is a logical consequence of deduction, it gives a fundamental limitation to how normative claims can be proven. Normative claims, being ought statements, thus cannot be derived from Truth Claims, or pure Reason. The only exception is arguments that don't prove ethical claims, but only rational claims like "1+1=2". For ethical claims, only Interests and Axioms work. Interests are the Only Option But even here, axioms cannot be used as the core for the rational justification of normative force because you cannot prove someone else "rationally ought to accept X claim" if they do not accept your axiom. Axioms are by definition unprovable, they are assumptions. Interests though, can be used to prove normative claims. Imagine you want to prove your friend "ought to buy a washing machine". This can be as simple as appealing to their interest in clean clothes. Therefore, only Interests can be used to prove normative claims. Definitions: Justification: Proving an action justifiable means to form a deductive argument that derives a claim in the form "you ought to accept X". Such a deductive argument only proves justification if the conclusion is derived from premises that apply to the person you're justifying the action to; for if they don't then the conclusion cannot follow. Normative Claim: For the purposes of this text, the claims used are not simple normative truths like "you ought to accept 1+1=2" but rather something like "you ought not steal". Normative Justification: A deductive argument (or argument equivalent to a deduction) that derives a claim in the form "you ought to accept X". [see full text] [see deduction] [see yoggism as a procedural norm] Deriving Interest Fulfillment Persuasive Arguments and thus Rational Justification must appeal to Interests Premises of a persuasive argument must be justifiable to the person the ought claim is made to, otherwise the claim could not follow. Rational Justification functions as a persuasive argument, an argument that proves a claim in the form "you ought to accept X" to some opponent. Any argument like this, any 'persuasive argument' at all, must appeal to the interests of the opponent for the opponent to accept the premises; the only exception being arguments that prove claims solely based on rationalism itself. For if the opponent does not accept the premises, the argument will not follow. For example, trying to argue that "you ought to buy a washing machine" must appeal to the interests of the opponent. Rational Justification must appeal to the Normative Value of Interests Normative claims cannot be derived purely through non-normative premises. If a claim is truely normative, that normativity has to come from premises that are justifiable. Persuasive Arguments, and thus Rational Justification, is only meaningful if it proves a normative claim "you ought to accept X". The normativity of the claim must be derived from the premises of the argument, and those premises must appeal to the interests of the opponent. Therefore, as a premise of any act of rational justification, the normative value of the opponent's interests must be appealed to. Interactions should be Rationally Justifiable If you act in a way where your behavior is rationally unjustifiable, you are being irrational. Any semblance of reason would thus discredit such behavior. If you interact with someone, you should be able to rationally justify your interaction, in a way where those involved in the interaction should be rationally required to accept your justification. This means you should be able to justify that the claim “You rationally ought to accept my way of interacting is reasonable” is true for the person you are interacting with; you should be able to argue you are acting reasonably. To contradict the value of Interests is to contradict Rational Justification Interactions that contradict the normative value of interests, fail to be rationally justifiable to those engaged in the interaction. This is a 'persuasive argument', meaning an argument that attempts to derive a claim in the form "You ought to accept X". Any argument in this form, must appeal to the interests of any debate opponent for the conclusion to have valid normative weight. To engage in an interaction that is inconsistent with the normative value of interest, is to engage in an interaction that cannot be rationally justified to anyone. Imagine someone is outside of your house and is dancing weirdly on the sidewalk. Not too close to your house to disturb your yard, not making much noise, either. They just.. look weird, and you can see them being weird out of your window. Imagine you have an interest in them not doing that. Said another way, you don't like that they are doing that. What is more reasonable relative to the Fulfillment of Interests? A. To forcibly stop the person from doing what they want. B. To close your window so them dancing stops getting on your nerves. Inherent Interest Theory --A Definition of Inherent Interest-- Inherentness is a spectrum used to compare interests. An interest is more inherent than another if the given interest is entangled with other interests, or acts as a conduit for other interests regardless of external factors; in a way the second interest does not, or to a higher extent. For example, an interest in not having food taken away, can in most circumstances be a very inherent interest, as it acts as a conduit for an interest in not dying; which itself is a conduit for all other interests. --Action Spectrum-- Different actions carry more or less justificatory burden based on how much the action interferes with interests, and whether that interference is intrinsic to the contents of the action itself. This creates a spectrum between action and inaction and is logically necessary as the rejection of this spectrum makes neutrality and inaction collapse as distinctions, and allows the derivation of contradictory claims. [see full text] Normative Will A water bottle cannot behave irrationally, the distinction of rational behavior and irrational behavior does not apply to it. A water bottle's behavior can only be measured