Note that the following arguments use Normative Rationalism as an assumption.

This assumption comes from the 2nd section of this text: [yoggism as a procedural norm]

This also provides a more rational alternative to NAP Argumentation Ethics.

You can skip to the Deduction of Interests as a normative value, here: [Deduction of Interests as a Value]​

​​

–Justification Arguments presuppose the Normative Value of Interests–
A Normative Justification as used here, means a deductive argument deriving a conclusion in the form "you ought to accept/believe X".
Such an argument must derive its conclusion from premises. Since the conclusion is a normative one, it contains "You ought", that normative conclusion must be derived from normative premises.

Here, the different types of premises that can be used to derive claims can be identified. These are:
1. Truth Claims (true facts about the world, is-statements)
2. Reason (logical truths, A=A, if A implies B and A is true then B is true, I think therefore I am)
3. Interests (wants, desires, preferences, goals; of some sentient being)
4. Axioms (assumptions, statements assumed to be true without justification)
5. Presuppositions (norms presupposed by things actors are already doing)

Any argument entailing normative force must rationally justify that normative force via one or more of these types of premises.
Immediately the problem is that due to what is called the is/ought gap, truth and reason cannot justify normative (ethical) force, the type of normativity that governs apparently logically neutral behaviors like "you ought not murder". Is-statements, and logical tautologies, cannot directly derive normativity of this sort.

Axioms also cannot fully derive ethical normativity, not in a way that is guaranteed to apply to the recipient, because the axioms themselves definitionally cannot be justified. Normative claims that are supposed to apply to specific people, derived from axioms like "Murder is wrong", are thus impossible to rationally justify.
 

–Presuppositions and Non-Ethical Normatives–
The one type of normativity that can be derived is normative rationalism, the idea that rationality and reason have action-guiding value. This can be derived through presuppositions, as engaging in argumentation or accepting deductive arguments based on their logical weight presupposes that rationality can have this action-guiding value.

This rationality though cannot derive normative ethical claims on its own, and every attempt to do so from Kantianism, Argumentation Ethics, Contractualism, have had to assume extra normative claims that cannot be justified in and of themselves.
 

–Interests CAN Justify Normative Claims–
Interests however, and the value of them, is the one type of premise that when appealed to actually can derive normative claims. Imagine a deductive argument that sets out to prove "You ought to buy my washing machine". This is a normative claim, so you can't derive the ought from pure logic. You also cannot derive the ought from truth claims, and appealing to "Washing machines are good" as an axiom isn't helpful.

Yet if you appeal to "You want clean clothes" then suddenly it is possible to derive "You ought to buy my washing machine". Of course for the conclusion to be normative, that premise must also be normative, therefore "You ought to achieve your end of getting clean clothes" must be true at least relative to the person the conclusion is meant to apply to.
 

–Interests from Normative Force Conclusion–
Thus, only interests can derive normative force in a way that can be applied.
Therefore, any presupposition of the existence of ethical normative force, implicitly justifies the value of Interests in-order to rationally ground that normative force via justification.

All arguments that function as a Normative Justification that tries to prove you ought to accept its conclusion, thus must presuppose the Fulfillment of Interests as a value as it pertains to the relevant interests of the person the argument's conclusion is meant to apply to.
The only exception being arguments that prove normative claims based around pure truth, like "You ought to accept A = A".
 

–Interactions ought to be Justifiable–
If you interact with someone, you should be able to rationally justify your interaction, in a way where those involved in the interaction should be rationally required to accept it.
This means you should be able to justify that the claim “You rationally ought to accept the standard I'm applying by acting” is true for the person you are interacting with; you should be able to justify your action.

This is a Normative Justification, meaning a deductive argument that attempts to derive a claim in the form "You ought to accept X". Any argument in this form, must appeal to the interests of any debate opponent for the conclusion to have valid normative weight.

To engage in an interaction that is inconsistent with the normative value of interest, is to engage in an interaction that cannot be rationally justified to anyone.
To reject justification in this sense, is to forfeit all justification of ethical normative force, which leaves you unable to justify your own actions.
If normative claims and normative arguments, arguments about things like "you ought not to murder", are recognized as meaningful whatsoever, forfeiting normative force prevents you from engaging in that conversation.
 

–Layered Justification–
Imagine someone fulfilling their interests while not interacting with anyone else in a way that interferes with their interest fulfillment. This is someone acting in a way that does not frustrate against anyone else's inherent interests, where 'inherent interest' means an interest that acts as a conduit of other interests, like basic autonomy.

Such fulfillment is neutral under Justification Ethics. No deduction can be made for or against the action. Yet, acts against the neutral action are explicitly unjustifiable, as they represent inherent frustration.
It should also be noted that Justification Ethics cannot on its own derive a claim of positive obligation, aka an obligation to act. It only deals with the justifiability of actual actions, not inaction.

