This is an addition to the text of Justification Ethics.

It explains procedural norms as well as why normative rationalism is a valid assumption.

It also provides a more direct alternative to NAP Argumentation Ethics.

 

—How Non-Abuse is a norm of Argumentation—
Rational argumentation can only happen if the members of a debate feel free to speak their mind and argue for themselves freely.
What ‘freely’ means though, is interest-based, not just aggression-based.
And the reasons for why freedom of this respect is important, and the reasons for why freedom of thought, expression, and argumentation are important, inherently apply to more situations than just argumentation.

(1): Coercion and Argument
If a person is dying in the desert from dehydration and they find another person who has water bottles, but this other person then says “I won't give you water, unless you grant me intimate favors”, this clear coercion renders rational argumentation between the two impossible.
Rational argumentation cannot function if your debater is also your landlord and says they will just evict you if you disagree with them.

(2): Why the Use of Force is Coercive
The problems here are actually the same reasons for why the threat of violent force invalidates rational argumentation: It forces one party to capitulate to the interests of the coercer, due to the alternative being forced to be much worse, and this is true regardless of how irrational or nonsensical the interests of the coercer are.
In the same way, when the alternative is eviction, or worse even starvation or dehydration, it does the same thing albeit to a sometimes lesser extent. Functionally, it forces capitulation to the coercive party in a way that sidesteps reason.
What's clear from this is the process of argumentation actually requires both non-aggression and non-abuse, not just non-aggression, since abuse can come about non-aggressively.

This points in the direction of the AAP, and interestingly, this thought process also holds up to rational scrutiny, unlike NAP Argumentation Ethics. What's different is that with AAP Argumentation Ethics, this standard actually makes sense to apply to many circumstances universally,  because it is baked into what is required as a premise, to justify interactions rationally. To justify an interaction, or method of interaction, you must appeal to the idea that your opponent's interests have normative value.
With NAP Argumentation Ethics it can be argued that aggression may not be valid in the process of argumentation, but may be valid in other circumstances, and you can argue that without a performative contradiction.
With AAP Argumentation Ethics though, arguing that abuse is not valid in the process of argumentation is actually correct, but arguing abuse is valid for other circumstances may not make sense if the structure of civil interaction, in argumentation, is at all similar to the structure of the interaction of the other circumstance. It is also impossible to rationally justify such abuse on the basis of interests not having normative value, as such justification requires assuming and appealing to your opponent's interests for them to agree with the premises of any argument you give.

—Abuse, and Interest-Frustration, is Anti-Rational—
Similar reasons for the norms of argumentation can be applied to other circumstances. For example, the reason argumentation should be non-aggressive and more broadly non-abusive, is because those things prevent people from feeling free to express their actual thoughts and thus may prevent rational speech, which hinders seeking of truth.
You can't argue rationally with your landlord if he reserves the right to just evict you for arguing too well, even though he's doing so non-aggressively. This gives a second requirement to argumentation, or a more refined requirement; that of non-abuse where abuse is some organized inherent frustration of another's interests, usually at the feet of two or more people or parties where one has opposing interests to the other, yet also has virtually all the power.
Any other scenario where the goal of the interaction is to reach some sort of mutually beneficial agreement, for the benefit of both parties, can be directly compared to argumentation in this respect as that mutual benefit cannot be realized if people's interests are not respected or given fair weight. This is why it can be said that engagement of argumentation and acceptance of its specific norms can be used to rationally derive the reasons for why the AAP really is applicable in most situations directly, and for how the AAP being applied to all situations upholds civility as a principle more consistently than the NAP and other moral principles.
It is for this reason that Argumentation Ethics on its own is valid for deriving the AAP in situations where civility, defined as mutual benefit, is important, and invalid for deriving the NAP.




–Normative Rationalism is assumed by any Argument–
Any persuading argument must appeal to Normative Rationalism, the idea that those ought to do what is utmost-rational.
Any rational argument that aims to persuade people of an “ought” presupposes that rationality has normative authority.
Therefore, any argument against normative rationalism cannot be persuasive without contradicting itself.
Any deductive argument or argument that can be reduced ultimately to a deductive argument, as well as any engagement in argumentation for the purpose of seeking the truth, and/or creating justifiable or valid deductive arguments, must also presuppose the validity of rationalism and presuppose normative rationalism for such argumentation to be able to have any weight.
This is the justification for Normative Rationalism as an a-priori assumption.
Below is a more explicit deductive proof for the Persuasive Argument case:


---Normative Rationalism is an assumption necessary for all Persuading Arguments to Stand---
–Definitions:
(Persuading Argument): An argument that validly deduces people ought to do something, or that people ought to believe something, including the central claim of the argument.
(Normative Rationalism): Defined as used elsewhere, in it's weak form, the idea that normative claims, oughts and ought-nots, can be derived via rational deduction.

–Premises:
(P1): A persuading argument is only meaningful if it's deduction rationally holds given the premises, I.E. follows proper rules of inference.
(P2): A persuading argument gives a conclusion that is normative, such as the claim that "therefore, people ought to believe in Santa Claus" or the claim that "therefore, people ought to eat more milk and cookies".
(P3): Rational arguments that use rational deduction to deduce a conclusion, necessarily presuppose the validity of rational deduction itself.
(P4): If a rational argument deduces a normative claim, the argument must assume the normativity, or if possible derive it within the argument from the premises.
(P5): An appeal to rationality's normativity in a particular case, while restricting it to other cases, requires a rational justification. Using rational justification presupposes general normative rationalism though, therefore any appeal to general normative rationalism is inconsistent unless applied universally.

–Logic:
(L1): From (P1), Any meaningful persuasive argument is thus a rational argument.
(L2): From (P2), Any rational persuasive argument gives a normative claim.
(L3): From (L1 + L2), Normative claims given by meaningful, persuading arguments, must be derived from a basis of rational deduction.
(L4): From (L3 + P3), Meaningful, persuading arguments, must appeal to the idea that normative claims can be derived through rational deduction.
(L5): From (L4 + P5), Meaningful, persuading arguments, if they appeal to general normative rationalism in a specific case, rationally must appeal to it as a universal principle.
(L6): From (L4 + P4), Meaningful, persuading arguments, as they derive normative claims, they must appeal to general normative rationalism, as if normative rationalism was false, then rational deduction would be disconnected from normativity, making the deduction of the argument invalid as the rationality of a deduction would be irrelevant to whether the conclusion was normatively true, making the conclusion given by the argument an irrational claim.
(L7): From (L6 + L5), Meaningful, persuading arguments, must appeal to general normative rationalism as a universal principle.

–Conclusion:
From (L6): All meaningful, persuading arguments that derive a claim over what people ought to do, or ought to believe, necessarily appeals to general normative rationalism.

So, to argue against general normative rationalism, must either be irrational, or must not attempt to make people disbelieve in normative rationalism. Any argument against normative rationalism, is thus entirely rational to reject, and holds no normative weight, even if someone thinks they should believe in that which is rational, since that belief contradicts the argument itself.

Therefore, all meaningful persuasive arguments must appeal to general normative rationalism, and any argument against normative rationalism, holds no weight even if you assume rational claims should be believed. If you do, the argument just contradicts itself.