relative to the laws of physics themselves. Sentient beings can act rationally and irrationally though, relative to their interests and relative to the value of truth. The Normative Will of sentient beings is the difference in volition and capacity to resist instinct, the capacity to act rationally or irrationally relative to rational standards and relative to one's own interests, and the capacity to contradict naturally selected preferences. Through Justification Ethics, we can derive that all sentient beings have normative value. Definition: Normative Will is therefore the capacity for normative evaluation of behaviors relative to standards beyond the mere laws of physics; including rationality, ethics, and personal preferences. [see full text] Implications How it connects to Justification Ethics Justification Ethics is the idea that rational justification presupposes an appeal to the Normative Value of Interests themselves. If you interact with a water bottle, you need not justify your actions to the water bottle, because rationally justifying a claim of "this water bottle ought to accept X idea" makes no sense. The water bottle is not a rational actor at any level. For sentient beings this isn't true. Consider the interaction of "I will steal this child's candy". How can you rationally justify such an interaction? The child would object, and the child's cognition should be complex enough to be able to judge the action on rational grounds, thus the objection is of rational weight. Thus, rational justification requires you to be able to prove "the child ought rationally to accept my interaction as non-contradictory". This is impossible, because you cannot: 1. Prove it's positively rational to steal candy based on rationalism alone, with no explicit or implicit appeal to normative value. 2. Prove it's legitimate to steal candy relative to the normative value of Interests, as the action is inherently frustrating and without reason. Therefore, stealing candy from a child is rationally unjustifiable. Therefore, Normative Will is the way to measure how strictly Justification Ethics applies. Animal Rights through Justification Justification Ethics, which implies the Normative Value of Interests, can apply to any sentient being where their cognition is complex enough to judge a given action on rational grounds, relative to the standards or complexity of the action and it's affects. In the "stealing candy from a child" example, the child's cognition is complex enough such that you can derive the normative claim "they rationally ought to disapprove of you stealing from them" is true for the child, relative to their interests. Likewise, you can't derive they rationally ought to accept your behavior. Similar logic applies to animals, you can simply replace "child" with "monkey/dog/bird/earthworm" and it's fine. Those beings do have the ability to act rationally and irrationally relative to their interests, and relative to how they should act relative to truth. Since preference is present in all sentient beings, normative claims can be derivable through an appeal to their interests. If you try to kill a dog for no reason other than you want to, it is impossible to make an argument such that "the dog ought rationally to accept your interaction as non-contradictory". This is impossible, because you cannot: 1. Prove it's positively rational to harm the dog based on rationalism alone, with no explicit or implicit appeal to normative value. 2. Prove it's legitimate to harm the dog relative to the normative value of Interests, as the action is inherently frustrating and without reason. Since normative claims involving the dog must appeal to their interests, and acting to hurt the dog is inherently frustrating, such actions are unjustifiable. Absolute Interest Conclusion Proven It has thus been shown that Normative Will is the appropriate measure on how strictly Justification Ethics applies. Killing a dog is unjustifiable because normative claims involving them must appeal to interests, same with killing a monkey, or a child, or a cow, or a human. The logical consequence of this is that any entity that is sentient with Interests, has Justification Ethics apply to it to the rational extent. Any unnecessary inherent frustration of their interests is thus illegitimate as it cannot be justified without appealing either to factual and purely rational premises, which doesn't work, or appealing to the Normative Value of Interests by trying to appeal to their own standards, which contradict the claim trying to be proven, thus justification fails. Therefore, the Fulfillment of Interests of all sentient beings, in all reference frames; with priority to Inherent, Rational Interests, as a value, is sustained. [see Absolute Interest Conclusion overview] Yogg Virtue Theory Yogg Virtue Theory is the idea that the definition of a Good Character or Good Virtue is founded on the Respect for Interests, and behaviors that curate this respect, are good. This grants the Yogg Virtue Principle : You ought to act in a way consistent with the virtues that curate respect for interests, including Mutual Respect, Justice, Truth, and Recognition of others as Self-Sovereign. You ought to not act against Consent, or enforce Interest Misalignment for your own gain through Unfairness, Irrationality, Explotativeness, or Abuse. You ought to form a character that adheres to the responsibility of upholding these character traits, against Negligence towards others, and Abuse of others. Common virtues such as Justice, Self-Sovereignty, and Generosity, are simply emergent properties of the Respect for Interests. The idea of Virtue is a great way of explaining how inaction can be morally wrong. Specifically if someone does not act to save someone and lets someone come to harm, the justification of calling that a moral wrong, is difficult under Justification Ethics, Justification Ethics is contingent on the normative obligation to rationally justify methods of interaction. If there is no interaction occurring, it's not obvious how there could be an obligation to rationally justify inaction, or even