This is because "interactions ought be justifiable" is presupposed by the recognition of normative value, and presupposed by argumentation. Yet, "inaction ought be justifiable" is not presupposed by either.

This allows the separation of Justification Ethics into three layers.
1. Actions that are inherently frustrating or abusive under the Anti-Abuse Principle, cannot justify normative force. Actions that promote fulfillment of interests can justify normative protection. Actions that constitute fulfillment of interests while not interacting with anyone else, are neutral. To act against such behavior is still unjustifiable.
2. Inherent Interest Theory as derived, states that interests acting as conduits of other interests, are Inherent Interests and ought to be given priority in justification.
3. The concept of Retaliatory Law justifies frustration in one extra case, if it constitutes defense against inherent frustration. This is justified as proportional defense is frustration of interests in defense of interests more inherent.
These then explicitly solve conflicts between interests, generating the AAP.
 

–Justifying the Anti-Abuse Principle–
These building blocks then justify the Anti-Abuse Principle as a consequence.
Actions that inherently frustrate against other's interests are unjustifiable, unless they constitute defense against inherent frustration.

Actions that constitute fulfillment of other's interests justify normative protection.
Actions that only fulfill interests of an individual, while not interacting with anyone else, are neutral, and unjustifiable to act against.

Conflict between interests is measured via Inherent Interest Theory, where interests that are entangled with other interests, like an interest in basic autonomy, are given more normative justificatory weight.
 

—The Anti-Abuse Principle (AAP)—
Actions that constitute interference with another's non-abusive fulfillment of their own inherent and non-contradictory interests, are illegitimate.
Actions that inherently result in the frustration of interests, through overall frustration by misalignment of interests between parties, or due to conduct that frustrates against inherent interests, are unjustifiable, constitute ‘abuse’, and are thus illegitimate.
Actions that prevent abuse, or inhibit otherwise unjustifiable conduct; including conduct that is a product of interest misalignment between parties, and conduct that is inherently frustrating to interests; are legitimate as they constitute resistance to abuse.
 

–Max Stirner's Egoism–
This then sows the seeds for a sort of Universal Egoism, the idea that my ends matter, and yours, and everyone's. This sets up Yoggism to be the most consistent framework for ensuring the protection of the individual's self-interest, within an organized group or apart from one.

This idea is a "spook to end all spooks". In Max Stirner's Egoism, a 'spook' is referred to as some action or concept meant to push you away from your own self-interest.
To define a rule against creating spooks upon others, is the kind of rule a "Union of Egoists", the hypothetical social organizing envisioned by Max Stirner, advocates for. This rule is essentially exactly what the Anti-Abuse Principle is.

This makes Yoggism particularly justifiable by Egoist standards, compared with other normative frameworks. Yoggism itself is a spook technically, but it is also the anti-spook.
It should also be said that the only thing 'spooky' about Yoggism is its recognition of a minimal spook, the idea that actions require justification in any way. This minimal spook is then presupposed by all ethical debate.
 

–Rejection of Normative Force results in Unjustifiable Nihilism–
If someone says "normative ethical force cannot be justified", they are presupposing that actions and that which is action-guiding, normativity, ought to be justified in the first place.

This claim is also presupposed by argumentation and the acceptance of deductive proofs.
The idea that deductive justification of actions is valuable itself, forces confrontation with the Fulfillment of Interests because interests are the only way to ground claims of justification for actions such as acts of gift-giving, eating food, violence, murder, theft, etc.

To reject normative ethical force is also to reject any normative force pertaining to logically neutral actions, which is simply to embrace nihilism.
 

–Interest-Frustration cannot be justified by Nihilistic Egoism–
True Egoism requires the conclusion that it is irrational to say a strong person should not murder a disadvantaged person. Either that, or it must contradict itself.
It is impossible to argue such a conclusion to someone if they are the disadvantaged, because making such an argument requires appealing to their preferences and such a conclusion contradicts them; their interest in not being attacked is clearly relevant to any argument against it, yet the argument against it can only function by granting their interests no weight.

This is a blatant contradiction in the nature of justification itself.
You cannot rationally justify an assertion that you can punch someone in the face for your own enjoyment, because any argument that could prove a normative claim applies to them, must appeal to some preferences they have, yet the assertion itself is contradictory to their preferences and grants their interests no weight.
It also cannot be claimed that to have a preference beyond Egoism is irrational, as Egoism itself dictates that all self-interest is valid.

It is only Preference as Normative Force itself, that allows for the distinction between rational and irrational interests, and it is this which allows for proper rational justification.
Therefore, it is impossible to justify Egoism, it is impossible to justify behavior through Egoism, it is impossible to normatively argue for Egoism in a way that applies to anyone with an interest against it, and it is also self-contradictory to accept an argument for Egoism as it always contradicts your own rationally-justifiable preferences.
 

