Note that the following arguments use Normative Rationalism as an assumption.

This assumption comes from the 2nd section of this text: [yoggism as a procedural norm]

This also provides a more rational alternative to NAP Argumentation Ethics.

​

–Persuasive Arguments appeal to the Normative Value of Interests–
A persuasive argument, as defined here, is an argument that derives a claim in the form "you ought to accept X". This claim is a normative claim, and it's validity and normativity must be derived from the argument's premises. For the argument to be correct the person or "debate opponent" should rationally agree with the premises, otherwise the ought claim would not apply.

An argument with a normative "you ought to accept X" claim, may obtain it's normativity from rationalism, or from subjective opinions, and emotive preferences. Normative rationalism may be assumed by virtue of the structure of any argument itself, where the question of whether the argument's premises are correct or not already presupposes rationalism and the validity of deduction.

If a persuasive argument's conclusion is derived through more than just pure rationalism though, the debate opponent will only accept premises, and only be required rationally to accept premises, if the premises appeal to shared preferences that are valid, preferences as in anything behavior guiding; be that wants, desires, beliefs, values, etc. These are rational interests.

Any persuasive argument must have premises that appeal to your opponent's interests, their rational interests, unless an argument is founded only on rationalism itself. Since persuasive arguments prove normative claims, that normativity must arise from the premises, premises that must appeal to the opponent, thus the normativity must arise from and assume the normative value of the relevant interests of the opponent.
Again, besides arguments that prove things purely rationally.

Therefore, any persuasive argument must either prove something based solely on rationalism, or must presuppose the normative value of an opponent's rational interests, relevant to the interaction.
 

–Yoggist Justification Ethics, Interests through Justification–
If you interact with someone, you should be able to rationally justify your interaction, in a way where those involved in the interaction should be rationally required to accept it.

This means you should be able to justify that the claim “You rationally ought to accept my way of interacting is reasonable” is true for the person you are interacting with; you should be able to argue you are acting reasonably.
This is a 'persuasive argument', meaning an argument that attempts to derive a claim in the form "You ought to accept X". Any argument in this form, must appeal to the interests of any debate opponent for the conclusion to have valid normative weight.

To engage in an interaction that is inconsistent with the normative value of interest, is to engage in an interaction that cannot be rationally justified to anyone.
 

–Egoism is not Rationally Justifiable–
True Egoism is the claim that "Your own self-interest is the only thing with normative value." This claim thus cannot be rationally justified, as any arguments meant to act as justification to someone must appeal to their rational interests relevant to the argument; unless there is some way to prove Egoism through pure rationalism, but this is impossible.

Egoism cannot be argued for through rational justification because it is true that any act of rational justification presupposes that the interests of the opponent that are relevant to the interaction have normative value.
Egoism contradicts this notion directly.

The only way to prove Egoism or any other framework that contradicts the normative value of preferences, is thus by proving them purely rationally, with no assumptions that could constitute preferences more than just hard logic, and appealing to hard logic through the presupposition of the validity of arguments itself.
This is impossible because of the is/ought problem.
 

–Interest-Frustration cannot be justified by Egoism–
True Egoism also requires the conclusion that it is irrational to say a strong person should not murder a disadvantaged person.

It is impossible to argue such a conclusion to someone if they are the disadvantaged, because making such an argument requires appealing to their preferences and such a conclusion contradicts them; their interest in not being attacked is clearly relevant to any argument against it, yet the argument against it can only function by granting their interests no weight.

This is a blatant contradiction in the nature of justification itself.
You cannot rationally justify an assertion that you can punch someone in the face for your own enjoyment, because any argument they would care about must appeal to some preferences they share, yet the assertion itself is contradictory to their preferences and grants their interests no weight.

It also cannot be claimed that to have a preference beyond Egoism is irrational, as Egoism itself dictates that all self-interest is rationally valid.
It is only Preference as a Normative Force itself, that allows for the distinction between rational and irrational interests, and it is this which allows for proper rational justification.

