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Absolute Interest Conclusion Back to Home Details Step-by-Step Guide Philosophy Menu More Absolute Interest Conclusion [Full Text] —The Absolute Interest Conclusion— The Absolute Interest Conclusion is the conclusion that: It is utmost rational to uphold the fulfillment of existent interests of all sentient beings, across all possible reference frames; with priority to existent, rational, Inherent Interests. This conclusion can be derived logically, using the following argument: (1): Why Future Interests Count Future interests are also valuable as people generally have an interest in their future and the fulfillment of interests they hold in the future. When people do not value their future interests, then we can apply the following argument: A hypothetical large group of people who do not have an interest in their future interests, will on average end up minimizing the fulfillment of interests of a majority of the group. It is utmost rational, relative to each person, of any group, to avoid such a scenario; and this is true regardless of precondition. This logic applies to all future interests, but only interests given from those already or previously sentient. The reason for this is that the minimization of existent interests has no relevant causal relationship with the prevention of the creation of new interests. (2): Reducing everything to Rationality We can thus define oughts as interests, treating the fulfillment of interests as a form of Moral Utility, that we should maximize throughout all of time, across all possible reference frames; assuming present interests are as ultimately meaningful as future interests; which is defendable from the argument already given. Finally, we can now convert all ‘oughts’ and ‘ought-nots’ to simply ‘rationalities’ and ‘irrationalities’. (3): Cooperation for Interests This grants us something similar to the contractarian idea that morality emerges from valuing social cohesion and the need for cooperation through agreements, based on people’s subjective interests; but with one key difference: All sentient beings capable of ‘interests’ are held as morally significant. (4): Fulfillment of Interests vs. Creation of new Interests To maximize interests means to maximize the fulfillment of any existing interests. There is no rational justification for the creation of new Interests, unless it maximizes potential for already existant inherent interests related to certain mental states such as happiness or other Approximate Goods. This is due to it being rational to most rationally fulfill an interest assuming you are acting according to your own interests already, this says nothing about creating new interests to act according to, unless doing so helps to fulfill your existing interests. All of this is to say that forcibly modifying everyone’s brains to really want to lick walls, and then giving them walls to lick, is a terrible way to help anyone, as it is not an ethical thing to do as it does not maximize existent interests and violates basic freedoms which actually minimizes existent interests. Even in situations where everyone ends up happy with their new artificial interests, situations with more rational interests will be more rational and overall more stable, and any situation that tries to force people into some set of interests will be violating their interests in not doing that, continuously. A situation where people are able to fulfill their own individual interests will be much more consistent with the AIC, and much more consistent with the fulfillment of interests as a principle. (5): Overall Rational Outcomes The self-interest of one individual is different from the overall interests of a group. Recognizing and valuing the group interests, the utmost rational, most consistent interests of the most universal group, will give us this Absolute Interest Conclusion. Since the class of all sentient beings represents the largest class actions can be compared and measured according to, it is an Absolute Class, representing the utmost rational standard of intrinsic value. To contradict this utmost rational standard is thus irrational, therefore the intrinsic values that are held consistently among all members of the Absolute Class, must not be contradicted. This intrinsic value is the value of the Fulfillment of Interests itself. It should be noted at this point that the idea of a "collective" is meaningless, as you cannot directly conclude a group collectively has some interest, unless the interest is shared unanimously. Collectives don't exist, only individuals exist in any meaningful way, only individuals can act rationally or irrationally. In this case, the fulfillment of interests is a rational, inherent, and existant value, and interest, intrinsic and inherent to all sentient beings, regardless of external factors. Therefore, it is utmost rational to maximize the Fulfillment of Existent Inherent Interests of all sentient beings in all possible reference frames. (6): Intrinsic Standards, Value Reductionism, and the Axiom of Choice The Axiom of Choice is a mathematical construct, usually added onto Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory mathematics. Set Theory is based on the idea of ‘Sets’, of collections of members. So you can have a Set of all Purple Dogs, and a Set of all Bananas. The Set of all Naturally Purple Dogs is equivalent to the Empty Set, a set containing no elements at all. Now, the Axiom of Choice is the axiom that, phrased crudely: If you have a bunch of sets, and then you take one or a few elements out of each set, and group up all of those