Under Egoism, it is also impossible to successfully argue against actions consistent with Yoggism.
Under any system it is theoretically impossible to argue against actions consistent with Yoggism, as doing so requires extra assumptions that need not apply.

 

–Interests as Normative Value, Deductively Proven–
We can now demonstrate this proof step-by-step:
--Basic Clarifications--
A. Interests are not presuppositions onto themselves. This argument is based on the concept of examining that which can be justified relative to someone who already rationally values their own interests. The normative value of interests is agent-relative, someone who values nothing at all simply forfeits all normative force and cannot justify their actions or claims.
B. In this context we can assume normative claims deduced from premises, must require at least one normative premise; this is justified by the is/ought gap.
C. Interests are defined as any preferences, wants, desires, goals, that which a being's behavior tends towards; they are inherently and definitionally action-guiding.

--The Argument--
–Definitions:
(Normative Justification): A deductive argument that derives a normative claim in the form “you ought to accept X” or “you ought not act against or inconsistent with X”.
(Ultimate Justification): A normative justification of a claim that does not ultimately depend on unjustified normative premises, except for the rules of logic themselves.
(Descriptive Facts): Is-statements, claims that are not normative but explain facts about the world, I.E. “the sky is blue”.
(Interests): That which the behavior of a sentient being tends towards.
(Interests as a value): The appeal to interests as the source of normativity that derives a normative claim.

–Premises:
(P1): Normative Justifications that derive normative claims in the form “you ought to accept X”, must include at least one normative premise.
(P2): Purely descriptive facts and logical truths alone cannot derive normative claims. (The is-ought gap)
(P3): Normative axioms and assumptions cannot constitute an ultimate justification, because the axioms themselves are left unjustified and can be used to support contradicting claims.
(P4): Normative Justifications can derive normative claims by appealing to someone's interests, I.E. “you ought to buy a washing machine” from an interest in clean clothes.
(P5): Normative justifications must derive their normativity from premises their target is rationally required to accept, as otherwise their target is not rationally required to accept the claim, leaving it unjustified.
(P6): In deduction, claims are derived from premises; such premises are either descriptive facts, logical truths, interests, axioms, or presuppositions; or reducible thereto.
(P7): Presuppositions arising from norms of some external process, cannot consistently ground normative ethical claims, as such process can be evaded and its norms need not apply outside the process.
(P8): If a norm is merely presupposed by participation in an inevitable or universal process, that fact alone cannot justify a normative ethical claim as such presuppositions reduce to mere descriptive facts.

–Logic:
(L1): From (P2 + P3), neither descriptive facts, purely logical truths, nor axioms or assumptions can ultimately ground justification of normative claims.
(L2): From (P1 + L1), normative justifications cannot derive conclusions solely from descriptive facts, purely logical truths, axioms, or assumptions.
(L3): From (P4 + P5), normative justifications can derive normative claims by deriving the normativity from an appeal to interests.
(L4): From (L2 + L3), interests have the capacity to ground normative justification, whereas descriptive facts, pure logic, and axioms cannot ultimately ground normative justification.
(L5): From (L4 + P6), interests and presuppositions are the only available types of premises for the normative grounding of normative claims.
(L6): From (P7 + P8), presuppositions cannot consistently justifiably ground normative claims.

–Conclusion:
From (L5 + L6): Therefore, normative ethical justifications that consistently derive claims in the form “you ought to accept X”, must ultimately appeal to interests as a value, as otherwise they are rendered unjustifiable.
 

 

–To not respect Interests, is thus a performative Contradiction–
We may also demonstrate that to act in a way inconsistent with premises assumed by an argument, is a performative contradiction.
A performative contradiction is when a statement's assertion contradicts necessary presuppositions required for it to be meaningful.

Imagine you argue with your landlord about what you or them ought to do, in any sense. The landlord attempts a persuasive argumentation, thus appealing to your interests. This value of your interests must be a premise of their argument, as otherwise normative force is unjustifiable.

If the landlord then turns on you and threatens to evict you for criticizing them, they are acting inconsistent with the assumption of the normative value of your interests they held previously, as doing so forfeits their ability to justify normative force, and thus forfeits their own argument.
By arguing for the claim that they should evict you, or for arguing that if they threaten eviction you ought to give in, this is thus a performative contradiction.

Therefore, if they still hold their previous argument as valid, and/or hold persuasive argumentation between them and you in any way to be valid, they are also contradicting themselves.
Rationally, it can be argued that they ought to value argumentation with you, or with anyone willing to give persuasive argument for that matter.

The only way then to not contradict yourself, when interacting with others where you would value argumentation, is to uphold the Fulfillment of Interests for all parties involved in the interaction.
Thus, rational interactions ought to uphold the Fulfillment of Interests as a principle applicable to those parties.