Therefore, it is impossible to justify Egoism, it is impossible to justify behavior through Egoism, it is impossible to normatively argue for Egoism in a way that applies to anyone with an interest against it, and it is also self-contradictory to accept an argument for Egoism as it always contradicts your own rationally-justifiable preferences.
 

–A Premise of Egoism proves Yoggism–
Rational Egoism is the conclusion that any agent rationally ought to appeal to nothing more than their own self-interest, which comes from the idea they should most rationally act in accordance with their own interests, and only their own interests.

Cooperation, fairness, and civility, thus are only rationally justifiable in so far as they promote your own self-interest.
It is true that since all beings act in accordance with their own interests, as a matter of definition, they rationally ought to most rationally act in accordance with their own interests. This is equivalent to saying they rationally ought to act rationally.

What is not true is the notion that acting against one's own self-interest is always irrational. This premise is wrong and can be demonstrated as wrong both outside of Egoism, and within Egoism.
Egoism relies on this premise, yet it can be proven demonstrably that the premise contradicts Egoism, showing Rational Egoism taken on absolutes, to be self-contradictory.

–Premises:
(P1): If an agent is rational, then they ought to act most rationally in accordance with their own interests.
(P2): A consideration can justify an action for an agent only if ignoring that consideration would count as irrational for that agent.
(P3): Acting against one’s own interests counts as irrational.

–Logic:
(L1): From (P2), Justifications must make ignoring them irrational.
(L2): From (P1 + P3), Acting against one’s interests is irrational for a rational agent.
(L3): From (L2), Any consideration that requires acting against one’s interests is irrational.
(L4): From (L1 + L3), Considerations that require irrational actions are not rationally justifiable.

–Conclusion:
From (L4): Therefore, for an action to be justified for an agent, the justification must be relative to that agent’s interests, or again be justified through rationalism itself.
This conclusion holds true as long as Premise 3 is true. Rational Egoism relies on Premise 3, yet the conclusion contradicts Egoism by widely opening up the Interests Via Justification argument.
If justification is impossible without appealing to the interests of those involved, without assuming the normative value of relevant preferences held by those involved in an interaction, then Egoism is impossible to fully justify as it fundamentally contradicts the notion of other's interests being in any way normative.
Thus, Egoism in and of itself is inconsistent relative to justification, and collapses into Yoggism.



–The value of Interests, derived from the value of Rational Interaction and Deliberation–
We can now demonstrate this proof step-by-step:
--Basic Definitions and Clarifications--
A. Persuasive arguments are definitionally, arguments that prove a conclusion of "Therefore, you ought to believe X", from deduction through premises.
B. In this context we can assume normative claims deduced from premises, must require at least one normative premise.
C. Interests are defined as any preferences, values, beliefs, wants, desires, that which a being's behavior tends towards; they are action-guiding.
D. If a premise in an argument acts as a normative claim, the argument's correctness can assume the normativity of the premise, but only in so far as the argument is correct. If the argument is incorrect, either invalid or one of the premises is false, then the normativity of the given premise is not necessarily valid. For example, a persuasive argument that 1+1=2 could appeal to an opponent's irrational interests in astrology, though it would be wrong to thus conclude that astrology has actual rational normative weight. The normativity is only true in so far as the argument is true, and an argument appealing to wrong premises is not true.
E. Standards of evidence, values, beliefs, axioms, etc. are all themselves rational interests under the definition. Appealing to truth is appealing to your own (justifiable) preference for truth. Logical consistency is also something held as a preference by pretty much everyone, and it is also a preference appealed to by any argument.
F. This argument is taken to apply to arguments that try to prove something based on more than just pure rationalism. For example, athematics requires mathematical rules be appealed to.