specific elements into a new collection, that collection is itself considered a valid set. If every set contains valid elements, then grouping one from each set should also yield a valid set. It seems logical, because if each element of a set is a set itself, I.E. a single element A corresponds to a set [A], the set who's only element is A, and the sets containing them are of course sets themselves, then it seems the ‘set-hood’ of each set emerges from and can be reduced to the set's members. If we simply group up a bunch of random or arbitrarily chosen elements, no matter how we group them, that group’s ‘set-hood’ can be reduced to its members, and its members are all valid both as elements and as single-element sets. So, how could the new collection not constitute a valid set? Especially if it follows all other rules for sets, which it unequivocally does. This intuition appeals to a logical and philosophical system called Reductionism, the idea that some thing's function can correspond to it thought of as a collection of members, and that collection's function, as a mere byproduct of it's members behavior. Under reductionism, all things that contain other things, function merely as the sum of their parts. A machine functions not as it's own thing, but as a byproduct of the parts making it up. It is not separate from it's parts, instead it is equivalent, both in function and ontologically, to the sum of it's parts. We can apply this same logic to Rational Standards and Values. Let us use the word Class instead of Set, now imagine the class of all Dogs. If all members of this class value chewing bones, even in slightly different ways, each value of each member shares something in common: the concept of “Chewing Bones” itself. If values are the sum of their parts, following this reductionist logic, then each value members have gets their value from its parts. Thus, each member shares the concept of Chewing Bones in common, and as the value of values is deduced from their parts, value should rationally be present in the concept of Chewing Bones itself. This shared concept should thus rationally be a value of the group. To say it another way, it would be irrational to not accept Chewing Bones as a value, as rationally it can be derived through reductionism. This allows us to define a shared Intrinsic Value, universal across some collection, where to act against that value, is to act against this collection as a standard of value from which we can measure actions. To reject the idea of Intrinsic Value is to act in contradiction with basic logical reductionism. To simply ignore the most rational and universal version of some value, is to contradict the idea that actions can be measured by any sort of rational standard, which is utmost irrational and incoherent. The best standards of value are thus the standards that are the most consistent, I.E. the most intrinsic. For example, the standard of "All judges argue based on assumption X" is more intrinsic and consistent than a more arbitrary standard like "My cousin argues based on assumption X". The latter standard would not be a good justification to appeal to some assumption X, while the first standard would not be perfect, but would be better. The best rational standard of value, or measurement, is the class of all sentient beings itself, as anything outside of this class cannot be judged on the basis of rationality. This makes the class, an Absolute Class. Another example of an Absolute Class is the class of all couches, which is the most rational standard of measuring what attributes are intrinsic of couches. This couch class cannot be used to judge the rationality or consistency of values, nor the rationality of actions, it can only be used to judge how intrinsic the attributes of some specific couch is. The Fulfillment of Interests as a shared concept, is an example of an utmost rational value, as it is intrinsic among all sentient beings, an Absolute Class. Therefore, based on all that has been said here, the Fulfillment of Interests relative to all sentient beings is the most rational standard with which to measure behavior and the consistency of values, and the rationality of actions. (7): Intrinsic Potato Theory Jon values eating potatoes driving a car, Jessie values eating potatoes at the beach, Jessica values eating potatoes driving a truck. Jon, Jessie, and Jessica all value potatoes. For Jon to not value potatoes themselves, is for them to not value “eating potatoes while driving a car” in and of itself; yet removing potatoes would make Jon value it less. Thus, eating potatoes must have value. To say that they only value “themselves eating potatoes” and not “eating potatoes” in and of itself, is wrong. This is because if we remove the reference to potatoes we get that they must value “themselves”, regardless of other factors. Yet the feeling of meaninglessness can exist, thus this is wrong. If we assume basic value reductionism, then values get their value from their parts. Potatoes are a part. Thus, the only consistent value here is the eating of potatoes itself, as an object. Therefore, it can be said that: “All beings value themselves performing actions that fulfill interests.” To remove the reference to yourself, is to give the statement: “All beings value the performing of actions that fulfill interests in general.” To remove the fulfillment of interests, is to give the statement: “All beings value themselves performing actions, in and of itself.” Clearly, the first statement is true to a greater extent than the second statement. The third statement is clearly false as a being cannot value themselves as an end in