Note that the following arguments use Normative Rationalism as an assumption.

This assumption comes from the 2nd section of this text: [yoggism as a procedural norm]

This also provides a more rational alternative to NAP Argumentation Ethics.

You can skip to the Deduction of Interests as a normative value, here: [Deduction of Interests as a Value]​

​​

–Justification Arguments presuppose the Normative Value of Interests–
A Persuasive Argument as used here, means a deductive argument deriving a conclusion in the form "You ought to accept/believe X".
Such an argument must derive its conclusion from premises. Since the conclusion is a normative one, it contains "You ought", that normative conclusion must be derived from normative premises.

Here, the different types of premises that can be used to form such a conclusion can be identified. These are:

1. Truth Claims (true facts about the world, is-statements)
2. Reason (logical truths, A=A, if A implies B and A is true then B is true, I think therefore I am)
3. Interests (wants, desires, preferences, goals; of some sentient being)
4. Axioms (assumptions, statements assumed to be true without justification)

Any argument entailing normative force must rationally justify that normative force via one or more of these types of premises.

Immediately the problem is that truth and reason cannot justify normative (ethical) force, the type of normativity that governs apparently logically neutral behaviors like "you ought not murder", because of the is/ought gap. Is-statements, and logical tautologies, cannot directly derive normativity of this sort.
The one type of normativity that can be derived is normative rationalism, the idea that rationale and reason have action-guiding value. This is assumed as a starting point when engaging in argumentation or accepting deductive arguments based on their logical weight.

Axioms also cannot derive ethical normativity, not in a way that is guaranteed to apply to the recipient, because the axioms themselves definitionally cannot be justified. Normative claims that are supposed to apply to specific people, derived from axioms like "Murder is wrong", are thus impossible to rationally justify.
 

–Interests CAN Justify Normative Claims–
Interests however, and the value of them, is the one type of premise that when appealed to actually can derive normative claims. Imagine a deductive argument that sets out to prove "You ought to buy my washing machine". This is a normative claim, so you can't derive the ought from pure logic. You also cannot derive the ought from truth claims, and appealing to "Washing machines are good" as an axiom isn't helpful.

Yet if you appeal to "You want clean clothes" then suddenly it is possible to derive "You ought to buy my washing machine". Of course for the conclusion to be normative, that premise must also be normative, therefore "You ought to achieve your end of getting clean clothes" must be true at least relative to the person the conclusion is meant to apply to.
 

–Interests from Normative Force Conclusion–
Thus, only interests can derive normative force in a way that can be applied.
Therefore, any presupposition of the existence of normative force, implicitly justifies the value of the Fulfillment of Interests in-order to rationally ground that normative force via justification.

All arguments that are a 'Persuasive Argument' that tries to prove you ought to accept its conclusion, thus must presuppose the Fulfillment of Interests as a value as it pertains to the relevant interests of the person the argument's conclusion is meant to apply to.
The only exception being arguments that prove normative claims based around pure truth, like "You ought to accept A = A".
 

–Interactions ought to be Justifiable–
If you interact with someone, you should be able to rationally justify your interaction, in a way where those involved in the interaction should be rationally required to accept it.
This means you should be able to justify that the claim “You rationally ought to accept my way of interacting” is true for the person you are interacting with; you should be able to argue you are acting reasonably.
This is a 'Persuasive Argument', meaning an argument that attempts to derive a claim in the form "You ought to accept X". Any argument in this form, must appeal to the interests of any debate opponent for the conclusion to have valid normative weight.
To engage in an interaction that is inconsistent with the normative value of interest, is to engage in an interaction that cannot be rationally justified to anyone.
To reject justification in this sense, is to forfeit all justification of normative force, which leaves you unable to justify your own actions.
If normative claims and normative arguments, arguments about things like "you ought not to murder", are recognized as meaningful whatsoever, forfeiting normative force prevents you from engaging in that conversation.
 

–Layered Justification–
Imagine someone fulfilling their interests while not interacting with anyone else in a way that interferes with their interest fulfillment. This is someone acting in a way that does not frustrate against anyone else's inherent interests, where 'inherent interest' means an interest that acts as a conduit of other interests, like basic autonomy.
Such fulfillment is neutral under Justification Ethics. No deduction can be made for or against the action. Yet, acts against the neutral action are explicitly unjustifiable, as they represent inherent frustration.

It should also be noted that Justification Ethics cannot on its own derive a claim of positive obligation, aka an obligation to act. It only deals with the justifiability of actual actions, not inaction.
This is because "interactions ought be justifiable" is presupposed by the recognition of normative value, and presupposed by argumentation. Yet, "inaction ought be justifiable" is not presupposed by either.
This allows the separation of Justification Ethics into three layers.