how such justification could happen, and to whom. Praxeological Asymmetry could also be used to argue for inaction not needing justification, based on the epistemic logic of there being a default state of falsity for any positive claim, thus disbelief in something can be excused simply by the lack of evidence, though a true lack of evidence in all directions implies neutrality, violating this asymmetry. Virtue Ethics, specifically built around the Respect for Interests, solves these problems. Virtue Ethics is a philosophical approach emphasizing character and virtue, rather than adherence towards a principle or goal. Positive traits, Virtues, and negative traits, Vices, are the attributes that help curate morally positive and morally negative behavior, respectively. The Anti-Abuse Principle can then be used as an easy way to justify how: 1. Behaviors functioning off of misaligned interests can result in frustration for one side of a deal, which is dangerous, and 2. Respect of Interests in a way similar to Immanuel Kant's "Treat People as an End, never as a Mere Means" is a good way of describing how to prevent such abuse from occurring. These are the justification for Yogg Virtue Theory and it's utility. [see full text] Absolute Interest Conclusion It is utmost rational to uphold the fulfillment of interests of all sentient beings, across all possible reference frames; with priority to existent, rational, inherent interests , as a value. This conclusion is justified by rational justification itself via Justification Ethics , Normative Will , as well as the idea that the Utmost Rational Outcome for any specific set of sentient beings to approach is the outcome that best upholds the fulfillment of their Interests, where 'Interests' are rational preferences, wants, desires, or goals. It is also justified by an idea called Value Reductionism , wherein any value you have ultimately can be reduced to Interests and thus an implicit value of Interests. Further detail on Inherent Interests and non-inherent interests, is present in Inherent Interest Theory . Therefore, actions that are against the normative value of Interests are self-contradictory. Read Full Text All Texts Guide Oughts from Logic [see full text] Absolute Interest Conclusion [see overview] [see full text] Anti-Abuse Principle [see overview] [see full text] Justification Ethics [see overview] [see full text] [see deduction] Inherent Interest Theory [see full text] Retaliatory Law [see full text] Normative Will [see overview] [see full text] Yogg Virtue Theory [see overview] [see full text] Interest Property Theory [see full text] Markets and Interest Alignment [see full text] Rationally, you ought to utmost-Rationally Fulfill your own Interests, as all beings are acting in accordance with their interests and thus rationally must act utmost-rationally towards their ends. Thus, rational existent interests must have prioritization to the self. The utmost-rational outcome that all sentient beings should align with is that which upholds the Fulfillment of Interests of all sentient beings, in all reference frames; with priority to Inherent, Rational Interests. The distinction of Inherent Interests and non-inherent Interests is derived by Inherent Interest Theory . Thus, from the AIC, actions that constitute interference with another's non-abusive fulfillment of their own rational interests, are illegitimate. Actions that result in the frustration of interests, due to misalignment of interests between parties, are irrational, constitute "abuse", and are illegitimate. Abuse must be defended against. The Fulfillment of Interests as a value is implied by Rational Justification. Rational Justification of anything beyond pure rationalism requires appealing to the normative value of Interests, so any interaction that violates the value of Interests is rationally unjustifiable. As interactions ought to be rationally justifiable, that justification must be based in Interests, if an interaction cannot be justified on rationalism alone. Inherent Interest Theory explains how Yoggism implies some interests take priority over others, it defines Inherent Interests as interests that act as a conduit for other interests, and explains the difference between actions that inherently frustrate and actions that frustrate for external reasons. Justification Ethics grants the value of Interests based on rational interactions. This grants interests as a value, as well as self-defense of rational interests, but not clearance to do evil for "the greater good". Instead, defense of the pillars that uphold Interests themselves can justify ideas reflecting Threshold Deontology and how a breakdown of rational deliberation should be avoided at all costs. Giving to the poor, self-defense, and frustrating to prevent existential disaster, are all different. Good, Right, and merely Justifiable. Only sentient beings have interests relevant to Justification Ethics and Yoggism, as these beings can be described in terms of the rationality of their behavior relative to different standards. A water bottle cannot behave irrationally, yet sentient beings can. Normative Will is thus the capacity for normative evaluation of behaviors relative to standards beyond the mere laws of physics, including rationality, ethics, and personal preferences. Every sentient being possesses some degree of this Normative Will. This also functions as a measure of how strongly Justification Ethics may apply to a given sentient being. The value of well-rounded Consent can be derived via Justification Ethics. This virtue-wise can be framed as a Respect for Interests broadly. Through this value, is inaction always justified? A framing of Virtue Ethics in terms of the Respect for Interests solves this problem, regardless of Justification Ethics granting explicit obligations, there is a basis for good character. This grants the Yogg virtue Principle: You ought to act in a way consistent with the virtues that curate respect for interests. Self-Ownership can be justified under Yoggism based on Consent, where abusive conduct is framed as a violation of