themselves, regardless of all else that gives life meaning, to an extent that is somehow the same as if they were also fulfilling interests. Yet if it isn’t YOU that itself grants all the value, and it isn’t the performing of actions itself that is the value, then assuming values can be reduced to their parts as all things can, there is only one conclusion: The fulfillment of interests for consistency’s sake, must rationally be valued in and of itself. So, rationally, you should act with reference to the value of the fulfillment of interests itself. Finally, to fully disassemble Naive Egoism, we can use the following Logical Deduction: –Definitions: (Intrinsic Value): Something that is valued / acted upon in a way regardless of external factors to some extent; I.E. by most sentient beings in most circumstances, to a reasonable extent. If it is actually valued / acted upon by all sentient beings in all circumstances and all situations, it is intrinsic relative to the class of all sentient beings. Specific values such as individual preferences can give way to broad, all-encompassing values if the preference is intrinsically shared, especially among all beings. (Interest): Something that a sentient being’s behavior tends towards. An interest is Inherent if your behavior tends towards your goal regardless of external factors to some reasonable extent. (Absolute Class): An absolute class is a class where no greater class can be imagined that values and variables can be compared to or measured by, relative to the members of said class. (Rational Standards of Value): Actions and variables can be measured and compared, and rationally judged, relative to some standards of value, I.E. a set of rules or values. The more universal this standard, the least arbitrary and thus most consistent, all-encompassing, and most rational. An Absolute Class is the only utmost rational standard of value that can be defined by definition, as it is the only thing actions and variables can be compared to or measured by, relative to the members of the class. An action that is contradictory to what is utmost rational relative to an Absolute Class, is inconsistent with the only rational standard of value that can be defined relative to that specific class. Said another way, that action in contradicting the standard, would violate the concept of action comparison itself. This is based on the idea of Intrinsic Standards which is derived via Reductionism. –Premises: (P1): Rationally, you ought to fulfill your own interests in the most rational ways possible, relative to you acting in accordance with your own interests, which all are. (P2): Something that is acted upon by all sentient beings under all conditions, is a highly Intrinsic Value. (P3): Rationally, the recognition of Intrinsic Values is utmost logically consistent. (P4): Rationally, acting with reference to your recognitions, with reference to what is true, is most logical. (P5): The class of all sentient beings represent an Absolute Class, the only rational standard of value that can be defined relative to the class. (P6): A value or interest, like "I like mashed potatoes", can through reductionism be reduced to it's parts, those parts being "Me", "Liking of mashed foods", "Liking of potatoes"; where each part is itself something held has a rationally necessary value, and the original value is the sum of it's parts. (P7): From (Definition of "Intrinsic Value"): Intrinsic values can be defined relative to some large class of things. If something is held as a value or interest, or a value that is rational to act according to as well as possible, universally among the class of things, then that value is intrinsic to said class. (P8): Rationally, all actions and situations can be measured relative to some set of standards. Standards that are the least arbitrary are the most rational of standards to measure by, and can be referred to as specific values and interests. (P9): From (P6 + P7 + P8), An action that is contradictory to what is utmost rational relative to an Absolute Class, is itself a fundamentally irrational action as it is inconsistent with the only rational standard of value that can be defined relative to the class. The action violates the concept of rational comparison and measure itself. –Logic: (L1): From (P1), The utmost rational outcome relative to all sentient beings is the upholding of the fulfillment of existent interests of all sentient beings, non-contradiction with rational oughts. (L2): From (P5), The class of all sentient beings represent an Absolute Class. (L3): From (L1 + L2), The utmost rational outcome relative to the most rational standard of value is the maximization of the fulfillment of existent interests of all sentient beings. (L4): From (L3 + P9), An action that is contradictory to the utmost rational outcome relative to all sentient beings, is itself fundamentally irrational as it is inconsistent to the most rational standard of value definable. –Conclusion: From (L4 + L1), You ought to act in alignment with the value of the fulfillment of interests of all sentient beings. Therefore: It is utmost rational to uphold the fulfillment of existent interests of all sentient beings, across all possible reference frames; with priority to existent, rational, Inherent Interests. This is the Absolute Interest Conclusion. Priority should be given to rational Inherent Interests, as these are the most consistent of interests, and preservation and fulfillment of Inherent Interests will allow the most fulfillment of interests in general; protecting non-inherent interests may result in inherently frustrating behavior. It is