--The Argument--
0. General Normative Rationalism is assumed by argumentation
1. All persuasive arguments prove a conclusion of "Therefore, you ought to believe X"
2. Proving a conclusion in any argument requires premises
3. A persuasive argument's "you ought to believe X" claim will not hold if the opponent does not agree with the premises
4. An opponent agreeing with premises, requires the premises to appeal to their wants, desires, beliefs, preferences; definition-wise these are their interests relevant to the argument
5. Persuasive arguments ought to appeal to their opponent's relevant interests
6. The conclusion of a persuasive argument, "you ought to believe X", is a normative one
7. The normativity of a persuasive argument's claim must arise from the argument's premises, premises the opponent must agree with for the normative claim to hold for the opponent
8. The normative value of an opponent's rational interests relevant to some interaction, is assumed by any justifiable and rationally valid persuasive argument
9. Agreement with any meaningful, persuasive arguments, is to assert the idea that persuasive arguments can correctly derive normative conclusions in the form "you ought to believe X"
10. Agreement with any meaningful persuasive argument is to assert the value of rational interests of those involved in rational deliberation
11. Persuasive argumentation and thus rational justification is valuable due to it allowing those involved to converge on truth or rational conclusions
12. Rationally, interactions ought to be rationally justifiable
13. Rational justification works via persuasive argumentation. If an interaction is rationally justifiable, then you rationally ought to accept it, thus giving the "you ought to believe X" claim
14. Interactions rationally ought to appeal to the normative value of the relevant interests of all involved, due to the premises of the persuasive argumentation necessary to rationally justify the interaction
 

–To not respect Interests, is thus a performative Contradiction–
We may also demonstrate that to act in a way inconsistent with premises assumed by an argument, is a performative contradiction.
A performative contradiction is when a statement's assertion contradicts necessary presuppositions required for it to be meaningful.

Imagine you argue with your landlord. The landlord attempts a persuasive argumentation, thus appealing to your interests. This value of your interests is a premise of their argument.
If the landlord then turns on you and threatens to evict you, they are acting inconsistent with the assumption of the normative value of your interests they held previously.
By arguing for the claim that they should evict you, trying to argue in defense of their own actions, this is a performative contradiction.

Therefore, if they still hold their previous argument as valid, and/or hold persuasive argumentation between them and you in any way to be valid, they are also contradicting themselves.
Rationally, it can be argued that they ought to value argumentation with you, or with anyone willing to give persuasive argument for that matter.

The only way then to not contradict yourself, when interacting with others where you would value argumentation, is to uphold the Fulfillment of Interests for all parties involved in the interaction.
Thus, rational interactions ought to uphold the Fulfillment of Interests as a principle applicable to those parties.
 

–Deriving Premise 5–
5. An opponent agreeing with premises, requires the premises to appeal to their wants, desires, beliefs, preferences; definition-wise these are their interests relevant to the argument
This premise can be proven via deduction.

Definitions::
Interest - wants, desires, beliefs, preferences
Persuasive Argument - argument that deductively proves a claim in the form "you ought to accept X"

Logic::
1. A persuasive argument that proves a claim to an opposing party, must have its premises rationally acceptable by the opposing party.
2. For premises to be accepted, the opponent must rationally be required to agree that the premise is TRUE in the context necessary.
3. Premises may be based on subjective opinions, such as "You want clean clothes". These subjective claims can still be TRUE in the context of the argument, it can be TRUE that the opponent "wants clean clothes"
4. Premises may also be based on objective truths, such as "A=A" or "Logic".
5. Premises that are TRUE in the context of an argument, in a way that applies to the opponent, rationally should be accepted by the opponent.
6. If an opponent wants clean clothes, the subjective opinion-based premise "You want clean clothes" is TRUE as it pertains to the opponent.
7. Objective truths and subjective opinions are both forms of "Interests" by definition.
8. (from 7, 6, 2) For an opponent to be rationally required to agree a premise is TRUE in context, the premise must appeal to some Interest they hold, such as an objective truth they hold as true, like "A=A", or a subjective opinion that is TRUE for them, such as "You want clean clothes".
Therefore, in a rational persuasive argument, a debate opponent agreeing with premises, requires the premises to appeal to their wants, desires, beliefs, preferences; definition-wise these are their interests relevant to the argument.