consent, in a way that contradicts the Absolutist View of Ownership; due to it contradicting interests. You thus own your Interests, and Preferences, via the normative value of Interests, and also your Body and Mind as they are the primary conduit of your interests. Inherent Frustration is condemnable in local spaces; to be censored for honest criticism or fired for unfair reasons is inherent frustration even if done in the larger purview of property rights rather than direct use of force, as abusive use of property based on Interest Property Theory is not ethically justifiable. Due to the tendency for monopolization and more broadly centralization of firms in an unregulated market economy, caused by varying barriers to entry, inconsistency of perfect competition, and the self-reinforcing nature of market share growth, unregulated market economies naturally lead to abusive outcomes. All Yoggism Pages https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggism https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text0_oughts-from-logic https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text1_anti-abuse-principle https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text2_justification-ethics https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text_deduction-of-interests https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text9_inherent-interest-theory https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text6_retaliatory-law https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text5_normative-will https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text4_absolute-interest-conclusion https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text3_yogg-virtue-theory https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text7_interest-property-theory https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text8_markets-and-interest-alignment https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text2_yoggism-as-a-procedural-norm https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text_refutation-of-argumentation-ethics https://www.tc-blox.net/yoggtexts/text_refutationofthenap

Skins for Minecraft, available for download Minecraft Skins (we are not affiliated with Mojang Studios or Microsoft ) Java + Bedrock Nasal Jim Funny guy with a nose (the best skin, clearly) Download Java + Bedrock Cyclops Guy One eyed funny guy Download Java + Bedrock Cookie Person A person made of Cookies Download Java + Bedrock Red Alien 6-Eyed Alien who is Red Download Java + Bedrock Blue Alien 6-Eyed Alien who is Blue Download Java + Bedrock Dot Blob Blob of Dots, likes Tic Tac Toe Download Java + Bedrock Essence of Apple Made of Apples Download Java + Bedrock Green/Blue Blob Gradient of Blue and Green with White Eyes Download Java + Bedrock Spiralette Related to the Dot Blob but weirder Download Apply for Partnership and help Contribute

A funny embedded site created by TC Blox Studios that is basically Garry's Mod News (yes really) Back to Site This is a Legacy Version of TC-BLOX.NET. Links and Information may be outdated and parts of the site may not work.

A funny embedded site created by TC Blox Studios that is basically Garry's Mod News (yes really) Back to Site This is a Legacy Version of TC-BLOX.NET. Links and Information may be outdated and parts of the site may not work.

See the Demo Projects we have available for online play Topple The Tower (Legacy) Topple The Tower (Legacy) is free and Open-Source under the Open-Source 2023 License . - Download Demo as .zip - ToppleTheTower Legacy: The first gamedev project I made using the Unity Engine I plan on making a remastered version of this game in the future View Game on Itch.io Keybinds: WASD to move, W rolls you forward, S rolls you back, A and D strafe roll you left and right R to go back to the Main Menu T to swap between Third Person and First Person (in the downloadable version, which is an older version; perspectives are changeable in the menu) Known Issues and Bugs: Camera movement in first person is only on one axis Camera movement in first person is jittery Shadow render length is too short Texture and UI resolutions are too lacking Textures are missing from props Downloadable version forces you to go back to menu to change perspectives (these issues will be fixed in the remastered version, see development activity for more information)

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An Open-Source Voice Chat App created by jimmybob / TonyTCB Bobbelvox Bobbelvox is free and Open-Source under the copyleft Open-Source 2024 License . - Download app as .zip for Windows - - Download as .zip for Linux (x86_64 / x86_32) - - Download as .zip for Linux (arm64 / arm32) - - Download as .zip for Web (html) - The program's source code as Godot Project Files are available: - Download Project Files (Source Code) as .zip - Bobbelvox is a free and open-source Voice Chat program for Windows and Linux. You can use it to host voice calls. The code of Bobbelvox is reused in Bob Simulator for the Voice Chat feature. BobbelVox is an Open-Source Voice Chat Software created by jimmybob / TonyTCB using the Open-Source Godot Engine. BobbelVox was created by TC Blox Studios, you can see more at https://www.tc-blox.net BobbelVox is licensed under the TC Blox Studios Open-Source 2024 License: https://www.tc-blox.net/legal/opensource-2024-license It is recommended, for sensitive conversations, to use Bobbelvox with people within your own Wifi Network, for security reasons. As of v1.2.7, voice calls are not encrypted on their own. Usage of the Bobbelfont is licensed under the SIL Open Font License. You can view these licenses at: https://openfontlicense.org/open-font-license-official-text/ https://www.tc-blox.net/legal/opensource-2024-license BobbelVox's Source Code and provided Project Files are licensed under the TC Blox Studios Open-Source 2024 License. Resources part of the Godot Engine are licensed under the MIT License: https://godotengine.org/license/ Please give credit to jimmybob / TonyTCB and TC Blox Studios for use of BobbelVox assets and project files.