also utmost rational to act in alignment with the inference of this conclusion, as to violate it is to act against what is rational relative to the most rational standard of value, which would be logically inconsistent. L4 also grants us something interesting, the Absolute Interest Principle, the principle that it is inconsistent and irrational, to act against or in contradiction with the utmost rational outcome, that which upholds the fulfillment of existent interests of all sentient beings. —The Absolute Interest Principle— The most rational outcome overall, relative to the Absolute Class of all sentient beings, is that which upholds the fulfillment of existent interests of all sentient beings, across all possible reference frames; with priority to existent, rational, Inherent Interests. Therefore, it is inconsistent and irrational, to act against or in contradiction with this most rational outcome, and it is irrational to act against others rational interests as an end in itself, and to act against the fulfillment of interests on small scales as well; as it is in contradiction with the only coherent rational standards of value. Value Reductionism Rational Outcomes

Refutation of AE Back to Home Details Step-by-Step Guide Philosophy Menu More Refutation of Argumentation Ethics [Full Text] —The Argumentation as a Mere Means Problem— Most deductions of Argumentation Ethics attempt to prove you cannot consistently argue for aggression because it argues against norms you presuppose as valid by arguing, but this only makes sense if you assume that argumentation and the norms associated with it are valuable as ends in themselves. Otherwise, the idea that arguing for aggression is a performative contradiction and thus your argument is invalid, simply does not follow. Truth is, nobody is actually required to hold argumentation as an end in itself, as inherently valuable. The ability to argue for something in a way that constitutes the idealistic non-aggressive argumentation, doesn't actually affect what is true, nor does it affect what you can show others are rationally required to accept. The argumentation process is merely an idealistic process to seek truth, to generate and revise deductive proofs that are created by mixing and swapping ideas. Non-aggression isn't actually required to create and revise deductive proofs, and regardless of the norms involved in the process, if you create a deductive argument in favor of some condition X, your argument's validity has nothing to do with whether you argued it while aggressing or not. Thus if you argue in favor of aggression, your argument's validity is independant of what norms you use to argue, even if to an Argumentation Ethicist it may only be 'pseudo-arguing'. —Refutation of Argumentation Ethics— NAP Argumentation Ethics works like this: Argumentation requires certain norms to work, including self-ownership and non-aggression. If you attack your interlocutor (arguer), argumentation breaks down. What this means, is that arguing for anything that conflicts with the Non-Aggression Principle, is a performative contradiction as you are contradicting the very norms you presuppose by arguing in the first place. This argument is demonstrably wrong, and for a simple reason. The norms presupposed by engaging in argumentation are not the same norms being argued against when someone usually argues for something that contradicts the NAP; like taxes, regulations, or the existence of any limitations on property rights. This is because the argumentation process only presupposes procedural norms, one of which being non-aggression. Arguing for aggression in some other context thus cannot contradict your usage of a similar norm in the context of argumentation. Below is a more explicit explanation as to why. —Step-by-Step Explanation— --Basic Truths-- Argumentation is a process that is used to discover and refine arguments. Argumentation presupposes procedural norms, one of which being non-aggression. The arguments discovered and refined during argumentation stand by themselves if they have true premises. By engaging in Argumentation, you presuppose the procedural norm of non-aggression. This presupposition is only in the sense that if non-aggression is violated in the process, the process fails to fulfill it's purpose correctly. This is simply because aggression during the process of Argumentation results in people conceding when they shouldn't. --Reasoning-- The only time a performative contradiction arises is if one engages in full argumentation to argue against the procedural norms of argumentation itself. Thus, since what is presupposed is strictly procedural, then during argumentation, you can argue against 'non-aggression' as a principle all you want as long as you do not argue against non-aggression as a procedural norm of Argumentation itself. --Conclusion So, NAP Argumentation Ethics fails due to there being a difference between arguing against certain procedural norms, and arguing against norms for use in a different context. —Further Reasoning— The claim that "By arguing you presuppose the NAP therefore arguing against the NAP is a performative contradiction" is wrong because of a category error. Presupposing the NAP as a procedural norm of the process of argumentation simply has nothing to do with what other contexts you think the NAP may or may not apply to. Arguing the NAP is wrong in the context of government, for example, to argue for taxes or to argue for measures to enforce fair treatment, cannot be called a performative contradiction because you can do that while also accepting that true argumentation requires non-aggression.