1. Actions that are inherently frustrating or abusive under the Anti-Abuse Principle, cannot justify normative force. Actions that promote fulfillment of interests can justify normative protection. Actions that constitute fulfillment of interests while not interacting with anyone else, are neutral. To act against such behavior is still unjustifiable.

2. Inherent Interest Theory as derived, states that interests acting as conduits of other interests, are Inherent Interests and ought to be given priority in justification.

3. The concept of Retaliatory Law justifies frustration in one extra case, if it constitutes defense against inherent frustration. This is justified as proportional defense is frustration of interests in defense of interests more inherent.
These then explicitly solve conflicts between interests, generating the AAP.
 

–Justifying the Anti-Abuse Principle–
These building blocks then justify the Anti-Abuse Principle as a consequence.
Actions that inherently frustrate against other's interests are unjustifiable, unless they constitute defense against inherent frustration.
Actions that constitute fulfillment of other's interests justify normative protection.
Actions that only fulfill interests of an individual, while not interacting with anyone else, are neutral, and unjustifiable to act against.
Conflict between interests is measured via Inherent Interest Theory, where interests that are entangled with other interests, like an interest in basic autonomy, are given more normative justificatory weight.

—The Anti-Abuse Principle (AAP)—
Actions that constitute interference with another's non-abusive fulfillment of their own inherent and non-contradictory interests, are illegitimate.
Actions that inherently result in the frustration of interests, through overall frustration by misalignment of interests between parties, or due to conduct that frustrates against inherent interests, are unjustifiable, constitute ‘abuse’, and are thus illegitimate.
Actions that prevent abuse, or inhibit otherwise unjustifiable conduct; including conduct that is a product of interest misalignment between parties, and conduct that is inherently frustrating to interests; are legitimate as they constitute resistance to abuse.

 

–Max Stirner's Egoism–
This then sews the seeds for a sort of Universal Egoism, the idea that my ends matter, and yours, and everyone's. This sets up Yogg Interest Theory to be the most consistent framework for ensuring the protection of the individual's self-interest, within an organized group or apart from one.
This idea is a "spook to end all spooks". In Max Stirner's Egoism, a 'spook' is referred to as some action or concept meant to push you away from your own self-interest.
To define a rule against creating spooks upon others, is the kind of rule a "Union of Egoists", the hypothetical social organizing envisioned by Max Stirner, advocates for. This rule is essentially exactly what the Anti-Abuse Principle is.
This makes Yoggism particularly justifiable by Egoist standards, compared with other normative frameworks. Yoggism itself is a spook technically, but it is also the anti-spook.
 

–Rejection of Normative Force results in Unjustifiable Nihilism–
If someone says "normative ethical force cannot be justified", they are presupposing that actions and that which is action-guiding, normativity, ought to be justified in the first place.
This claim is also presupposed by argumentation and the acceptance of deductive proofs.
The idea that deductive justification of actions is valuable itself, forces confrontation with the Fulfillment of Interests because interests are the only way to ground claims of justification for actions such as acts of gift-giving, eating food, violence, murder, theft, etc.
To reject normative ethical force is also to reject any normative force pertaining to logically neutral actions, which is simply to embrace nihilism.
 

–Interest-Frustration cannot be justified by Nihilistic Egoism–
True Egoism requires the conclusion that it is irrational to say a strong person should not murder a disadvantaged person. Either that, or it must contradict itself.
It is impossible to argue such a conclusion to someone if they are the disadvantaged, because making such an argument requires appealing to their preferences and such a conclusion contradicts them; their interest in not being attacked is clearly relevant to any argument against it, yet the argument against it can only function by granting their interests no weight.

This is a blatant contradiction in the nature of justification itself.
You cannot rationally justify an assertion that you can punch someone in the face for your own enjoyment, because any argument they would care about must appeal to some preferences they share, yet the assertion itself is contradictory to their preferences and grants their interests no weight.
It also cannot be claimed that to have a preference beyond Egoism is irrational, as Egoism itself dictates that all self-interest is rationally valid.

It is only Preference as a Normative Force itself, that allows for the distinction between rational and irrational interests, and it is this which allows for proper rational justification.
Therefore, it is impossible to justify Egoism, it is impossible to justify behavior through Egoism, it is impossible to normatively argue for Egoism in a way that applies to anyone with an interest against it, and it is also self-contradictory to accept an argument for Egoism as it always contradicts your own rationally-justifiable preferences.