Retaliatory Law Back to Home Details Step-by-Step Guide Philosophy Menu More Retaliatory Law [Full Text] —Retaliatory Law— Justification Ethics implies that rational justification of actions necessarily appeals to the normative value of the interests of others involved in some rational interaction. This grants us the Fulfillment of Interests as a value, but not necessarily the clearance to inherently frustrate one's interests to protect some greater good outcome, even in extreme circumstances. The reason for this is that the Fulfillment of Interests as a value is simply the acceptance of the normativity of interests themselves, the very basis of this philosophy and of rational oughts considering more than one person. Inherently frustrating actions that are not an act of defense against irrational frustration, are thus illegitimate, as such is called out in the Anti-Abuse Principle, which explicitly lays this out. —Part 1: Defense and Retaliatory Law— --Basic Recap of Self-Defense-- As explained before, valuing Rational Interests can only mean the right to defend rational interests from irrational transgressions. To have the right over your interests, and to not have the right to defend your interests through proportionate means, is a contradiction. If the idea that Interests form a right to Property, where certain objects and environments can act as a conduit of your interests, where attacks against personal property is an act of inherent frustration against your interests, this also implies a right to proportionate self-defense of your body, mind, and property, your stuff, belongings, your home; by any means necessary to protect interest fulfillment. --Proportionate Force and Lethal Retaliation-- Rational Interests win out over Irrational Interests, this comes from the assumption of Normative Rationalism. If someone breaks into your house and tries to destroy all of your stuff and then tries to burn down your house, is lethal force justified to defend what is yours? The answer is proportionate force is justifiable. If lethal force becomes proportionate, then it is justifiable. It can be argued that the transgressor could tell you explicitly, "You can leave, I won't stop you. If you try to stop me from burning down your house though, I will kill you." If they say this, assuming you know they are being truthful, you now know that any resistance will be met with lethal force by them. Since force against them to some degree is already justifiable defense of your interests, if they turn to lethal force in retaliation, then since that lethal force is unjustifiable this situation becomes the same as one where they used lethal force from the beginning. For this reason, since them using lethal force is foreseeable anyway, it is thus justifiable for you to engage in lethal force before they do. If you have reasonable foresight that they will use lethal force if threatened in any way, then you have a right to cut to the chase, since your interference with them is already justifiable. --Proportionality must be based on Necessity, not Category of Harm-- Someone may argue that it is disproportionate to enforce action against inherent frustration that does not violate bodily autonomy, for example. The logic goes like this, if someone is underpaying workers or discriminating in hiring and service unjustifiably, enforcing regulations and civil rights statutes to stop them is disproportionate force because you are using force against someone who isn't, that is a fundamental difference between categories of harm and is thus disproportionate. This standard of proportionality is the idea that force is proportional if the force is at the same level, same category of harm, of what injustice is being thwarted. This standard immediately breaks, because if there is a disabled person stuck in a wheelchair and all they have is a gun, they may be unable to defend themselves or their property without going from yelling to full on lethal force. By the category of harm logic, they may as well not own their property since jumping to lethal force is "disproportionate". Justification Ethics solves this problem. Since all harm becomes subcategories of inherent interest frustration, there is no "category claim" that can be made because these categories simply don't exist in the way they've been explained. Imagine being slapped in the face vs. being fired from your job for no reason. Both are unjustifiable given Justification Ethics and an appeal to the value of interests, yet being fired from your job may be much worse than simply being slapped in the face. Yet, in terms of harm categories, being slapped in the face is a direct violation of bodily autonomy, while being fired is not. This grants a form of proportionality based in the necessity of the use of force, and here even Libertarians will agree. The disabled person owns their property, and all that is necessary to enforce what is right is permitted. Thus, enforcement of regulations against unfair treatment, discrimination, and other non-violent yet anti-interest abusive activity is actually justifiable under Justification Ethics. —Retaliatory Law— Based on this reasoning, this then justifies a limited use of justifiable force by some form of court system. If a court justifiably and soundly argues you are inherently frustrating against others to such a degree that it must be stopped, and you try to refuse their justifiable demands, then under Yoggism they have the right to use proportionate force to prevent your transgression. If you then resist further with lethal force, your resistance becomes an inherent frustration against them and unjustifiable use of force, to which whoever is enforcing demands against you can then defend themselves with their own lethal force. To be clear, this logic behind enforcement of justified rules immediately fails if said rules are unethical or unjustifiable in and of themselves. In a democratic society, this logic will also fail if rules are contrary to the interests of the public, aka decided undemocratically or in a way not representative of the citizens of some community. —Part 2: Threshold Deontology— There is more to ethics than simply what works as a consistent and static system of law, though. In a situation where inaction may result in mass destruction, and mass inherent frustration, but the action to prevent the destruction is itself inherently frustrating, we seemingly run into a problem. It should also be noted that while it may seem justifiable to kill an innocent person or temporarily violate someone's inherent rights, or interests, to prevent mass death; assuming a best-case scenario where we know for sure the consequences and can measure them; it does not seem justifiable to kill an innocent person to lower death rates globally by 0.2%, even if doing so may technically save many more people. Instead of simply appealing to intuition itself, the reasons behind the intuition can actually be justified by the Fulfillment of Interests and the rational engine that makes this work. This threshold deontology, can be argued for based on a valuing of rational deliberation. --Defense of Interest Structure-- Threshold Deontology is the idea that we ought to act in ways consistent with some deontological ruleset, or principles, such as "Do not murder", or "Actions that are inherently frustrating are illegitimate"; but only up to a point where not violating the deontology creates an existential disaster, like the destruction of a whole country. It can be reasoned that inaction can result in a breakdown of rational deliberation. Imagine a town of people who have national deliberation days, where every Wednesday, they come together to reason for how best to use resources. This reasoning is held up by each person in the town having the ability to participate in argumentation, the same way democracy works through voting. Now imagine a disaster strikes, and you have the ability to act. Inaction would result in a breakdown of argumentation, deliberation, of truth-seeking within the town itself. In such a scenario, it is possible to disrupt or take advantage of the disruption to argumentation, through inaction. Taking advantage of this disruption is irrational, and letting people get away with taking advantage, is also irrational, as it takes away from actual truth-seeking. For this reason, the violation of someone's interests to protect the overall value of deliberation, may be justifiable; as the inaction becomes a negligence towards defending rationality itself. --Violating Rights is still Wrong-- Note that the logic used does not say it is "right" or "good" to violate someone's rights to prevent existential disaster. Yoggism has specific standards on what actually constitutes a 'right', but an innocent person who isn't inherently frustrating does constitute rights, specifically a right over their continued sentience and non-abusive usage of their interest-based property. It has been argued before, from a deontological point of view, that given a consequentialist argument scenario such as "Kill this guy or the entire world explodes!", that the looming existential disaster doesn't make it suddenly a good thing the guy dies, and thus killing the guy is still wrong, it's just that both scenarios are terrible. This intuition is actually a rephrasing of the conclusions here, and the reasons for that intuition have just been derived. This grants us definitions for Good, Right, and Justified. —Good, Right, and Justified— There is clearly some difference between giving to the poor, and self-defense, and there is also a difference between self-defense, and frustrating for the purpose of preserving the structure of interests itself. These differences can be distinguished well in terms of interests and their effects on them. Giving to the poor, assuming your individual giving doesn't somehow harm them, is Good. It's purely good if doing so fulfills your own interests as well, since then no meaningful interests are frustrated by any measure. Self-defense on the other hand is different. As argued before, it's justifiable as it is the defense of rational interests over irrational interests and inherently frustrating transgression. However, the transgressor's interests are also inherently frustrated, it's fire beats fire. If the transgressor is killed, this is an inherent frustration, just done in defense of the value of interests. This is not purely good as previously described. Long-term such defense is good, but more accurately this action is not purely good, but is Right. It is right, and thus permissible, because it is directly consistent with Interests as a value, along with any other rational action. To frustrate against someone's interests for the purpose of preserving the structure of interests itself, this would be something like stealing from someone in an emergency to stop a large disaster from occurring. Since the someone you are frustrating against is not a transgressor, they are not acting in a way that is inherently frustrating, which is why it counts as theft, this cannot be called defense against transgressors who are contradicting interests at all. Instead, this can only be justified in instances where the e nds are rationally integral to the structures that preserve interest fulfillment in a fundamental sense. It should also be noted the difference between frustrating as an end in itself, versus frustrating as a mere temporary side-effect, a means to a greater end where said frustration is unnecessary. To lie to save someone's life for example, is to frustrate against someone's interest in the truth, not as an end in itself, but as a side-effect to reach a greater end where the lie becomes unnecessary. Actions such as this are not inherently frustrating, as what is inconsistent about inherent frustration is that inherently frustrating against another's interests, as an end in itself, is by definition an end inconsistent with the value of Interests. If it is not an end in itself, and is a side-effect separate from the action, or is defense against a transgressor, then it is not inherent frustration in this way. It is no longer inconsistent with, and may be in defense of, Interests. —Definitions— Interest - What a sentient being's behavior tends towards; sentient preferences. Interest Fulfillment - A being's interest being fulfilled or their preferences respected. Interest Frustration - The violation or contradiction of a being's interest. Good - An action that is interest fulfilling and is not inherently frustrating to any interests. Right - An action that is interest fulfilling, and not inherently frustrating unless against irrational interests in defense of rational interests; in a way consistent with Interests as a value. Justifiable - An action that results in the minimally inconsistent outcome relative to Interests as a value, measured by whether the action is 'right' interest-wise, or if the action is rationally integral to the structures that preserve interest fulfillment fundamentally. Bad - An action that is frustrating to interests while any fulfillment is limited to irrational interests. Evil - An action that is inherently frustrating to interests and is frustrating to the very structures that preserve interest fulfillment. Moral - An action that is consistent with Interests as a value, in some form. Immoral - An action that is inconsistent with Interests as a value, in some form. Ethical (Yogg Law) - An action consistent with the Anti-Abuse Principle. Unethical (Yogg Law) - An action inconsistent with the AAP or is otherwise Immoral. Existentially Justifiable (Yogg Existentials) - An action consistent with the Anti-Abuse Principle or existentially protective in the sense of protecting the structure of interests themselves. Unjustifiable (Yogg Existentials) - An action inconsistent with the AAP or is otherwise Immoral, while not being existentially protective, or being diminishing to the structure of interests. —The Anti-Abuse Principle (AAP)— Actions that constitute interference with another's non-abusive fulfillment of their own rational and non-contradictory interests, are illegitimate. Actions that result in the frustration of interests, through overall frustration by misalignment of interests between parties, or due to conduct that is inherently interest-frustrating, are irrational and self-contradictory, constitute ‘abuse’, and are thus illegitimate. Actions that prevent abuse, or inhibit otherwise interest-frustrating conduct; including conduct that is a product of irrational interest misalignment between parties, and conduct that is inherently irrationally frustrating; are legitimate as they constitute resistance to abuse.