–Interests as Normative Value, Deductively Proven–
We can now demonstrate this proof step-by-step:
--Basic Definitions and Clarifications--
A. Persuasive arguments are definitionally, arguments that prove a conclusion of "Therefore, you ought to believe X", from deduction through premises.
B. In this context we can assume normative claims deduced from premises, must require at least one normative premise.
C. Interests are defined as any preferences, values, beliefs, wants, desires, that which a being's behavior tends towards; they are action-guiding.
D. If a premise in an argument acts as a normative claim, the argument's correctness can assume the normativity of the premise, but only in so far as the argument is correct. If the argument is incorrect, either invalid or one of the premises is false, then the normativity of the given premise is not necessarily valid. For example, a persuasive argument that 1+1=2 could appeal to an opponent's irrational interests in astrology, though it would be wrong to thus conclude that astrology has actual rational normative weight. The normativity is only true in so far as the argument is true, and an argument appealing to wrong premises is not true.

--The Argument--
–Definitions:
Persuasive argument: an argument aimed at justifying the conclusion “Therefore, you ought to believe X”
Relevant interests: an agent’s wants, desires, beliefs, and preferences relevant to the argument
Rationally justifiable interaction: an interaction that can be defended via an argument deducing the claim "Therefore, you are rationally required to accept X"
Objectively true: as used here, a claim that directly follows from hard logic, empiricism, or other inarguable epistemology; true facts about reality itself, is-statements
Rational oughts: You rationally ought to accept anything that is rationally-derivable; including logic, inarguable epistemology such as empiricism, and the objectively true

–Premises:
(P0): If a claim is objectively true and rationally derivable, you rationally ought to accept it by definition; as they should be derivable through logic, empiricism, or other rational epistemology
(P1): All persuasive arguments aim to justify the normative conclusion “Therefore, you ought to believe X” (definition)
(P2): Any argument that proves a conclusion requires premises to derive it
(P3): A persuasive argument’s “you ought to believe X” claim's derivation does not hold for an opponent unless they are rationally required to accept all that is necessary to justify the claim
(P4):  To be rationally required to accept premises of an argument requires that those premises appeal to what is objectively true, or to your relevant interests
(P5): Normative conclusions must be derived through normative premises, for example rational oughts must be derived from rationally-derivable truths, which are normative by definition
(P6): Rational justification works via persuasive argumentation for the claim "Therefore, you ought to accept X claim", which then grants a specific claim's justification
(P7): Rationally, interactions ought to be rationally justifiable

–Logic:
(L1): From (P1 + P2), persuasive arguments necessitate premises to justify “you ought to believe X”
(L2): From (P3 + L1), for a persuasive argument's conclusion's derivability to hold for an opponent, the opponent must rationally be required to accept the premises
(L3): From (P1 + P5), the normative force of a persuasive argument's claim of “you ought to believe X” must come from the premises
(L4): From (L3 + L2), a persuasive argument's normative force requires the opponent to be rationally required to accept the premises
(L5): From (P4 + L4), a persuasive argument's premises must appeal either to objectively true statements, or to the opponent's relevant interests, for the argument to have normative weight
(L6): From (L5 + L4), the normative force of persuasive arguments depends upon the normative value of; objectively true statements, or opponent’s relevant interests, based on the premises
(L7): From (L6 + P6), the normative force of rational justification depends upon the normative value of; objectively true statements, or opponent’s relevant interests, based on the premises
(L8): From (L7 + P7), interactions rationally must appeal to the normative value of; relevant interests of participants, or objectively true statements; in-order to be rationally justifiable

–Conclusion:
From (L8): Interactions rationally ought to appeal to the normative value of relevant interests of participants, or that which is objectively true, because rational justification requires persuasive arguments whose normative force depends on appealing to at least one.
 

–To not respect Interests, is thus a performative Contradiction–
We may also demonstrate that to act in a way inconsistent with premises assumed by an argument, is a performative contradiction.
A performative contradiction is when a statement's assertion contradicts necessary presuppositions required for it to be meaningful.

Imagine you argue with your landlord about what you or them ought to do, in any sense. The landlord attempts a persuasive argumentation, thus appealing to your interests. This value of your interests must be a premise of their argument, as otherwise normative force is unjustifiable.

If the landlord then turns on you and threatens to evict you for criticizing them, they are acting inconsistent with the assumption of the normative value of your interests they held previously, as doing so forfeits their ability to justify normative force, and thus forfeits their own argument.
By arguing for the claim that they should evict you, or for arguing that if they threaten eviction you ought to give in, this is thus a performative contradiction.

Therefore, if they still hold their previous argument as valid, and/or hold persuasive argumentation between them and you in any way to be valid, they are also contradicting themselves.
Rationally, it can be argued that they ought to value argumentation with you, or with anyone willing to give persuasive argument for that matter.
The only way then to not contradict yourself, when interacting with others where you would value argumentation, is to uphold the Fulfillment of Interests for all parties involved in the interaction.
Thus, rational interactions ought to uphold the Fulfillment of Interests as a principle applicable to those parties.