Back to Home Details Step-by-Step Guide Philosophy Menu More Anti-Abuse Principle [Full Text] —Deriving a Deontological Principle— From the Absolute Interest Conclusion, given by the derived value of the Fulfillment of Interests, we can derive that to act in alignment with the value of the fulfillment of interests of all sentient beings is utmost rational. This grants us the following Absolute Interest Principle. ---Absolute Interest Principle--- The most rational outcome overall, relative to the Absolute Class of all sentient beings, is that which upholds the fulfillment of existent interests of all sentient beings, across all possible reference frames; with priority to existent, rational, Inherent Interests. Therefore, it is inconsistent and irrational, to act against or in contradiction with this most rational outcome, and it is irrational to act against others rational interests as an end in itself, and to act against the fulfillment of interests on small scales as well; as it is in contradiction with the only coherent rational standards of value. ---Bridging Consequentialism and Deontology--- From this principle, we can bridge consequentialism and deontology, and derive a universal deontological principle true in all circumstances that is entirely consistent with the Absolute Interest Conclusion, and thus the AIP as well. To do this in a way that is more versatile, we can uncover how certain actions may subtly constitute interest-frustration. ---Interest Alignment and Kantian Ethics--- A major part of Kantian Ethics, the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, is the idea that people should be treated as an end in themselves and never merely as a means. This idea’s usefulness can be derived if we value people’s interests. If someone is treated as a means to someone else’s end, that means whatever actions are done are not done in respect to the person’s interests. Said another way, their interests are not respected. This violates the Absolute Interest Principle directly, as the respect of people’s interests is necessary to ensure people’s interests are not simply ignored, or treated with a bare minimum of care. To act in a way that cannot be rationally justified relative to the other person's interests or preferences, is fundamentally contradictory with the AIP. We can expand upon this into a broader idea of Interest Alignment, where interactions and contracts between people are only truly ethical if the people involved have aligned interests; ensuring they are all mutually benefiting from the contract. It is in this way that Interest Alignment to a reasonable extent, explains the value of Consent, as it can only be achieved through enthusiastic, informed consent among the parties involved. ---Consent--- Consent is a continuous, preferably enthusiastic, explicit, and relevantly-informed, acceptance of an agreement, contract, or activity. Preferably enthusiastic here means you not only should have an interest in signing a contract, or accepting an agreement, but you also ought to enthusiastically approve of each term of the contract, every part or at least the most important parts of the agreement or activity. Relevantly-informed means that you know what you are agreeing to and have the knowledge required, to a reasonable and relevant extent, to meaningfully judge the agreement's outcomes relative to your own interests. The reason these things are valuable, the reason consent is a useful 'construct' at all, if it can even be denegrated to a mere construct, is because it is necessary to ensure interactions between people respect their interests. If people's interests are not aligned at all, I.E. they are all acting in respect to only their own individual interests, then they will end up frustrating against each-others interests. Relative to interests as a value, this is contradictory with the idea that interests are meaningful at all. It is for this reason that Consent, even if it is defined as a mere construct, is surely the most valuable, universal, and important construct. This is also the reason why behaviors that function off of misaligned interests, that may result in frustration for one side of a deal, can be so dangerous to the meaning of consent and interests itself. This, is the definition of Abuse. ---Rational Interests take priority over Irrational Interests--- Four ruffians break into your house, what the devil? As you grab your powdered wig and Kentucky rifle, blow a golfball sized hole through the first man, he's dead on the spot. Draw your pistol on the second man, misses him entirely because it's smoothbore, and have to resort to the cannon mounted at the top of the stairs loaded with grapeshot, "Tally ho, lads!" The grapeshot shreds two men in the blast, the sound and extra shrapnel set off car alarms. Fix bayonet and charge the last terrified rapscallion. He bleeds out waiting on the police to arrive since triangular bayonet wounds are impossible to stitch up. Self-defense is rationally justifiable, as your defense of yourself is an inherent and rational interest relative to your own self-interest, and their interest in killing or seriously hurting you is irrational as it is not inherent and is instead arbitrary. You are contradicting their interests in not being killed, but they are contradicting the interest of not being killed as well. You are merely defending yourself while defending rationality itself. It is justifiable as long as it is rational to act according to an inherent and non-arbitrary interest in contradiction with the relevant interests of an irrational actor, while the irrational actor contradicts their own relevant interests. This begs the question of what qualifies as consistent? Consistent relative to what, all sentient beings' interests? Which interests must be the most inherent and rational interests, as clearly it is irrational to act relative to the standard that 1+1=3, even if everybody has an interest in asserting that. The most rational standard thus must be based on the most inherent and rational interests, and the protection of them. Murderers valuing their own lives is an irrational, contradictory interest. It is an interest with some value, but of less value than the interest of someone acting otherwise entirely consistently with the value of interests and/or the AIP. Therefore: Killing ruffians in self-defense is rationally justifiable because your rational inherent interests are of more value than the contradictory interests of the ruffians, and thus your interests are more relevant to whatever utmost rational standard of value selected. This comes from the recognition that rational interests take priority over irrational interests. Based on these arguments and the AIP, irrational frustration can be said to involve acting in a way that is not aligned with the rational interests of others. Acting in alignment with rational interests, is thus utmost rational, and defense of those rational interests against rationality is also itself rational. Note as well that inherently interest-frustrating conduct is measured according to the standard that such conduct results in interest-frustrating by way of either interest misalignment, or otherwise, in most circumstances regardless of external factors to a reasonable extent, by the definition of "inherent harms". With these considerations, can be crafted the following principle of Yogg Law: —The Anti-Abuse Principle (AAP)— Actions that constitute interference with another's non-abusive fulfillment of their own rational and non-contradictory interests, are illegitimate. Actions that result in the frustration of interests, through overall frustration by misalignment of interests between parties, or due to conduct that is inherently interest-frustrating, are irrational and self-contradictory, constitute ‘abuse’, and are thus illegitimate. Actions that prevent abuse, or inhibit otherwise interest-frustrating conduct; including conduct that is a product of irrational interest misalignment between parties, and conduct that is inherently irrationally frustrating; are legitimate as they constitute resistance to abuse. This principle can be stated in essence in a simple sentence: "Do what you want, unless it stops others from doing what they want, unless what they want is irrational and inherently harmful to other's interests; in which case defend rational interests." Consent

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The Bobbelfont is a font created by jimmybob, licensed under the SIL Open Font License. It is the font used on TC-BLOX.NET Bobbelfont The Bobbelfont is a font created by jimmybob / TonyTCB . It is the doodly font present on TC-BLOX.NET and Bob Simulator . You may use it non-commercially or commercially freely. You may distribute it modified or unmodified with credit to TC Blox Studios . The Bobbelfont is distributed under the SIL Open Font License. You can view this license at: https://openfontlicense.org/open-font-license-official-text/ Download Font as .zip "the 27 checkerboard fox dogs jump and swing over the banana-flavored quilly zoo" "Mr. Manman eats 5,849,261,037 bananas. He was hungry, you see.. That was 8% of the total." -Examples of the Bobbelfont.

Bob Simulator is a 3D Sandbox / Adventure Game with Sandbox, RPG, and Adventure Elements. Home About Videos Yoggarithms Hyperseeds System Requirements Development Activity Bob Simulator Menu More Get Bob Simulator and play the game [Latest Update: v0.4.9] Currently the game is not available for download. You can play an old prototype, the Bob Simulator Space Demo here . The game is in active development. See devlogs here: Bob Simulator Devlogs Track my activity here: TC Blox Studios Development Activity Bob Simulator will be available under this usage license: Bob Simulator License

Play APPLE101, a small clicker game where you buy and sell for apples! APPLE101 APPLE101 is Free and Open-Source under the Open-Source 2023 License . View on Itch.io - Play on the Web on Itch.io - Download Demo as .zip APPLE101: A simple clicker game where you buy and sell stuff to make apples. Keybinds: Left Click or Tap to buy and sell. Known Issues and Bugs: Infinite Pineapple price is inaccurate Auto-Soupers cannot be turned off

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